feat(stalker): protocol-correct auth lifecycle (#1354)

.changes/stalker-auth-lifecycle.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+type: feature
+area: stalker
+---
+
+Stalker portals that ask for a login and password now work: the import dialog
+gained username/password fields and the app completes the portal's do_auth
+step. When a portal refuses access, its own explanation is shown instead of a
+generic error, saved sessions resume without re-authenticating, and the
+keep-alive ping follows the portal's cadence.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1111,6 +1111,16 @@ engine` (restart required) or
 - Stalker: `StalkerAccountInfoComponent` (`libs/portal/stalker/feature/src/lib/stalker-account-info/`), cached-first — renders the import-time `stalkerAccountInfo` snapshot instantly, then `StalkerAccountInfoService` refreshes, routing by the observed portal MODE rather than the URL shape (full mode: handshake+`get_profile`; simple mode: best-effort `account_info/get_main_info`, nested `js.account_info` envelope or flat fields), and re-routing when a lazy repair changes the mode mid-request. Details: `docs/architecture/stalker-portal.md` ("Account Info Dialog").
 - Dashboard source cards carry a passive subscription-expiry chip (amber within 7 days, error-toned once expired); account details remain behind ⋮ → Account info. `DashboardSourceExpiryService` (`libs/workspace/dashboard/data-access/`) gathers the facts: Xtream from `PortalStatusService.checkPortalStatusDetails()` (the switcher's cached status check, now carrying `exp_date`), Stalker from the persisted `stalkerAccountInfo` snapshot — it lives in the playlist payload, not on meta rows, so each Stalker source costs one memoized full-playlist read.
 
+**Stalker Session Authentication**:
+
+- Full portals authenticate through `StalkerSessionService` (`libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-session.service.ts`), a facade over `stalker-auth.api.ts` (handshake / `get_profile` / `do_auth` + the `authenticate()` orchestration), `stalker-watchdog.controller.ts`, `stalker-portal-error.ts` and `stalker-response-classification.ts`.
+- `get_profile`'s `js.status` decodes as: full profile/`0` = OK, `1` = blocked, `2` = login/password required → `do_auth` then `get_profile` with `auth_second_step=1` (only that retry sets it). Credentials come from the import dialog's username/password fields and are persisted so runtime re-auth can repeat `do_auth`. Status is read through a numeric coercion — portals stringify it.
+- Refusals throw `StalkerPortalError` (`login-required` / `login-rejected` / `blocked` / `auth-failed`) carrying the portal's markup-stripped `msg`/`block_msg` in `portalText`; the import dialog and the workspace context panel render it. Read it with `asStalkerPortalError()`, never `instanceof` in lazy-loaded code.
+- Auth failures are HTTP 200 + plain text (`Authorization failed.` / `Access denied.` / `Unauthorized request.`), classified at the transport boundary by `libs/shared/interfaces/src/lib/stalker-auth-failure.util.ts`; the Electron handler **returns** a `{stalkerAuthFailure}` marker rather than throwing, because `ipcRenderer.invoke` strips custom properties off rejections.
+- The handshake is idempotent, so `Playlist.stalkerToken` is re-presented and `get_profile` is skipped when it comes back unchanged (unless `not_valid` is set, or the persisted `stalkerSessionIdentity` no longer matches `stalkerSessionFingerprint(playlist)` — portal endpoint (origin **and** path) + identity + credentials; an edited endpoint, MAC or login must never inherit the previous session, and a token with no recorded fingerprint counts as unverified. The path is deliberate: discovery preserves tenant base paths, so `/tenant-a/server/load.php` and `/tenant-b/server/load.php` are different portals on one host and must not share a session). The advertised watchdog cadence is persisted alongside it (`stalkerWatchdogTimeout`/`stalkerTimeslot`) precisely because that reuse skips the response carrying it — and the skip only applies once the cadence is known, so a legacy token-only playlist profiles once instead of being stranded on the default. The *effective* cadence is stored, so stored absence means "never profiled" and nothing re-profiles on every start.
+- Watchdog: `get_events` immediately (`init=1`), then every `watchdog_timeout` s (default **120**, clamped 30–3600) offset by `timeslot`. Ping failures are logged only — a missed ping never invalidates auth, it only affects the portal's "online" reporting.
+- Full contract: `docs/architecture/stalker-portal.md` ("Session Authentication Lifecycle").
+
 **Favorites and Recently Viewed**:
 
 - Per-playlist favorites and global favorites

apps/electron-backend/src/app/events/stalker.events.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 import axios, { AxiosRequestConfig } from 'axios';
 import { ipcMain } from 'electron';
 import {
+    classifyStalkerAuthFailureBody,
+    createStalkerAuthFailureMarker,
     PortalDebugEvent,
     STALKER_REQUEST,
     buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext,
@@ -111,6 +113,18 @@ ipcMain.handle(
                 throw httpError;
             }
 
+            // The portal answers auth failures with HTTP 200 and a plain
+            // text/html body ("Authorization failed.", "Access denied.",
+            // "Unauthorized request."). Classify them here so the renderer
+            // receives a structured marker instead of pattern-matching raw
+            // response text.
+            const authFailureBody = classifyStalkerAuthFailureBody(
+                response.data
+            );
+            const responseData = authFailureBody
+                ? createStalkerAuthFailureMarker(authFailureBody)
+                : response.data;
+
             // Return the response data
             if (
                 params.action === 'create_link' &&
@@ -136,12 +150,12 @@ ipcMain.handle(
                     durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
                     status: 'success',
                     request: debugRequest,
-                    response: response.data,
+                    response: responseData,
                 };
                 emitPortalDebugEvent(debugEvent);
             }
 
-            return response.data;
+            return responseData;
         } catch (error) {
             if (payload.requestId) {
                 const debugEvent: PortalDebugEvent = {

apps/stalker-mock-server/README.md

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ actually get wrong:
 | `00:1A:79:00:00:05` | **embedded-series** | 50% of VOD items have embedded `series[]` arrays — tests the embedded series flow |
 | `00:1A:79:00:00:06` | **legacy-pagination** | No `get_all_channels` support — tests the paginated `get_ordered_list` crawl fallback for the full ITV channel list |
 | `00:1A:79:00:00:07` | **marketing-demo** | 35 original poster movies with the newest 20 first — safe for screenshots and marketing |
-| `00:1A:79:00:00:08` | **login-required** | `get_profile` answers `status: 2` until the client completes `do_auth` with non-empty credentials. The app cannot finish this flow yet (its `do_auth` path is dormant and sends empty credentials), so the scenario is exercised at the HTTP level only — it exists to receive the upcoming client-side `do_auth` work |
+| `00:1A:79:00:00:08` | **login-required** | `get_profile` answers `status: 2` until the client completes `do_auth` with non-empty credentials. The app drives this end to end: enter a username and password in the Stalker import dialog and it runs `do_auth`, then retries `get_profile` with `auth_second_step=1`. Covered by `stalker.e2e.ts` (`@stalker full portal authentication`) |
 | `00:1A:79:00:00:09` | **gated-stream** | `create_link` returns a local `/stream/gated/…` URL that answers 403 without the mac cookie and the MAC's current Bearer token — proves a player's media requests really carry the portal credentials |
 | `00:1A:79:00:00:0A` | **static-channel-cmd** | ITV rows carry a directly playable `cmd` with `use_http_tmp_link`/`use_load_balancing` both `'0'` — a client honouring the flags must play them without calling `create_link` |
 | `<any other MAC>` | **auto** | MAC bytes used as seed → deterministic unique dataset |

apps/stalker-mock-server/src/app/handlers/auth-handlers.spec.ts

@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@ import { handleHandshake } from './handshake.handler';
 /**
  * Handler-level coverage for the authentication actions.
  *
- * The e2e suite drives the app against this server, but the login-required
- * flow cannot be reached from the client yet (its `do_auth` path is dormant
- * and sends empty credentials), so the scenario is pinned down here rather
- * than only asserted in prose.
+ * The e2e suite drives the app through this flow end to end; these handler
+ * tests pin the SERVER half of the contract independently, so a client-side
+ * regression and a mock-side one cannot mask each other.
  *
  * Handlers are called directly instead of through the dispatcher: the
  * dispatcher pulls in every content handler and therefore the faker-based
@@ -82,8 +81,8 @@ describe('stalker mock authentication handlers', () => {
         })['token'] as string;
         expect(token).toMatch(/^[0-9A-F]{32}$/);
 
-        // The app sends auth_second_step=1 on its very first profile request,
-        // so that parameter alone must not satisfy the scenario.
+        // A client could mislabel its first profile as the second auth step;
+        // that parameter alone must not satisfy the scenario.
         expect(
             invoke(
                 handleGetProfile,

apps/stalker-mock-server/src/app/handlers/get-profile.handler.ts

@@ -33,10 +33,11 @@ export function handleGetProfile(
         return;
     }
 
-    // Gate on the actual do_auth completion, not on auth_second_step: the app
-    // sends auth_second_step=1 on its very first get_profile, so a parameter
-    // check would let the login-required flow be bypassed without ever
-    // exercising status 2 -> do_auth -> profile retry.
+    // Gate on the actual do_auth completion, not on auth_second_step. The
+    // client now sends `auth_second_step=0` first and `1` only on the retry
+    // after do_auth, so a parameter check would happen to work — but it would
+    // also silently pass for any client that mislabels its first profile,
+    // which is exactly the protocol mistake this scenario exists to catch.
     if (scenario.requiresLogin && !hasCompletedDoAuth(mac)) {
         res.json({
             js: {

apps/web-e2e/src/stalker.e2e.ts

@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ import {
  * `--project=chromium` alone (`.github/workflows/e2e-tests.yaml`). If a local
  * all-project run shows a lone auth failure that passes on rerun, this is why;
  * `--project=chromium` reproduces CI exactly.
+ *
+ * Most tests here tolerate that reset anyway — they re-authenticate, or assert
+ * that a NEW token appears. The token-reuse test cannot: its assertion IS that
+ * the portal session survives, so it uses per-project MACs held outside
+ * `OWNED_MACS`. See `AUTH_REUSE_MACS`.
  */
 
 test.describe.configure({ mode: 'serial' });
@@ -82,6 +87,13 @@ const LEGACY_PAGINATION_MAC = '00:1A:79:00:00:06';
  */
 const STATIC_CMD_MAC = '00:1A:79:00:00:0A';
 
+/**
+ * Login-required scenario MAC — get_profile answers status 2 until do_auth
+ * completes with non-empty credentials (empty credentials return {js:false},
+ * as the operator billing script would).
+ */
+const LOGIN_REQUIRED_MAC = '00:1A:79:00:00:08';
+
 /**
  * Dedicated MACs for the full-portal authentication tests. Mock state is keyed
  * by MAC, so keeping these distinct from the content scenarios above means an
@@ -90,6 +102,25 @@ const STATIC_CMD_MAC = '00:1A:79:00:00:0A';
  */
 const AUTH_FLOW_MAC = '00:1A:79:AD:00:01';
 const AUTH_REAUTH_MAC = '00:1A:79:AD:00:03';
+
+/**
+ * The token-reuse test needs the portal session to SURVIVE untouched between
+ * its import and its reload — that persistence is the whole assertion. Every
+ * other test here is reset-tolerant (they either re-authenticate or assert a
+ * new token), so they can share `OWNED_MACS`, which each `beforeEach` clears.
+ *
+ * `mode: 'serial'` only serializes within one project; the browser projects
+ * still run concurrently, so a sibling project's reset would rotate this
+ * session mid-test. Hence one MAC per project, and deliberately NOT in
+ * `OWNED_MACS`: nothing may reset them. Leftover state from an earlier run is
+ * harmless — the import negotiates and adopts its own token first.
+ */
+const AUTH_REUSE_MACS: Record<string, string> = {
+    chromium: '00:1A:79:AD:01:01',
+    firefox: '00:1A:79:AD:01:02',
+    webkit: '00:1A:79:AD:01:03',
+};
+const AUTH_REUSE_FALLBACK_MAC = '00:1A:79:AD:01:04';
 /**
  * Deliberately NOT an Infomir MAC: the strict endpoint rejects get_profile for
  * it, so no token is ever adopted and content requests fail permanently.
@@ -138,6 +169,7 @@ const OWNED_MACS = [
     EMBEDDED_SERIES_MAC,
     LEGACY_PAGINATION_MAC,
     STATIC_CMD_MAC,
+    LOGIN_REQUIRED_MAC,
     AUTH_FLOW_MAC,
     AUTH_REAUTH_MAC,
     AUTH_REJECTED_MAC,
@@ -212,9 +244,21 @@ async function addStalkerPortal(
  */
 async function addFullStalkerPortal(
     page: Page,
-    options: { name?: string; mac: string; expectContent?: boolean }
+    options: {
+        name?: string;
+        mac: string;
+        expectContent?: boolean;
+        username?: string;
+        password?: string;
+    }
 ): Promise<void> {
-    const { name = 'Full Stalker Portal', mac, expectContent = true } = options;
+    const {
+        name = 'Full Stalker Portal',
+        mac,
+        expectContent = true,
+        username,
+        password,
+    } = options;
 
     await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add playlist' }).click();
     const dialog = page.locator('mat-dialog-container');
@@ -224,6 +268,12 @@ async function addFullStalkerPortal(
     await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#title'), name);
     await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#portalUrl'), FULL_PORTAL_URL);
     await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#macAddress'), mac);
+    if (username !== undefined) {
+        await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#username'), username);
+    }
+    if (password !== undefined) {
+        await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#password'), password);
+    }
 
     const addButton = dialog.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add', exact: true });
     await expect(addButton).toBeEnabled({ timeout: 10_000 });
@@ -991,12 +1041,171 @@ test.describe('@stalker full portal authentication', () => {
             .toBe(true);
     });
 
-    test('never surfaces the portal plain-text auth failure as content', async ({
+    test('completes the documented login flow behind get_profile status 2', async ({
+        page,
+    }) => {
+        const requests = recordPortalRequests(page);
+        // The second auth step must only be claimed on the retry AFTER
+        // do_auth — a client that always sends auth_second_step=1 works
+        // against the mock but violates the documented protocol.
+        const profileSteps: string[] = [];
+        page.on('request', (request) => {
+            const url = new URL(request.url());
+            if (!url.pathname.endsWith('/stalker')) {
+                return;
+            }
+            if (url.searchParams.get('action') !== 'get_profile') {
+                return;
+            }
+            profileSteps.push(url.searchParams.get('auth_second_step') ?? '');
+        });
+
+        await addFullStalkerPortal(page, {
+            mac: LOGIN_REQUIRED_MAC,
+            username: 'user',
+            password: 'secret',
+        });
+
+        // The mock only adopts the token (and answers content) after do_auth
+        // completed with non-empty credentials, so rendered categories prove
+        // the whole status 2 -> do_auth -> profile retry chain ran.
+        await expect(page.locator('.category-item').first()).toBeVisible({
+            timeout: 30_000,
+        });
+
+        const actions = requests.map((entry) => entry.action);
+        expect(actions).toContain('do_auth');
+        expect(actions.indexOf('get_profile')).toBeLessThan(
+            actions.indexOf('do_auth')
+        );
+        expect(actions.lastIndexOf('get_profile')).toBeGreaterThan(
+            actions.indexOf('do_auth')
+        );
+
+        expect(profileSteps[0]).toBe('0');
+        expect(profileSteps).toContain('1');
+
+        // Content only flows once the token is adopted, which the mock does
+        // only after do_auth completed. Look AFTER the last get_profile:
+        // discovery's classification probe is itself a token-less
+        // `get_genres`, so the first CONTENT_ACTIONS hit is that probe.
+        const contentRequest = requests
+            .slice(actions.lastIndexOf('get_profile') + 1)
+            .find((entry) => CONTENT_ACTIONS.includes(entry.action));
+        expect(contentRequest).toBeDefined();
+        expect(contentRequest?.token).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+
+    test('explains a login-required portal and recovers once credentials are entered', async ({
+        page,
+    }) => {
+        // First attempt without credentials: the import must fail with the
+        // portal's actual reason, not a generic "check URL and MAC" error.
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add playlist' }).click();
+        const dialog = page.locator('mat-dialog-container');
+        await expect(dialog).toBeVisible();
+        await dialog.getByRole('radio', { name: /Stalker portal/i }).click();
+
+        await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#title'), 'Login Portal');
+        await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#portalUrl'), FULL_PORTAL_URL);
+        await setInputValue(
+            dialog.locator('input#macAddress'),
+            LOGIN_REQUIRED_MAC
+        );
+
+        const addButton = dialog.getByRole('button', {
+            name: 'Add',
+            exact: true,
+        });
+        await expect(addButton).toBeEnabled({ timeout: 10_000 });
+        await addButton.click();
+
+        await expect(
+            page.getByText(/requires a login and password/i)
+        ).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15_000 });
+        // The dialog stays open so the user can add the credentials.
+        await expect(dialog).toBeVisible();
+
+        // Second attempt with credentials in the same dialog succeeds.
+        await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#username'), 'user');
+        await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#password'), 'secret');
+        await expect(addButton).toBeEnabled({ timeout: 10_000 });
+        await addButton.click();
+        await expect(dialog).toBeHidden({ timeout: 30_000 });
+
+        await page.waitForURL(/stalker.*vod/, { timeout: 30_000 });
+        await expect(page.locator('.category-item').first()).toBeVisible({
+            timeout: 30_000,
+        });
+    });
+
+    test('reuses the persisted token after a reload instead of re-running get_profile', async ({
+        page,
+    }, testInfo) => {
+        const requests = recordPortalRequests(page);
+        const mac =
+            AUTH_REUSE_MACS[testInfo.project.name] ?? AUTH_REUSE_FALLBACK_MAC;
+
+        await addFullStalkerPortal(page, { mac });
+
+        await expect
+            .poll(
+                () =>
+                    requests.some(
+                        (entry) =>
+                            CONTENT_ACTIONS.includes(entry.action) &&
+                            entry.token
+                    ),
+                { timeout: 30_000 }
+            )
+            .toBe(true);
+
+        const sessionToken = requests.find(
+            (entry) => CONTENT_ACTIONS.includes(entry.action) && entry.token
+        )?.token;
+        expect(sessionToken).toBeTruthy();
+
+        const requestCountBeforeReload = requests.length;
+        await page.reload();
+
+        // Wait on the UI rather than the request log: a reload restores the
+        // route, boots the app and re-authenticates before the first content
+        // request goes out, and rendered categories prove that whole chain
+        // finished (the portal only answers content for an adopted token).
+        await expect(page.locator('.category-item').first()).toBeVisible({
+            timeout: 60_000,
+        });
+
+        const afterReload = requests.slice(requestCountBeforeReload);
+
+        // Content came back under the SAME token, negotiated by re-presenting
+        // the persisted one in the handshake.
+        expect(
+            afterReload.filter(
+                (entry) =>
+                    CONTENT_ACTIONS.includes(entry.action) &&
+                    entry.token === sessionToken
+            ).length
+        ).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+        // The handshake re-presented the persisted token...
+        const reloadHandshake = afterReload.find(
+            (entry) => entry.action === 'handshake'
+        );
+        expect(reloadHandshake?.token).toBe(sessionToken);
+
+        // ...and because the portal returned it unchanged (idempotent
+        // handshake, still-adopted session), the profile round trip was
+        // skipped entirely.
+        expect(
+            afterReload.filter((entry) => entry.action === 'get_profile')
+        ).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    test('refuses a rejected portal at import and never renders its plain-text failure', async ({
         page,
         request,
     }) => {
-        const requests = recordPortalRequests(page);
-
         // A MAC outside the Infomir OUI makes the strict endpoint answer
         // get_profile with a bare {status:1}, so no token is ever adopted and
         // every content request keeps returning the plain-text failure. Unlike
@@ -1014,25 +1223,38 @@ test.describe('@stalker full portal authentication', () => {
         ).json();
         expect(failureBody.payload).toBe('Authorization failed.');
 
-        await addFullStalkerPortal(page, {
-            mac: AUTH_REJECTED_MAC,
-            expectContent: false,
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add playlist' }).click();
+        const dialog = page.locator('mat-dialog-container');
+        await expect(dialog).toBeVisible();
+        await dialog.getByRole('radio', { name: /Stalker portal/i }).click();
+
+        await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#title'), 'Rejected Portal');
+        await setInputValue(dialog.locator('input#portalUrl'), FULL_PORTAL_URL);
+        await setInputValue(
+            dialog.locator('input#macAddress'),
+            AUTH_REJECTED_MAC
+        );
+
+        const addButton = dialog.getByRole('button', {
+            name: 'Add',
+            exact: true,
         });
+        await expect(addButton).toBeEnabled({ timeout: 10_000 });
+        await addButton.click();
 
-        // The app must have actually hit the failing portal...
-        await expect
-            .poll(
-                () =>
-                    requests.filter((entry) =>
-                        CONTENT_ACTIONS.includes(entry.action)
-                    ).length,
-                { timeout: 30_000 }
-            )
-            .toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        // `status: 1` means the portal refused this device, so the import must
+        // stop there instead of persisting a portal that can never load. (It
+        // used to be treated as success whenever the portal sent no msg text,
+        // which imported a dead source.)
+        await expect(page.getByText(/refused access/i)).toBeVisible({
+            timeout: 15_000,
+        });
+        await expect(dialog).toBeVisible();
+        await expect(page).not.toHaveURL(/stalker/);
 
-        // ...and must never render the raw portal response as content. A
-        // portal answers auth failures with HTTP 200 + plain text, so an app
-        // that trusts the status code would happily paint these strings.
+        // And the raw portal response is never painted as UI. A portal answers
+        // auth failures with HTTP 200 + plain text, so an app that trusts the
+        // status code would happily render these strings.
         await expect(page.locator('body')).not.toContainText(
             'Authorization failed.'
         );

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/ar.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "رابط الخادم",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "يجب أن يكون الرابط صالحًا مع بروتوكول (مثال: http://example.com/stalker_portal)",
             "ADD": "إضافة",
-            "VALIDATING": "جارٍ التحقق من البوابة..."
+            "VALIDATING": "جارٍ التحقق من البوابة...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "مطلوب فقط عندما تطلب البوابة اسم مستخدم وكلمة مرور",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "فشلت المصادقة مع البوابة. تحقق من الرابط وعنوان MAC.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "تتطلب هذه البوابة اسم مستخدم وكلمة مرور. املأ حقلي اسم المستخدم وكلمة المرور وأعد المحاولة.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "رفضت البوابة اسم المستخدم وكلمة المرور.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "رفضت البوابة الوصول لهذا الجهاز.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "أفادت البوابة: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "التصفية حسب الاسم",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "تصفية وفرز",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "لم يتم تحديد فئة",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "يرجى اختيار فئة لعرض المحتوى"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "تتطلب البوابة اسم مستخدم وكلمة مرور. أعد استيراد البوابة واملأ حقلي اسم المستخدم وكلمة المرور.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "إعدادات القائمة",
             "HOME": "الرئيسية",
             "DELETE": "حذف"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/ary.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "رابط الخادم",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "خاص يكون رابط صحيح مع البروتوكول (مثلا http://example.com/c ولا https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "زيد",
-            "VALIDATING": "جاري التحقق من البوابة..."
+            "VALIDATING": "جاري التحقق من البوابة...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "خاصين غير إذا البوابة كتطلب اسم المستخدم وكلمة المرور",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "فشل تسجيل الدخول للبوابة. تحقق من الرابط وعنوان MAC.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "هاد البوابة كتطلب اسم المستخدم وكلمة المرور. عمّر خانات اسم المستخدم وكلمة المرور وحاول مرة أخرى.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "البوابة رفضات اسم المستخدم وكلمة المرور.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "البوابة رفضات الوصول لهاد الجهاز.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "البوابة قالت: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "فلتر بالاسم",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "فلتر وترتيب",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "ما كاين حتى فئة متختارة",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "عفاك اختار فئة باش تشوف المحتوى"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "البوابة كتطلب اسم المستخدم وكلمة المرور. عاود استيراد البوابة وعمّر خانات اسم المستخدم وكلمة المرور.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "إعدادات قائمة التشغيل",
             "HOME": "الرئيسية",
             "DELETE": "حذف"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/by.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "URL сервера",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Павінен быць сапраўдны URL-адрас з пратаколам (напрыклад, http://example.com/c або https://example.com/stalker_portal/c).",
             "ADD": "Дадаць",
-            "VALIDATING": "Праверка партала..."
+            "VALIDATING": "Праверка партала...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Патрэбна толькі тады, калі партал запытвае лагін і пароль",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Не ўдалося аўтэнтыфікавацца на партале. Праверце URL і MAC-адрас.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Гэты партал патрабуе лагін і пароль. Запоўніце палі імя карыстальніка і пароля і паспрабуйце яшчэ раз.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "Партал адхіліў лагін і пароль.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "Партал адмовіў у доступе для гэтай прылады.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "Партал паведаміў: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Фільтраваць па імені",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Фільтр і сартаванне",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Катэгорыя не выбрана",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Калі ласка, выберыце катэгорыю, каб убачыць кантэнт"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Партал патрабуе лагін і пароль. Імпартуйце партал яшчэ раз і запоўніце палі імя карыстальніка і пароля.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Налады плэйліста",
             "HOME": "На галоўную",
             "DELETE": "Выдаліць"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/de.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "Server-URL",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Sollte eine gültige URL mit Protokoll sein (z. B. http://example.com/c oder https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Hinzufügen",
-            "VALIDATING": "Portal wird überprüft …"
+            "VALIDATING": "Portal wird überprüft …",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Nur erforderlich, wenn das Portal Benutzername und Passwort verlangt",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Authentifizierung am Portal fehlgeschlagen. Überprüfen Sie die URL und die MAC-Adresse.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Dieses Portal erfordert Benutzername und Passwort. Füllen Sie die Felder Benutzername und Passwort aus und versuchen Sie es erneut.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "Das Portal hat Benutzername und Passwort abgelehnt.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "Das Portal hat den Zugriff für dieses Gerät verweigert.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "Das Portal meldet: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Nach Namen filtern",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Filtern & Sortieren",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Keine Kategorie ausgewählt",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Bitte wählen Sie eine Kategorie aus, um den Inhalt anzuzeigen"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Das Portal erfordert Benutzername und Passwort. Importieren Sie das Portal erneut und füllen Sie die Felder Benutzername und Passwort aus.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Playlist-Einstellungen",
             "HOME": "Startseite",
             "DELETE": "Löschen"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/el.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "Διεύθηνση URL σέρβερ",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Θα πρέπει να είναι μια έγκυρη διεύθυνση URL με πρωτόκολλο (π.χ. http://example.com/c ή https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Προσθήκη",
-            "VALIDATING": "Επικύρωση πύλης..."
+            "VALIDATING": "Επικύρωση πύλης...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Απαιτείται μόνο όταν η πύλη ζητά όνομα χρήστη και κωδικό πρόσβασης",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Η ταυτοποίηση με την πύλη απέτυχε. Ελέγξτε τη διεύθυνση URL και τη διεύθυνση MAC.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Αυτή η πύλη απαιτεί όνομα χρήστη και κωδικό πρόσβασης. Συμπληρώστε τα πεδία ονόματος χρήστη και κωδικού πρόσβασης και δοκιμάστε ξανά.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "Η πύλη απέρριψε το όνομα χρήστη και τον κωδικό πρόσβασης.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "Η πύλη αρνήθηκε την πρόσβαση για αυτήν τη συσκευή.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "Η πύλη ανέφερε: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Φιλτράρισμα κατά όνομα",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Φιλτράρισμα & Ταξινόμηση",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Δεν έχει επιλεγεί κατηγορία",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Επιλέξτε μια κατηγορία για να δείτε το περιεχόμενο"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Η πύλη απαιτεί όνομα χρήστη και κωδικό πρόσβασης. Εισαγάγετε ξανά την πύλη και συμπληρώστε τα πεδία ονόματος χρήστη και κωδικού πρόσβασης.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Ρυθμίσεις λίστας αναπαραγωγής",
             "HOME": "Αρχικό",
             "DELETE": "Διαγραφή"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/en.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "Server URL",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Should be a valid url with protocol (e.g. http://example.com/c or https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Add",
-            "VALIDATING": "Validating portal..."
+            "VALIDATING": "Validating portal...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Only needed when the portal asks for a login and password",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Failed to authenticate with the portal. Check the URL and MAC address.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "This portal requires a login and password. Fill in the username and password fields and try again.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "The portal rejected the login and password.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "The portal refused access for this device.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "The portal reported: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Filter by name",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Filter & Sort",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "No category selected",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Please select a category to see the content"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "The portal requires a login and password. Import the portal again and fill in the username and password fields.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Playlist Settings",
             "HOME": "Home",
             "DELETE": "Delete"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/es.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "URL del servidor",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Debe ser una URL válida con protocolo (por ejemplo, http://example.com/c o https://example.com/stalker_portal/c).",
             "ADD": "Agregar",
-            "VALIDATING": "Validando portal…"
+            "VALIDATING": "Validando portal…",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Solo es necesario cuando el portal pide usuario y contraseña",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "No se pudo autenticar con el portal. Verifica la URL y la dirección MAC.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Este portal requiere usuario y contraseña. Completa los campos de nombre de usuario y contraseña e inténtalo de nuevo.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "El portal rechazó el usuario y la contraseña.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "El portal denegó el acceso a este dispositivo.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "El portal informó: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Filtrar por nombre",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Filtrar y ordenar",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Ninguna categoría seleccionada",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Selecciona una categoría para ver el contenido"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "El portal requiere usuario y contraseña. Vuelve a importar el portal y completa los campos de nombre de usuario y contraseña.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Configuración de lista de reproducción",
             "HOME": "Hogar",
             "DELETE": "Borrar"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/fr.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "URL du serveur",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Doit être une URL valide avec un protocole (par exemple http://example.com/c ou https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Ajouter",
-            "VALIDATING": "Validation du portail…"
+            "VALIDATING": "Validation du portail…",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Nécessaire uniquement lorsque le portail demande un identifiant et un mot de passe",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Échec de l'authentification auprès du portail. Vérifiez l'URL et l'adresse MAC.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Ce portail nécessite un identifiant et un mot de passe. Renseignez les champs nom d'utilisateur et mot de passe, puis réessayez.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "Le portail a rejeté l'identifiant et le mot de passe.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "Le portail a refusé l'accès pour cet appareil.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "Le portail a signalé : {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Filtrer par nom",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Filtrer et trier",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Aucune catégorie sélectionnée",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Veuillez sélectionner une catégorie pour voir le contenu"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Le portail nécessite un identifiant et un mot de passe. Importez à nouveau le portail et renseignez les champs nom d'utilisateur et mot de passe.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Paramètres de la liste",
             "HOME": "Accueil",
             "DELETE": "Supprimer"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/hu.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "Kiszolgáló URL-címe",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Adjon meg protokollt is tartalmazó, érvényes URL-címet (például http://example.com/c vagy https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Hozzáadás",
-            "VALIDATING": "Portál ellenőrzése…"
+            "VALIDATING": "Portál ellenőrzése…",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Csak akkor szükséges, ha a portál felhasználónevet és jelszót kér",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Nem sikerült a hitelesítés a portálon. Ellenőrizze az URL-címet és a MAC-címet.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Ez a portál felhasználónevet és jelszót igényel. Töltse ki a felhasználónév és a jelszó mezőt, majd próbálja újra.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "A portál elutasította a felhasználónevet és a jelszót.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "A portál megtagadta a hozzáférést ettől az eszköztől.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "A portál a következőt jelezte: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Szűrés név alapján",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Szűrés és rendezés",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Nincs kiválasztott kategória",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "A tartalom megjelenítéséhez válasszon egy kategóriát."
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "A portál felhasználónevet és jelszót igényel. Importálja újra a portált, és töltse ki a felhasználónév és a jelszó mezőt.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Lejátszási lista beállításai",
             "HOME": "Kezdőlap",
             "DELETE": "Törlés"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/it.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "URL server",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Dovrebbe essere una URL valida con protocollo (es. http://esempio.it/c o https://esempio.it/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Aggiungi",
-            "VALIDATING": "Validazione del portale..."
+            "VALIDATING": "Validazione del portale...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Necessario solo se il portale richiede nome utente e password",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Impossibile autenticarsi con il portale. Controlla l'URL e l'indirizzo MAC.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Questo portale richiede nome utente e password. Compila i campi nome utente e password e riprova.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "Il portale ha rifiutato il nome utente e la password.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "Il portale ha negato l'accesso a questo dispositivo.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "Il portale ha segnalato: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Filtra per nome",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Filtra e ordina",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Nessuna categoria selezionata",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Seleziona una categoria per vedere i contenuti"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Il portale richiede nome utente e password. Importa di nuovo il portale e compila i campi nome utente e password.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Impostazioni Playlist",
             "HOME": "Home",
             "DELETE": "Elimina"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/ja.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "サーバーURL",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "プロトコルを含む有効なURLである必要があります（例：http://example.com/c または https://example.com/stalker_portal/c）",
             "ADD": "追加",
-            "VALIDATING": "ポータルを検証中..."
+            "VALIDATING": "ポータルを検証中...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "ポータルがユーザー名とパスワードを要求する場合のみ必要",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "ポータルでの認証に失敗しました。URLとMACアドレスを確認してください。",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "このポータルにはユーザー名とパスワードが必要です。ユーザー名とパスワードの欄を入力して、もう一度お試しください。",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "ポータルがユーザー名とパスワードを拒否しました。",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "ポータルがこのデバイスのアクセスを拒否しました。",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "ポータルからの報告：{{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "名前でフィルター",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "フィルターと並び替え",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "カテゴリーが選択されていません",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "コンテンツを表示するにはカテゴリーを選択してください"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "ポータルにはユーザー名とパスワードが必要です。ポータルを再インポートして、ユーザー名とパスワードの欄を入力してください。",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "プレイリスト設定",
             "HOME": "ホーム",
             "DELETE": "削除"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/ko.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "서버 URL",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "프로토콜이 포함된 유효한 URL이어야 합니다(예: http://example.com/c 또는 https://example.com/stalker_portal/c).",
             "ADD": "추가하다",
-            "VALIDATING": "포털을 검증하는 중..."
+            "VALIDATING": "포털을 검증하는 중...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "포털이 사용자 이름과 비밀번호를 요구하는 경우에만 필요",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "포털 인증에 실패했습니다. URL과 MAC 주소를 확인하세요.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "이 포털에는 사용자 이름과 비밀번호가 필요합니다. 사용자 이름과 비밀번호 필드를 입력한 후 다시 시도하세요.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "포털이 사용자 이름과 비밀번호를 거부했습니다.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "포털이 이 기기의 접근을 거부했습니다.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "포털에서 보고한 내용: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "이름으로 필터",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "필터 및 정렬",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "선택된 카테고리가 없습니다",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "콘텐츠를 보려면 카테고리를 선택하세요"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "포털에 사용자 이름과 비밀번호가 필요합니다. 포털을 다시 가져온 후 사용자 이름과 비밀번호 필드를 입력하세요.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "재생목록 설정",
             "HOME": "홈",
             "DELETE": "삭제"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/nl.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "Server URL",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Moet een geldige URL zijn met protocol (bijv. http://example.com/c o https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Toevoegen",
-            "VALIDATING": "Portaal valideren..."
+            "VALIDATING": "Portaal valideren...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Alleen nodig als het portaal om een gebruikersnaam en wachtwoord vraagt",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Aanmelden bij het portaal is mislukt. Controleer de URL en het MAC-adres.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Dit portaal vereist een gebruikersnaam en wachtwoord. Vul de velden gebruikersnaam en wachtwoord in en probeer het opnieuw.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "Het portaal heeft de gebruikersnaam en het wachtwoord geweigerd.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "Het portaal heeft de toegang voor dit apparaat geweigerd.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "Het portaal meldde: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Filter op naam",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Filteren & sorteren",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Geen categorie geselecteerd",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Selecteer een categorie om de inhoud te bekijken"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Het portaal vereist een gebruikersnaam en wachtwoord. Importeer het portaal opnieuw en vul de velden gebruikersnaam en wachtwoord in.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Afspeellijst instellingen",
             "HOME": "Home",
             "DELETE": "Verwijderen"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/pl.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "URL serwera",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Powinien to być poprawny URL z protokołem (np. http://example.com/c lub https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Dodaj",
-            "VALIDATING": "Walidacja portalu..."
+            "VALIDATING": "Walidacja portalu...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Potrzebne tylko wtedy, gdy portal wymaga loginu i hasła",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Nie udało się uwierzytelnić w portalu. Sprawdź URL i adres MAC.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Ten portal wymaga loginu i hasła. Wypełnij pola nazwy użytkownika i hasła i spróbuj ponownie.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "Portal odrzucił login i hasło.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "Portal odmówił dostępu temu urządzeniu.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "Portal zgłosił: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Filtruj według nazwy",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Filtruj i sortuj",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Nie wybrano kategorii",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Wybierz kategorię, aby zobaczyć treści"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Portal wymaga loginu i hasła. Zaimportuj portal ponownie i wypełnij pola nazwy użytkownika i hasła.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Ustawienia listy odtwarzania",
             "HOME": "Strona główna",
             "DELETE": "Usuń"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/pt.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "URL do servidor",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Deve ser uma URL válida com protocolo (por exemplo, http://example.com/c ou https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Adicionar",
-            "VALIDATING": "Validando portal..."
+            "VALIDATING": "Validando portal...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Necessário apenas quando o portal exige login e senha",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Falha na autenticação com o portal. Verifique a URL e o endereço MAC.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Este portal exige login e senha. Preencha os campos de nome de usuário e senha e tente novamente.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "O portal rejeitou o login e a senha.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "O portal recusou o acesso para este dispositivo.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "O portal informou: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Filtrar por nome",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Filtrar e ordenar",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Nenhuma categoria selecionada",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Selecione uma categoria para ver o conteúdo"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "O portal exige login e senha. Importe o portal novamente e preencha os campos de nome de usuário e senha.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Configurações da playlist",
             "HOME": "Início",
             "DELETE": "Excluir"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/ru.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "URL сервера",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Должен быть действительный URL-адрес с протоколом (например, http://example.com/c или https://example.com/stalker_portal/c).",
             "ADD": "Добавить",
-            "VALIDATING": "Проверка портала…"
+            "VALIDATING": "Проверка портала…",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Требуется, только если портал запрашивает логин и пароль",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Не удалось авторизоваться на портале. Проверьте URL и MAC-адрес.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Этот портал требует логин и пароль. Заполните поля имени пользователя и пароля и повторите попытку.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "Портал отклонил логин и пароль.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "Портал отказал в доступе этому устройству.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "Портал сообщил: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "Фильтровать по имени",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Фильтр и сортировка",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Категория не выбрана",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "Пожалуйста, выберите категорию для просмотра содержимого"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Портал требует логин и пароль. Импортируйте портал заново и заполните поля имени пользователя и пароля.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Настройки плейлиста",
             "HOME": "На главную",
             "DELETE": "Удалить"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/tr.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "Sunucu URL'si",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "Geçerli bir URL olmalıdır (örn. http://example.com/c veya https://example.com/stalker_portal/c)",
             "ADD": "Ekle",
-            "VALIDATING": "Portal doğrulanıyor..."
+            "VALIDATING": "Portal doğrulanıyor...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "Yalnızca portal kullanıcı adı ve parola istediğinde gereklidir",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "Portalda kimlik doğrulaması başarısız oldu. URL'yi ve MAC adresini kontrol edin.",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Bu portal kullanıcı adı ve parola gerektiriyor. Kullanıcı adı ve parola alanlarını doldurup tekrar deneyin.",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "Portal, kullanıcı adı ve parolayı reddetti.",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "Portal bu cihaz için erişimi reddetti.",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "Portal şunu bildirdi: {{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "İsime göre filtrele",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "Filtrele ve Sırala",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "Kategori seçilmedi",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "İçeriği görmek için lütfen bir kategori seçin"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "Portal, kullanıcı adı ve parola gerektiriyor. Portalı yeniden içe aktarın ve kullanıcı adı ile parola alanlarını doldurun.",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "Oynatma Listesi Ayarları",
             "HOME": "Ana Sayfa",
             "DELETE": "Sil"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/zh.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "服务器 URL",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "应该是带有协议的有效网址（例如 http://example.com/c 或 https://example.com/stalker_portal/c）",
             "ADD": "添加",
-            "VALIDATING": "正在验证门户…"
+            "VALIDATING": "正在验证门户…",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "仅在门户要求登录名和密码时才需要填写",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "门户身份验证失败。请检查 URL 和 MAC 地址。",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "此门户需要登录名和密码。请填写用户名和密码字段后重试。",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "门户拒绝了该登录名和密码。",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "门户拒绝了此设备的访问。",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "门户返回信息：{{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "按名称筛选",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "筛选与排序",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "未选择分类",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "请选择一个分类以查看内容"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "门户需要登录名和密码。请重新导入该门户并填写用户名和密码字段。",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "播放列表设置",
             "HOME": "首页",
             "DELETE": "删除"

apps/web/src/assets/i18n/zhtw.json

@@ -195,7 +195,13 @@
             "SERVER_URL": "伺服器網址",
             "URL_VALIDATION_ERROR": "必須是有效的網址並包含協定（例如 http://example.com/c 或 https://example.com/stalker_portal/c）",
             "ADD": "新增",
-            "VALIDATING": "正在驗證入口網站..."
+            "VALIDATING": "正在驗證入口網站...",
+            "CREDENTIALS_HINT": "僅在入口網站要求登入名稱與密碼時才需填寫",
+            "AUTH_FAILED": "入口網站驗證失敗。請檢查網址與 MAC 位址。",
+            "LOGIN_REQUIRED": "此入口網站需要登入名稱與密碼。請填寫使用者名稱與密碼欄位後重試。",
+            "LOGIN_REJECTED": "入口網站拒絕了此登入名稱與密碼。",
+            "PORTAL_REFUSED": "入口網站拒絕了此裝置的存取。",
+            "PORTAL_MESSAGE": "入口網站回報：{{message}}"
         },
         "FILTER_BY_NAME": "依名稱篩選",
         "FILTER_AND_SORT": "篩選與排序",
@@ -957,6 +963,7 @@
                 "TITLE": "未選擇類別",
                 "DESCRIPTION": "請選擇一個類別以查看內容"
             },
+            "STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED": "入口網站需要登入名稱與密碼。請重新匯入入口網站並填寫使用者名稱與密碼欄位。",
             "PLAYLIST_SETTINGS": "播放清單設定",
             "HOME": "首頁",
             "DELETE": "刪除"

docs/architecture/stalker-portal.md

@@ -83,9 +83,9 @@ Two portal modes exist, persisted per playlist as
   the wider phrase set (`Invalid token`, `Auth failed`, bare `unauthorized`),
   since a panel fills those in deliberately. While a full portal is the
   active playlist, `StalkerSessionService` keeps a **watchdog** running —
-  periodic authenticated `watchdog/get_events` pings (currently every 25 s;
-  the protocol default expects 120 s, tracked for a later PR) whose failures
-  are non-fatal.
+  periodic authenticated `watchdog/get_events` pings at the cadence the
+  portal advertises (`watchdog_timeout`, default 120 s — see "Watchdog"
+  below) whose failures are non-fatal.
 - **Simple portal** (reseller-style `portal.php` panels): no auth lifecycle
   at all — requests carry only the `mac=` cookie.
 
@@ -235,6 +235,181 @@ blank fields are not generated or forwarded to `get_profile`.
   metadata is independent from M3U playlist EPG metadata and must not depend on
   M3U-specific EPG fields.
 
+## Session Authentication Lifecycle
+
+Full portals authenticate through `StalkerSessionService`
+(`libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-session.service.ts`), which
+is a facade over three focused modules:
+
+- `stalker-auth.api.ts` — the raw `handshake` / `get_profile` / `do_auth`
+  requests and the `authenticate()` orchestration.
+- `stalker-watchdog.controller.ts` — the periodic `get_events` keep-alive.
+- `stalker-token-cache.ts` — the in-run token and pending-auth state, tagged
+  with the identity fingerprint each session was negotiated for.
+- `stalker-session-store.ts` — the session persisted on the playlist row.
+- `stalker-response-classification.ts` + `stalker-portal-error.ts` — failure
+  detection and the typed `StalkerPortalError` the UI layers render.
+
+### Handshake and token persistence
+
+The handshake token is **idempotent** (Stalker 4.9.35 `stb.class.php`):
+re-presenting the MAC's current session token returns it unchanged, and tokens
+have no TTL — they are only invalidated when another device runs `get_profile`
+on the same MAC. `ensureToken()` exploits this: when the in-memory cache is
+cold it re-presents the persisted `Playlist.stalkerToken` (from the playlist
+object, falling back to the stored row via `PlaylistsService`, since store
+metas do not carry payload fields). A token that comes back unchanged is an
+already-adopted session, so the `get_profile` round trip is skipped entirely —
+unless the handshake also set `not_valid`, which vetoes the shortcut: adopting
+a token the portal just called dead would be unrecoverable, since the reuse
+path writes no replacement back and every later start would re-present it.
+A renegotiated session is written back best-effort
+(`PlaylistsService.updateStalkerSession`) so the next app start can reuse it.
+The handshake's `not_valid` flag is propagated into the follow-up
+`get_profile` as `not_valid_token`.
+
+Reuse is gated on a session fingerprint (`stalkerSessionFingerprint`) covering
+the **portal endpoint (origin AND path), the device identity and the account
+credentials**, stored
+next to the token as `Playlist.stalkerSessionIdentity` and used for the
+in-run cache as well, so an edit applies without a restart. All three halves
+are load-bearing: `ensureToken()` re-presents tokens in a handshake, so an
+endpoint edit would otherwise disclose the previous portal's bearer token to
+another portal — and origin alone is not enough, since discovery deliberately
+preserves tenant base paths, so `/tenant-a/…` and `/tenant-b/…` on one host
+are different portals; an identity edit must not inherit the old session; and for a
+status-2 portal the login decides which account the token represents. A token
+with no recorded fingerprint (written before this existed) counts as
+unverified and is never re-presented — such a row owes a full profile anyway,
+and the write-back then records the fingerprint.
+
+Because that reuse skips the only response carrying the watchdog cadence, the
+cadence is persisted **with** the token (`Playlist.stalkerWatchdogTimeout` /
+`stalkerTimeslot`, payload fields like `stalkerToken` itself — no schema
+change) and re-applied on the reuse path. The import dialog persists what its
+own `get_profile` advertised, which for a portal whose token never goes stale
+is the only profile the app ever sees.
+
+The skip is therefore conditional on the cadence being **known**: a playlist
+imported before the cadence was persisted has a reusable token and no
+cadence, and skipping would strand it on the 120 s default permanently, since
+the profile is the only thing that could teach it. Such a playlist runs one
+profile, persists what it learns, and skips from then on. What gets persisted
+is the *effective* cadence (the 120 s default when the portal advertises
+none), so stored absence keeps meaning exactly one thing — never profiled —
+rather than sending a portal that advertises nothing back through a profile on
+every start.
+
+### `get_profile` status decoding
+
+`authenticate()` decodes `js.status` the way the stock middleware means it:
+
+- full profile / `status: 0` — OK; `watchdog_timeout` and `timeslot` are read
+  for the watchdog cadence.
+- `status: 1` — blocked (device conflict, malformed MAC, disabled account).
+  `msg`/`block_msg` carry the portal's own explanation; they are
+  markup-stripped, combined, and thrown as `StalkerPortalError('blocked')`.
+- `status: 2` — login/password required. The client runs `do_auth`
+  (`login`, `password`, plus `device_id`/`device_id2` when configured) and
+  retries `get_profile` with `auth_second_step=1`. Only that retry claims the
+  second auth step — the initial request sends `auth_second_step=0`. Missing
+  credentials throw `StalkerPortalError('login-required')`; a `{js: false}`
+  verdict (the operator billing script refused) throws `'login-rejected'`.
+
+Credentials come from the import dialog's username/password fields and are
+persisted on the playlist, so runtime re-authentication can repeat `do_auth`
+after the portal drops the session.
+
+### Plain-text failure bodies
+
+Auth failures are **HTTP 200 + a text/html body**, never a 401/403. The three
+exact bodies (`Authorization failed.` — stale/missing token, optionally with a
+numeric debug suffix; `Access denied.` — blocked account;
+`Unauthorized request.` — missing mac cookie) are classified at the transport
+boundary: the Electron main process
+(`apps/electron-backend/src/app/events/stalker.events.ts`) converts them into
+a structured `{ stalkerAuthFailure }` marker
+(`libs/shared/interfaces/src/lib/stalker-auth-failure.util.ts`) — returned,
+not thrown, because `ipcRenderer.invoke` strips custom properties from
+rejections. The PWA proxy path still delivers the raw string; the renderer
+classifier accepts both shapes plus the legacy `{ js: '<body>' }` envelope.
+`makeAuthenticatedRequest` retries once with fresh authentication and
+otherwise throws `StalkerPortalError('auth-failed')` carrying the body.
+
+### Error surfacing
+
+`StalkerPortalError.portalText` holds the portal's own words. The import
+dialog shows them in its failure snackbar (with kind-specific i18n headlines,
+`HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.*`); the workspace context panel replaces the generic
+"could not load categories" hint with the portal text (or the login-required
+guidance) when category loading failed with a portal refusal
+(`stalkerCategoryErrorDescription` in `workspace-context-panel.component.ts`).
+
+Both renderers are kind-agnostic — they append `portalText` whenever it is
+present — so the obligation sits entirely on the throw sites: **every** exit
+out of the status-2 branch carries the text, not just the terminal `blocked`
+one. A login refusal is precisely where the portal says something actionable
+("wrong password", "subscription expired"), and dropping it leaves the user
+with a generic line while the useful sentence sits unread in the payload.
+Each exit reads the response IN HAND: after the `auth_second_step=1` retry the
+text is the retry's, since quoting the first profile back would describe a
+request that already succeeded. `do_auth` itself answers a bare `{js: false}`,
+so a rejection there keeps the profile's text — the one that asked for the
+login.
+
+### Abandoning an authentication
+
+`authenticate()` takes an optional `AbortSignal` and checks it before every
+portal call. Endpoint discovery gives each confirmation attempt its own
+controller and aborts it when the attempt exceeds its budget, before moving to
+the next candidate.
+
+This matters because `get_profile` — not the handshake — is what adopts a
+token for the MAC portal-side. Without the check, a timed-out attempt could
+still send its `get_profile` after a later candidate had authenticated,
+invalidating that healthy candidate's token and making discovery report a
+working portal as refused.
+
+Cancellation is deliberately cooperative rather than a socket-level abort
+threaded to axios: once a request is on the wire the server processes it
+regardless of what the client does, so tearing the socket down would not
+prevent the adoption. Only not sending the request does, which is exactly what
+the between-calls check guarantees.
+
+That leaves the window where the timer fires while a `get_profile` is already
+dispatched — which the check cannot cover, but sequencing can: discovery
+**drains** the abandoned attempt (bounded by one request budget) before probing
+the next candidate, instead of racing it. The request cannot be un-sent, but
+nothing forces us to have a competing session in flight while it lands.
+
+**A drain that times out stops discovery.** Draining is bounded, and the bound
+has to mean something: an attempt still unsettled after its own 65 s budget
+plus the 15 s drain is one no transport can recall — the PWA `fetch()` takes no
+signal at all, and the Electron main process runs its HTTP request to
+completion. Advancing anyway would stake the next candidate's freshly issued
+session on that request never landing. So the rejection carries
+`abandonedInFlight` and the candidate loop returns instead of probing on,
+preferring an honest "could not confirm this portal" the user can retry over a
+session that looks established and dies later. It costs nothing in the normal
+case: an aborted attempt settles as soon as its in-flight request errors out,
+so the drain returns at once and the loop continues.
+
+The budget itself covers the longest real flow: a status-2 portal costs four
+sequential requests (handshake, profile, `do_auth`, profile retry) and the
+Electron transport allows each 15 s, so a two-request budget would have failed
+valid but slow login portals.
+
+### Watchdog
+
+The portal expects `get_events` every `watchdog_timeout` seconds — **120 by
+default**, echoed in the profile together with a per-user `timeslot` jitter
+that offsets the first periodic ping. `StalkerWatchdogController` starts with
+an immediate `init=1` ping on activation, applies the profile cadence when a
+profile is decoded (clamped to 30–3600 s against garbage), and otherwise uses
+the documented 120 s default. Failing to ping never invalidates the session —
+it only affects the portal's admin-panel "online" reporting — so ping failures
+are logged and never retried or escalated.
+
 ## Request Transport and `cmd` Encoding
 
 A real MAG/STB sends `cmd` unencoded: the portal's client JS concatenates raw
@@ -390,9 +565,15 @@ Every static return therefore warms first, through one primitive —
 
 `ensureToken` performs handshake + `get_profile` with no link minted, and
 validates the identity the cached token was negotiated for — which the raw
-`getCachedToken()` the header builders use cannot. It is cheap where it is not
-needed: a simple portal returns immediately and a warm cache with a matching
-fingerprint resolves without a request.
+`getCachedToken()` cannot. It is cheap where it is not needed: a simple portal
+returns immediately and a warm cache with a matching fingerprint resolves
+without a request.
+
+The store's player feature reads `getCachedToken()` for its header set, which
+is safe there because it runs immediately after the warm above populated the
+cache for that same playlist. `StreamResolverService` cannot make that
+assumption — a direct-URL favorite reaches it with nothing warmed — so it goes
+through `ensureToken` instead; see "Playback Header Contract" below.
 
 The classification happens BEFORE the handshake, not after: a **foreign-host**
 static URL never needs the session at all, and warming it anyway would stall
@@ -563,6 +744,30 @@ Two stream profiles exist, selected by one shared predicate:
   never reach a third-party host; direct stream URLs carry their access token
   in the URL minted by `create_link`.
 
+**The token is bound to the endpoint the headers claim.** Both header inputs —
+the portal coordinates and the Bearer token — must describe the same portal, or
+a session negotiated for one host is presented to another. In
+`StreamResolverService` that is structural: the token is resolved from the same
+`headerPlaylist` object the headers are built from, never from the row it was
+derived from. The live case is a completed lazy repair, which moves the
+endpoint in the override but not in the stored row. Resolving from the override
+also keys the session cache the way `ensureStalkerSession()` and
+`executeStalkerRequest()` already do, so the collection route reuses their
+session instead of handshaking again for a second fingerprint.
+
+For the same reason `headerPlaylist` is built by applying the override to the
+row rather than folding in the two resolved coordinates: a repair rewrites the
+portal **mode** as well as the URL, and the token resolver is mode-aware. A
+playlist repaired from simple to full would otherwise keep its stale
+`isFullStalkerPortal: false` here — the `create_link` request having already
+run under the repaired mode and adopted a token — and the same-host gated
+stream would go out with no Bearer header on the very playback the repair
+existed to rescue.
+
+That resolution is skipped for a foreign host, whose profile carries no token
+anyway — obtaining one would only stall playback behind a handshake, exactly
+the trade the static branch avoids by classifying first.
+
 The Electron main process keeps a fallback header context per resolved
 `create_link` URL (`stalker-playback-context.service.ts`) for external-player
 launches that arrive without renderer headers. It classifies streams with the

libs/playlist/import/feature/src/lib/stalker-portal-import/stalker-portal-import.component.html

@@ -101,16 +101,27 @@
             'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.SIGNATURE_HINT' | translate
         }}</mat-hint>
     </mat-form-field>
-    <!-- <mat-form-field class="w-full">
+    <mat-form-field class="w-full">
         <mat-label for="username">{{
             'HOME.XTREAM_PLAYLIST.USERNAME' | translate
         }}</mat-label>
         <input matInput type="text" id="username" formControlName="username" />
+        <mat-hint>{{
+            'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.CREDENTIALS_HINT' | translate
+        }}</mat-hint>
     </mat-form-field>
     <mat-form-field class="w-full">
         <mat-label for="password">{{
             'HOME.XTREAM_PLAYLIST.PASSWORD' | translate
         }}</mat-label>
-        <input matInput type="text" id="password" formControlName="password" />
-    </mat-form-field> -->
+        <input
+            matInput
+            type="password"
+            id="password"
+            formControlName="password"
+        />
+        <mat-hint>{{
+            'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.CREDENTIALS_HINT' | translate
+        }}</mat-hint>
+    </mat-form-field>
 </form>

libs/playlist/import/feature/src/lib/stalker-portal-import/stalker-portal-import.component.spec.ts

@@ -2,13 +2,19 @@ import { TestBed } from '@angular/core/testing';
 import { MatSnackBar } from '@angular/material/snack-bar';
 import { Store } from '@ngrx/store';
 import { TranslateService } from '@ngx-translate/core';
-import { StalkerPortalDiscoveryService } from '@iptvnator/portal/stalker/data-access';
+import {
+    stalkerSessionFingerprint,
+    StalkerPortalDiscoveryService,
+    StalkerPortalError,
+} from '@iptvnator/portal/stalker/data-access';
+import { Playlist } from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
 import { StalkerPortalImportComponent } from './stalker-portal-import.component';
 
 describe('StalkerPortalImportComponent identity handling', () => {
     let component: StalkerPortalImportComponent;
     let portalDiscovery: { discover: jest.Mock };
     let store: { dispatch: jest.Mock };
+    let snackBar: { open: jest.Mock };
 
     beforeEach(() => {
         portalDiscovery = {
@@ -23,6 +29,7 @@ describe('StalkerPortalImportComponent identity handling', () => {
         store = {
             dispatch: jest.fn(),
         };
+        snackBar = { open: jest.fn() };
 
         TestBed.configureTestingModule({
             providers: [
@@ -33,7 +40,7 @@ describe('StalkerPortalImportComponent identity handling', () => {
                 { provide: Store, useValue: store },
                 {
                     provide: MatSnackBar,
-                    useValue: { open: jest.fn() },
+                    useValue: snackBar,
                 },
                 {
                     provide: TranslateService,
@@ -72,7 +79,10 @@ describe('StalkerPortalImportComponent identity handling', () => {
                 deviceId2: 'DEVICE-ID-2',
                 signature1: 'SIGNATURE-1',
                 signature2: 'SIGNATURE-2',
-            }
+            },
+            // Credentials ride along for portals that answer get_profile
+            // with status 2 (login/password required).
+            { credentials: { username: '', password: '' } }
         );
 
         const playlist = store.dispatch.mock.calls[0][0].playlist;
@@ -115,7 +125,8 @@ describe('StalkerPortalImportComponent identity handling', () => {
         expect(portalDiscovery.discover).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
             'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/c',
             '00:1A:79:AA:BB:CC',
-            {}
+            {},
+            { credentials: { username: '', password: '' } }
         );
 
         const playlist = store.dispatch.mock.calls[0][0].playlist;
@@ -131,6 +142,170 @@ describe('StalkerPortalImportComponent identity handling', () => {
         expect(playlist.signature2).toBeUndefined();
     });
 
+    it('passes the entered login and password into discovery', async () => {
+        component.form.patchValue({
+            _id: 'playlist-login',
+            title: 'Login Portal',
+            macAddress: '00:1A:79:00:00:08',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/c',
+            username: 'user',
+            password: 'secret',
+            importDate: '2026-05-15T00:00:00.000Z',
+        });
+
+        await component.addPlaylist();
+
+        expect(portalDiscovery.discover).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            expect.any(String),
+            '00:1A:79:00:00:08',
+            {},
+            { credentials: { username: 'user', password: 'secret' } }
+        );
+        // Persisted so runtime re-auth can repeat do_auth after the portal
+        // drops the session.
+        const playlist = store.dispatch.mock.calls[0][0].playlist;
+        expect(playlist.username).toBe('user');
+        expect(playlist.password).toBe('secret');
+    });
+
+    it('persists the cadence and the identity the token was negotiated for', async () => {
+        portalDiscovery.discover.mockResolvedValue({
+            status: 'resolved',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+            token: 'token-1',
+            watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 90,
+            timeslotSeconds: 11,
+        });
+        component.form.patchValue({
+            _id: 'playlist-cadence',
+            title: 'Cadence Portal',
+            macAddress: '00:1A:79:AA:BB:CC',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/c',
+            importDate: '2026-05-15T00:00:00.000Z',
+        });
+
+        await component.addPlaylist();
+
+        const playlist = store.dispatch.mock.calls[0][0].playlist;
+        expect(playlist.stalkerWatchdogTimeout).toBe(90);
+        expect(playlist.stalkerTimeslot).toBe(11);
+        // Without this a later start would re-present the token under an
+        // edited identity.
+        expect(playlist.stalkerSessionIdentity).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    });
+
+    it('records credentials in the imported session fingerprint', async () => {
+        // Otherwise the first runtime ensureToken() computes a fingerprint
+        // WITH the credentials, mismatches the imported one, and discards the
+        // session the import just established — silently defeating reuse for
+        // exactly the login portals this flow exists for.
+        portalDiscovery.discover.mockResolvedValue({
+            status: 'resolved',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+            token: 'token-1',
+        });
+        component.form.patchValue({
+            _id: 'playlist-login-fp',
+            title: 'Login Portal',
+            macAddress: '00:1A:79:00:00:08',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/c',
+            username: 'user',
+            password: 'secret',
+            importDate: '2026-05-15T00:00:00.000Z',
+        });
+
+        await component.addPlaylist();
+
+        const playlist = store.dispatch.mock.calls[0][0].playlist;
+        expect(playlist.stalkerSessionIdentity).toBe(
+            stalkerSessionFingerprint({
+                portalUrl:
+                    'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+                macAddress: '00:1A:79:00:00:08',
+                username: 'user',
+                password: 'secret',
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('records the effective cadence when the portal advertises none', async () => {
+        portalDiscovery.discover.mockResolvedValue({
+            status: 'resolved',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+            token: 'token-1',
+        });
+        component.form.patchValue({
+            _id: 'playlist-default-cadence',
+            title: 'Quiet Portal',
+            macAddress: '00:1A:79:AA:BB:CC',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/c',
+            importDate: '2026-05-15T00:00:00.000Z',
+        });
+
+        await component.addPlaylist();
+
+        const playlist = store.dispatch.mock.calls[0][0].playlist;
+        // Stored absence has to keep meaning "never profiled", or every
+        // later start would re-profile such a portal.
+        expect(playlist.stalkerWatchdogTimeout).toBe(120);
+        expect(playlist.stalkerTimeslot).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it("relays the portal's own refusal instead of a generic error", async () => {
+        portalDiscovery.discover.mockResolvedValue({
+            status: 'auth-rejected',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+            error: new StalkerPortalError('login-required'),
+        });
+        component.form.patchValue({
+            _id: 'playlist-refused',
+            title: 'Login Portal',
+            macAddress: '00:1A:79:00:00:08',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/c',
+            importDate: '2026-05-15T00:00:00.000Z',
+        });
+
+        await component.addPlaylist();
+
+        expect(snackBar.open).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.LOGIN_REQUIRED',
+            undefined,
+            expect.any(Object)
+        );
+        expect(store.dispatch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it("appends the portal's explanation to a blocked refusal", async () => {
+        portalDiscovery.discover.mockResolvedValue({
+            status: 'auth-rejected',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+            error: new StalkerPortalError(
+                'blocked',
+                'device conflict - device_id mismatch'
+            ),
+        });
+        component.form.patchValue({
+            _id: 'playlist-blocked',
+            title: 'Blocked Portal',
+            macAddress: '00:1A:79:AA:BB:CC',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/c',
+            importDate: '2026-05-15T00:00:00.000Z',
+        });
+
+        await component.addPlaylist();
+
+        // The translate mock returns keys, so both the kind headline and the
+        // portal-message wrapper must be present.
+        expect(snackBar.open).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.PORTAL_REFUSED HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.PORTAL_MESSAGE',
+            undefined,
+            expect.any(Object)
+        );
+    });
+
     it('classifies the offline fallback on the normalized URL, not the raw query', async () => {
         // A query merely MENTIONING /server/load.php must not make a
         // panel-style /c URL look canonical and abort the offline import.

libs/playlist/import/feature/src/lib/stalker-portal-import/stalker-portal-import.component.ts

@@ -13,11 +13,15 @@ import { Store } from '@ngrx/store';
 import { TranslatePipe, TranslateService } from '@ngx-translate/core';
 import { PlaylistActions } from '@iptvnator/m3u-state';
 import {
+    asStalkerPortalError,
     legacyTransformStalkerPortalUrl,
     normalizeStalkerPortalInputUrl,
+    STALKER_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT_PERIOD_SECONDS,
     StalkerPortalDiscoveryService,
     StalkerPortalIdentity,
     normalizeStalkerPortalIdentity,
+    stalkerSessionFingerprint,
+    type StalkerPortalErrorKind,
 } from '@iptvnator/portal/stalker/data-access';
 import {
     createRandomId,
@@ -129,18 +133,37 @@ export class StalkerPortalImportComponent {
             const discovery = await this.portalDiscovery.discover(
                 originalUrl,
                 formValue.macAddress ?? '',
-                stalkerIdentity
+                stalkerIdentity,
+                {
+                    credentials: {
+                        username: formValue.username ?? '',
+                        password: formValue.password ?? '',
+                    },
+                }
             );
 
             let portalUrl: string;
             let isFullStalkerPortal: boolean;
             let stalkerToken: string | undefined;
             let stalkerAccountInfo: Playlist['stalkerAccountInfo'] | undefined;
+            // The import profile is the only get_profile some portals ever
+            // see: later starts reuse the token and skip it, so the cadence
+            // it advertises has to be persisted here or the watchdog would
+            // stay on the 120 s default forever. Effective values, so stored
+            // absence keeps meaning "never profiled".
+            let stalkerWatchdogTimeout: number | undefined;
+            let stalkerTimeslot: number | undefined;
 
             if (discovery.status === 'resolved') {
                 portalUrl = discovery.portalUrl;
                 isFullStalkerPortal = discovery.isFullStalkerPortal;
                 stalkerToken = discovery.token;
+                if (stalkerToken) {
+                    stalkerWatchdogTimeout =
+                        discovery.watchdogTimeoutSeconds ??
+                        STALKER_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT_PERIOD_SECONDS;
+                    stalkerTimeslot = discovery.timeslotSeconds ?? 0;
+                }
 
                 if (discovery.accountInfo) {
                     stalkerAccountInfo = {
@@ -167,10 +190,13 @@ export class StalkerPortalImportComponent {
                     '[StalkerImport] Authentication failed:',
                     discovery.error
                 );
+                // The portal explains its own refusals — a demanded login, a
+                // rejected one, a device conflict — so relay those words
+                // instead of the generic "check URL and MAC".
                 this.snackBar.open(
-                    'Failed to authenticate with portal. Please check URL and MAC address.',
+                    this.buildAuthErrorMessage(discovery.error),
                     undefined,
-                    { duration: 5000 }
+                    { duration: 8000 }
                 );
                 return;
             } else if (
@@ -219,6 +245,25 @@ export class StalkerPortalImportComponent {
                 portalUrl,
                 isFullStalkerPortal,
                 stalkerToken,
+                // What this token was negotiated for: endpoint, identity AND
+                // credentials. Reuse is refused when any of them no longer
+                // matches — and the credentials must be included here, or the
+                // first runtime `ensureToken()` would compute a fingerprint
+                // WITH them, mismatch this one, and throw away the session
+                // the import just established.
+                ...(stalkerToken
+                    ? {
+                          stalkerSessionIdentity: stalkerSessionFingerprint({
+                              portalUrl,
+                              macAddress: formValue.macAddress ?? '',
+                              username: formValue.username ?? '',
+                              password: formValue.password ?? '',
+                              ...this.toPlaylistIdentityFields(stalkerIdentity),
+                          } as Playlist),
+                      }
+                    : {}),
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout,
+                stalkerTimeslot,
                 stalkerAccountInfo,
                 ...this.toPlaylistIdentityFields(stalkerIdentity),
             } as Playlist;
@@ -230,6 +275,36 @@ export class StalkerPortalImportComponent {
         }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Turns an authentication failure into a message the user can act on.
+     * The portal explains refusals itself (`msg`/`block_msg`, or one of the
+     * documented plain-text bodies); its own words are appended verbatim.
+     */
+    private buildAuthErrorMessage(error: unknown): string {
+        const portalError = asStalkerPortalError(error);
+        const keyByKind: Record<StalkerPortalErrorKind, string> = {
+            'login-required': 'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.LOGIN_REQUIRED',
+            'login-rejected': 'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.LOGIN_REJECTED',
+            blocked: 'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.PORTAL_REFUSED',
+            'auth-failed': 'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.AUTH_FAILED',
+        };
+        const base = this.translate.instant(
+            portalError
+                ? keyByKind[portalError.kind]
+                : 'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.AUTH_FAILED'
+        );
+
+        if (portalError?.portalText) {
+            const detail = this.translate.instant(
+                'HOME.STALKER_PORTAL.PORTAL_MESSAGE',
+                { message: portalError.portalText }
+            );
+            return `${base} ${detail}`;
+        }
+
+        return base;
+    }
+
     private toPlaylistIdentityFields(identity: StalkerPortalIdentity): {
         stalkerSerialNumber?: string;
         stalkerDeviceId1?: string;

libs/portal/shared/data-access/src/lib/collection/stream-resolver.service.spec.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@ import {
     XtreamApiService,
     XtreamUrlService,
 } from '@iptvnator/portal/xtream/data-access';
-import { StalkerSessionService } from '@iptvnator/portal/stalker/data-access';
+import {
+    StalkerPortalRepairService,
+    StalkerSessionService,
+} from '@iptvnator/portal/stalker/data-access';
 import { EpgRuntimeBridgeService } from '@iptvnator/epg/data-access';
 import {
     DataService,
@@ -25,6 +28,7 @@ describe('StreamResolverService', () => {
     let dataService: { sendIpcEvent: jest.Mock };
     let stalkerSession: {
         getCachedToken: jest.Mock;
+        ensureToken: jest.Mock;
         makeAuthenticatedRequest: jest.Mock;
     };
     let epgBridge: Partial<EpgRuntimeBridgeService>;
@@ -44,8 +48,8 @@ describe('StreamResolverService', () => {
         };
         stalkerSession = {
             getCachedToken: jest.fn(() => null),
-            makeAuthenticatedRequest: jest.fn(),
             ensureToken: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ token: null }),
+            makeAuthenticatedRequest: jest.fn(),
         };
         epgBridge = {
             getChannelPrograms: jest.fn(),
@@ -792,7 +796,10 @@ describe('StreamResolverService', () => {
                 isFullStalkerPortal: true,
             } satisfies Partial<Playlist>)
         );
-        stalkerSession.getCachedToken.mockReturnValue('TOKEN77');
+        // Playback goes through ensureToken, never the raw cache accessor:
+        // that one skips the endpoint/identity/credential check, so an
+        // edited playlist would put the old account's token in the headers.
+        stalkerSession.ensureToken.mockResolvedValue({ token: 'TOKEN77' });
         stalkerSession.makeAuthenticatedRequest.mockResolvedValue({
             js: { cmd: 'ffmpeg https://stalker.example.com:8080/live/88.ts' },
         });
@@ -808,7 +815,7 @@ describe('StreamResolverService', () => {
             stalkerCmd: 'ffrt3 http://stalker.example.com/media/88.mpg',
         } satisfies UnifiedCollectionItem);
 
-        expect(stalkerSession.getCachedToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith('stalker-1');
+        expect(stalkerSession.ensureToken).toHaveBeenCalled();
         expect(playback.headers?.['Cookie']).toContain(
             'mac=00:11:22:33:44:55'
         );
@@ -818,6 +825,202 @@ describe('StreamResolverService', () => {
         expect(playback.origin).toBe('https://stalker.example.com');
     });
 
+    it('binds the playback token to the endpoint the headers claim', async () => {
+        // A completed repair moved the endpoint. The headers are built from
+        // that moved endpoint, so the session must be negotiated for it too —
+        // authenticating against the pre-repair row would send a token minted
+        // for one host to another (and key the session cache differently from
+        // every other consumer, forcing a redundant handshake).
+        const stored = {
+            _id: 'stalker-1',
+            portalUrl: 'https://old.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+            macAddress: '00:11:22:33:44:55',
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } satisfies Partial<Playlist>;
+        const repaired =
+            'https://new.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php';
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(of(stored));
+        jest.spyOn(
+            TestBed.inject(StalkerPortalRepairService),
+            'applyOverride'
+        ).mockImplementation(
+            (playlist: any) => ({ ...playlist, portalUrl: repaired }) as any
+        );
+        stalkerSession.ensureToken.mockResolvedValue({ token: 'TOKEN88' });
+        stalkerSession.makeAuthenticatedRequest.mockResolvedValue({
+            js: { cmd: 'ffmpeg https://new.example.com:8080/live/88.ts' },
+        });
+
+        const playback = await service.resolvePlayback({
+            uid: 'stalker::stalker-1::88',
+            name: 'Moved Portal Channel',
+            contentType: 'live',
+            sourceType: 'stalker',
+            playlistId: 'stalker-1',
+            playlistName: 'Stalker',
+            stalkerId: '88',
+            stalkerCmd: 'ffrt3 http://old.example.com/media/88.mpg',
+        } satisfies UnifiedCollectionItem);
+
+        expect(stalkerSession.ensureToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            expect.objectContaining({ portalUrl: repaired })
+        );
+        expect(playback.headers?.['Authorization']).toBe('Bearer TOKEN88');
+        expect(playback.origin).toBe('https://new.example.com');
+    });
+
+    it('carries a repaired simple→full mode into the playback headers', async () => {
+        // A lazy repair rewrites the portal MODE as well as the URL. The
+        // create_link request runs under the repaired mode and adopts a token,
+        // so reading the stored row's stale `isFullStalkerPortal: false` when
+        // resolving that token would drop the Bearer header from the very
+        // playback the repair was meant to rescue.
+        const stored = {
+            _id: 'stalker-1',
+            portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/portal.php',
+            macAddress: '00:11:22:33:44:55',
+            isFullStalkerPortal: false,
+        } satisfies Partial<Playlist>;
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(of(stored));
+        jest.spyOn(
+            TestBed.inject(StalkerPortalRepairService),
+            'applyOverride'
+        ).mockImplementation(
+            (playlist: any) =>
+                ({
+                    ...playlist,
+                    portalUrl:
+                        'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+                    isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+                }) as any
+        );
+        stalkerSession.ensureToken.mockResolvedValue({ token: 'REPAIRED77' });
+        stalkerSession.makeAuthenticatedRequest.mockResolvedValue({
+            js: { cmd: 'ffmpeg https://portal.example.com:8080/live/95.ts' },
+        });
+
+        const playback = await service.resolvePlayback({
+            uid: 'stalker::stalker-1::95',
+            name: 'Repaired Portal Channel',
+            contentType: 'live',
+            sourceType: 'stalker',
+            playlistId: 'stalker-1',
+            playlistName: 'Stalker',
+            stalkerId: '95',
+            stalkerCmd: 'ffrt3 http://portal.example.com/media/95.mpg',
+        } satisfies UnifiedCollectionItem);
+
+        expect(stalkerSession.ensureToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            expect.objectContaining({ isFullStalkerPortal: true })
+        );
+        expect(playback.headers?.['Authorization']).toBe('Bearer REPAIRED77');
+    });
+
+    it('authenticates a cold session for a direct-URL radio favorite', async () => {
+        // A direct-URL radio favorite skips create_link entirely, so on a
+        // cold session nothing has authenticated and the in-memory cache is
+        // empty — the Bearer-gated stream would 403 in the audio player.
+        // Re-presenting the persisted token costs one idempotent handshake.
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                _id: 'stalker-1',
+                portalUrl:
+                    'https://stalker.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+                macAddress: '00:11:22:33:44:55',
+                isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+                stalkerToken: 'PERSISTED77',
+            } satisfies Partial<Playlist>)
+        );
+        stalkerSession.getCachedToken.mockReturnValue(null);
+        stalkerSession.ensureToken.mockResolvedValue({
+            token: 'PERSISTED77',
+        });
+
+        const playback = await service.resolvePlayback({
+            uid: 'stalker::stalker-1::99',
+            name: 'Gated Radio',
+            contentType: 'live',
+            sourceType: 'stalker',
+            playlistId: 'stalker-1',
+            playlistName: 'Stalker',
+            stalkerId: '99',
+            radio: 'true',
+            stalkerCmd: 'https://stalker.example.com/radio/99.mp3',
+        } satisfies UnifiedCollectionItem);
+
+        expect(stalkerSession.ensureToken).toHaveBeenCalled();
+        // The fast path must stay a fast path: no create_link round trip.
+        expect(stalkerSession.makeAuthenticatedRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(playback.headers?.['Authorization']).toBe('Bearer PERSISTED77');
+    });
+
+    it('falls back to create_link when the cold session cannot be established', async () => {
+        // A portal-owned static stream with no usable session would be served
+        // knowing it will 401, so playback is not blocked — it takes the
+        // `create_link` route instead, which mints a URL carrying its own
+        // token and is the only path that can trigger the lazy portal repair.
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                _id: 'stalker-1',
+                portalUrl:
+                    'https://stalker.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+                macAddress: '00:11:22:33:44:55',
+                isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+            } satisfies Partial<Playlist>)
+        );
+        stalkerSession.getCachedToken.mockReturnValue(null);
+        stalkerSession.ensureToken.mockRejectedValue(
+            new Error('handshake refused')
+        );
+        stalkerSession.makeAuthenticatedRequest.mockResolvedValue({
+            js: { cmd: 'ffmpeg https://stalker.example.com/radio/99-tmp.mp3' },
+        });
+
+        const playback = await service.resolvePlayback({
+            uid: 'stalker::stalker-1::99',
+            name: 'Gated Radio',
+            contentType: 'live',
+            sourceType: 'stalker',
+            playlistId: 'stalker-1',
+            playlistName: 'Stalker',
+            stalkerId: '99',
+            radio: 'true',
+            stalkerCmd: 'https://stalker.example.com/radio/99.mp3',
+        } satisfies UnifiedCollectionItem);
+
+        expect(playback.streamUrl).toBe(
+            'https://stalker.example.com/radio/99-tmp.mp3'
+        );
+        // No session, so no Bearer — the minted URL carries its own token.
+        expect(playback.headers?.['Authorization']).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('does not authenticate a simple portal for playback headers', async () => {
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                _id: 'stalker-2',
+                portalUrl: 'https://simple.example.com/portal.php',
+                macAddress: '00:11:22:33:44:55',
+                isFullStalkerPortal: false,
+            } satisfies Partial<Playlist>)
+        );
+        stalkerSession.getCachedToken.mockReturnValue(null);
+
+        await service.resolvePlayback({
+            uid: 'stalker::stalker-2::99',
+            name: 'Simple Radio',
+            contentType: 'live',
+            sourceType: 'stalker',
+            playlistId: 'stalker-2',
+            playlistName: 'Stalker',
+            stalkerId: '99',
+            radio: 'true',
+            stalkerCmd: 'https://simple.example.com/radio/99.mp3',
+        } satisfies UnifiedCollectionItem);
+
+        expect(stalkerSession.ensureToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
     it('keeps Stalker collection playback from a foreign CDN credential-free', async () => {
         playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
             of({
@@ -1027,10 +1230,12 @@ describe('StreamResolverService', () => {
                 _id: 'stalker-1',
                 portalUrl: 'https://new.example.com/portal.php',
                 macAddress: 'AA:BB:CC:00:00:99',
-                isFullStalkerPortal: false,
+                isFullStalkerPortal: true,
             } satisfies Partial<Playlist>)
         );
-        stalkerSession.getCachedToken.mockReturnValue('TOKEN-NEW');
+        // A full portal, so the Bearer assertion below is meaningful: only a
+        // portal with a session has a token to attach at all.
+        stalkerSession.ensureToken.mockResolvedValue({ token: 'TOKEN-NEW' });
 
         const playback = await service.resolvePlayback({
             uid: 'stalker::stalker-1::93',

libs/portal/shared/data-access/src/lib/collection/stream-resolver.service.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import {
     Channel,
     EpgItem,
     EpgProgram,
+    isFullStalkerPortalPlaylist,
     Playlist,
     isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe,
     ResolvedPortalPlayback,
@@ -505,7 +506,7 @@ export class StreamResolverService {
      * them to the stream origin; foreign hosts get the credential-free
      * profile from the shared classifier).
      */
-    private buildStalkerPlayback(
+    private async buildStalkerPlayback(
         item: UnifiedCollectionItem,
         playlist: Playlist | undefined,
         resolved: {
@@ -514,24 +515,51 @@ export class StreamResolverService {
             streamUrl: string;
             isLive?: boolean;
         }
-    ): ResolvedPortalPlayback {
+    ): Promise<ResolvedPortalPlayback> {
         // The item may carry portal/mac overrides for playlists that no
         // longer exist; the builder only reads header-relevant fields.
+        //
+        // The override is applied to the ROW, not just folded in as the two
+        // resolved coordinates: a repair rewrites the portal MODE as well as
+        // the URL, and a playlist repaired from simple to full would otherwise
+        // keep its stale `isFullStalkerPortal: false` here. The request that
+        // just ran adopted a token under the repaired mode, but the mode-aware
+        // token resolver below would read the stale flag and hand back none —
+        // emitting a same-host gated stream without the Bearer header on the
+        // very playback the repair existed to rescue.
         const headerPlaylist = {
-            ...(playlist ?? {}),
+            ...(playlist ? this.portalRepair.applyOverride(playlist) : {}),
             macAddress: resolved.macAddress,
             portalUrl: resolved.portalUrl,
         } as Playlist;
-        const token = this.stalkerSession.getCachedToken(item.playlistId);
+        const crossOriginStream = isCrossOriginStalkerStream(
+            headerPlaylist,
+            resolved.streamUrl
+        );
+        // Classified before authenticating, for the same reason the static
+        // branch classifies first: the header builder gives a foreign host the
+        // credential-free profile, so a token obtained here would be discarded
+        // — after stalling playback behind a handshake against a portal that
+        // may be slow or offline while the CDN is perfectly reachable.
+        //
+        // When it IS needed, the token is resolved from `headerPlaylist`
+        // rather than the row it came from: those are the exact coordinates
+        // the headers claim, so the bearer token and the MAC cookie cannot end
+        // up bound to a different endpoint than the one they are sent to. A
+        // repair override that moved the endpoint is the live case — it
+        // reaches `resolved.portalUrl` but not the raw row, and every other
+        // session consumer (`ensureStalkerSession`, `executeStalkerRequest`)
+        // already authenticates against the override, so this also stops the
+        // resolver from keying the session cache differently and re-shaking.
+        const token =
+            playlist && !crossOriginStream
+                ? await this.resolveStalkerPlaybackToken(headerPlaylist)
+                : null;
         const headers = buildStalkerExternalPlaybackHeaders(
             headerPlaylist,
             token,
             resolved.streamUrl
         );
-        const crossOriginStream = isCrossOriginStalkerStream(
-            headerPlaylist,
-            resolved.streamUrl
-        );
         const portalOrigin = getStalkerPortalOrigin(headerPlaylist);
 
         return {
@@ -550,6 +578,40 @@ export class StreamResolverService {
         };
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Resolves the Bearer token a full portal's stream needs.
+     *
+     * A direct-URL radio favorite skips `create_link` entirely, so on a cold
+     * session nothing has authenticated yet and the in-memory cache is empty —
+     * a same-host Bearer-gated stream would then 403 in the built-in audio
+     * player. `ensureToken()` re-presents the persisted token instead, which
+     * is a single idempotent handshake rather than a full re-auth. Failures
+     * stay non-fatal: many portals do not gate the stream itself.
+     */
+    private async resolveStalkerPlaybackToken(
+        playlist: Playlist | undefined
+    ): Promise<string | null> {
+        // The shared mode contract, not the raw flag: a legacy row with an
+        // absent flag but a canonical URL IS a full portal, and reading the
+        // property directly would skip authentication for it — a restored
+        // older backup opens a direct-URL radio favorite with no Bearer.
+        if (!playlist || !isFullStalkerPortalPlaylist(playlist)) {
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        // Always through ensureToken, never the raw cache accessor: that one
+        // skips the endpoint/identity/credential check, so after an edit this
+        // playback path would put the previous account's token into the
+        // stream headers. ensureToken returns the cached token when it is
+        // still valid for this playlist, so a warm session costs nothing.
+        try {
+            const { token } = await this.stalkerSession.ensureToken(playlist);
+            return token;
+        } catch {
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+
     private buildStalkerRadioChannel(
         item: UnifiedCollectionItem,
         playback: ResolvedPortalPlayback

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/index.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ export * from './lib/models';
 export * from './lib/stores';
 export * from './lib/stalker-account-info.service';
 export * from './lib/stalker-content-types';
+export * from './lib/stalker-portal-error';
+export * from './lib/stalker-response-classification';
+export * from './lib/stalker-session-store';
+export * from './lib/stalker-watchdog.controller';
 export * from './lib/stalker-itv-cache.service';
 export * from './lib/stalker-live-playback.utils';
 export * from './lib/stalker-portal-discovery.service';

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-auth.api.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+import type { DataService } from '@iptvnator/services';
+import type { createLogger } from '@iptvnator/portal/shared/util';
+import { StalkerAuthApi } from './stalker-auth.api';
+
+/**
+ * Client-side mirror of the mock server's `auth-handlers.spec.ts`: the same
+ * documented flows — status 2 → do_auth → profile retry, blocked profiles,
+ * idempotent token reuse, not_valid propagation — asserted against the
+ * requests the client actually sends.
+ */
+describe('StalkerAuthApi', () => {
+    const portalUrl =
+        'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php';
+    const macAddress = '00:1A:79:AA:BB:CC';
+
+    let sendIpcEvent: jest.Mock;
+    let api: StalkerAuthApi;
+
+    const logger = {
+        error: jest.fn(),
+        warn: jest.fn(),
+        debug: jest.fn(),
+    } as unknown as ReturnType<typeof createLogger>;
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        jest.clearAllMocks();
+        Object.defineProperty(globalThis, 'crypto', {
+            configurable: true,
+            value: {
+                subtle: {
+                    digest: jest.fn(
+                        async () => new Uint8Array(20).fill(1).buffer
+                    ),
+                },
+            },
+        });
+
+        sendIpcEvent = jest.fn();
+        api = new StalkerAuthApi(
+            { sendIpcEvent } as unknown as DataService,
+            logger
+        );
+    });
+
+    function callsByAction(action: string) {
+        return sendIpcEvent.mock.calls.filter(
+            (call) => call[1].params.action === action
+        );
+    }
+
+    it('walks the login-required flow: status 2 -> do_auth -> profile retry', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1', not_valid: 0 },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { status: 2, template: 'auth', info: 'Login required' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: true })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { status: 0, watchdog_timeout: 120, timeslot: 15 },
+            });
+
+        const result = await api.authenticate(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            { deviceId1: 'DEV-1', deviceId2: 'DEV-2' },
+            { credentials: { username: 'user', password: 'secret' } }
+        );
+
+        expect(result.token).toBe('TOKEN-1');
+        expect(result.watchdogTimeoutSeconds).toBe(120);
+        expect(result.timeslotSeconds).toBe(15);
+
+        // First profile request is NOT the second auth step.
+        const profiles = callsByAction('get_profile');
+        expect(profiles).toHaveLength(2);
+        expect(profiles[0][1].params.auth_second_step).toBe('0');
+        // The retry after do_auth is.
+        expect(profiles[1][1].params.auth_second_step).toBe('1');
+
+        // do_auth carries the credentials and the device identity.
+        const doAuth = callsByAction('do_auth');
+        expect(doAuth).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(doAuth[0][1].params).toEqual(
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                login: 'user',
+                password: 'secret',
+                device_id: 'DEV-1',
+                device_id2: 'DEV-2',
+            })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('throws login-required when the portal wants credentials and none are stored', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 2 } });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress)
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            name: 'StalkerPortalError',
+            kind: 'login-required',
+        });
+        // Empty credentials are never sent to the billing script.
+        expect(callsByAction('do_auth')).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('throws login-rejected when do_auth answers {js:false}', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 2 } })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: false });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+                credentials: { username: 'user', password: 'wrong' },
+            })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ kind: 'login-rejected' });
+    });
+
+    it('throws login-rejected when the profile still demands a login after do_auth', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 2 } })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: true })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 2 } });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+                credentials: { username: 'user', password: 'secret' },
+            })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ kind: 'login-rejected' });
+    });
+
+    it('carries the portal explanation out of every login refusal', async () => {
+        // The actionable sentence ("wrong password", "subscription expired")
+        // rides along with the refusal, and the dialog renders it after the
+        // generic line. Each exit must read the response IN HAND: the retry
+        // explains its own rejection, and quoting the first profile back
+        // would describe a request that already succeeded.
+        const handshake = { js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' } };
+        const credentials = { username: 'user', password: 'secret' };
+
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce(handshake)
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { status: 2, msg: 'Enter your subscriber login' },
+            });
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress)
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            kind: 'login-required',
+            portalText: 'Enter your subscriber login',
+        });
+
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce(handshake)
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 2, msg: 'Login needed' } })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: false });
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, { credentials })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            kind: 'login-rejected',
+            portalText: 'Login needed',
+        });
+
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce(handshake)
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 2, msg: 'Login needed' } })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: true })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { status: 2, block_msg: 'Subscription expired' },
+            });
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, { credentials })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            kind: 'login-rejected',
+            // The retry's text, not the first profile's.
+            portalText: 'Subscription expired',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('decodes a blocked profile into the portal explanation', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: {
+                    status: 1,
+                    msg: 'device conflict - device_id mismatch',
+                    block_msg: 'Your STB is damaged.<br/> Call the provider.',
+                },
+            });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress)
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            kind: 'blocked',
+            portalText:
+                'device conflict - device_id mismatch — Your STB is damaged. Call the provider.',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('treats a bare {status:1} profile as refused', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 1 } });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress)
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ kind: 'blocked' });
+    });
+
+    it('propagates the handshake not_valid flag into not_valid_token', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'NEW-TOKEN', random: 'r1', not_valid: 1 },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 0 } });
+
+        await api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+            storedToken: 'STALE-TOKEN',
+        });
+
+        const profile = callsByAction('get_profile')[0][1];
+        expect(profile.params.not_valid_token).toBe('1');
+    });
+
+    it('re-presents a stored token and skips get_profile when it comes back unchanged', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+            js: { token: 'STORED-TOKEN', random: 'r1', not_valid: 0 },
+        });
+
+        const result = await api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+            storedToken: 'STORED-TOKEN',
+            skipProfileWhenReused: true,
+        });
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({
+            token: 'STORED-TOKEN',
+            reusedStoredToken: true,
+        });
+        expect(callsByAction('handshake')[0][1].params.token).toBe(
+            'STORED-TOKEN'
+        );
+        expect(callsByAction('get_profile')).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('runs the full profile when the portal replaces a stale stored token', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'FRESH-TOKEN', random: 'r1', not_valid: 1 },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 0 } });
+
+        const result = await api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+            storedToken: 'STALE-TOKEN',
+            skipProfileWhenReused: true,
+        });
+
+        expect(result.token).toBe('FRESH-TOKEN');
+        expect(result.reusedStoredToken).toBe(false);
+        expect(callsByAction('get_profile')).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('does not reuse an echoed token the portal flagged not_valid', async () => {
+        // `not_valid: 1` is the portal saying the presented token is not a
+        // live session. Adopting it because the string matched would be
+        // unrecoverable: nothing writes a replacement back, so every later
+        // start would re-present the same dead token.
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'STORED-TOKEN', random: 'r1', not_valid: 1 },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: 0 } });
+
+        const result = await api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+            storedToken: 'STORED-TOKEN',
+            skipProfileWhenReused: true,
+        });
+
+        expect(result.reusedStoredToken).toBe(false);
+        expect(callsByAction('get_profile')).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(callsByAction('get_profile')[0][1].params.not_valid_token).toBe(
+            '1'
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('decodes a stringified status 2 into the login flow', async () => {
+        // Portals routinely stringify numeric fields — the same reason
+        // watchdog_timeout/timeslot accept strings. A strict === would read
+        // "2" as a healthy profile and skip do_auth entirely.
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: '2' } })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: true })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: '0' } });
+
+        const result = await api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+            credentials: { username: 'user', password: 'secret' },
+        });
+
+        expect(result.token).toBe('TOKEN-1');
+        expect(callsByAction('do_auth')).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(
+            callsByAction('get_profile')[1][1].params.auth_second_step
+        ).toBe('1');
+    });
+
+    it('decodes a stringified status 1 as a refusal', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { status: '1' } });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress)
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ kind: 'blocked' });
+    });
+
+    it('never sends get_profile once the caller abandoned the attempt', async () => {
+        // The harm this prevents: `get_profile` is what adopts a token for
+        // the MAC portal-side, so an abandoned discovery attempt reaching it
+        // after another candidate authenticated would invalidate that
+        // healthy candidate's token.
+        const abandon = new AbortController();
+        sendIpcEvent.mockImplementationOnce(async () => {
+            abandon.abort();
+            return { js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' } };
+        });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+                signal: abandon.signal,
+            })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'StalkerAuthAbortedError' });
+
+        expect(callsByAction('handshake')).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(callsByAction('get_profile')).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('does not even handshake when already abandoned', async () => {
+        const abandon = new AbortController();
+        abandon.abort();
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+                signal: abandon.signal,
+            })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'StalkerAuthAbortedError' });
+
+        expect(sendIpcEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('rechecks the abort after the async prehash, not just before the call', async () => {
+        // getProfile awaits generatePrehash(); an abort landing during that
+        // await would otherwise still let the adopting request go out.
+        const abandon = new AbortController();
+        const digest = globalThis.crypto.subtle.digest as jest.Mock;
+        digest.mockImplementation(async () => {
+            abandon.abort();
+            return new Uint8Array(20).fill(1).buffer;
+        });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.getProfile(portalUrl, macAddress, 'TOKEN-1', {}, 'r1', {
+                signal: abandon.signal,
+            })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'StalkerAuthAbortedError' });
+
+        expect(sendIpcEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('stops the status-2 login flow when abandoned mid-way', async () => {
+        const abandon = new AbortController();
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' } })
+            .mockImplementationOnce(async () => {
+                abandon.abort();
+                return { js: { status: 2 } };
+            });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress, {}, {
+                credentials: { username: 'user', password: 'secret' },
+                signal: abandon.signal,
+            })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'StalkerAuthAbortedError' });
+
+        expect(callsByAction('do_auth')).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('classifies a transport auth-failure marker during get_profile', async () => {
+        sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'TOKEN-1', random: 'r1' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                stalkerAuthFailure: 'Unauthorized request.',
+            });
+
+        await expect(
+            api.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress)
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            kind: 'auth-failed',
+            failureBody: 'Unauthorized request.',
+        });
+    });
+});

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-auth.api.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
+import type { DataService } from '@iptvnator/services';
+import {
+    extractStalkerAuthFailureBody,
+    STALKER_REQUEST,
+} from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
+import type { createLogger } from '@iptvnator/portal/shared/util';
+import {
+    normalizeStalkerPortalIdentity,
+    type StalkerPortalIdentity,
+} from './stalker-identity.utils';
+import {
+    combineStalkerPortalMessages,
+    StalkerPortalError,
+} from './stalker-portal-error';
+
+export interface StalkerHandshakeResponse {
+    js: {
+        token: string;
+        not_valid?: number;
+        random?: string;
+    };
+}
+
+export interface StalkerProfileResponse {
+    js: {
+        id?: string;
+        name?: string;
+        mac?: string;
+        status?: number;
+        msg?: string;
+        block_msg?: string;
+        /** Watchdog cadence in seconds, echoed by the portal (default 120). */
+        watchdog_timeout?: number | string;
+        /** Per-user jitter in seconds so watchdog pings do not align. */
+        timeslot?: number | string;
+        account_info?: {
+            login?: string;
+            expire_date?: number;
+            tariff_plan_name?: string;
+            status?: number;
+        };
+    };
+}
+
+interface StalkerAuthConfirmationResponse {
+    js?: boolean;
+}
+
+export interface StalkerPortalCredentials {
+    username?: string;
+    password?: string;
+}
+
+export interface StalkerAuthenticateOptions {
+    /**
+     * Previously persisted session token. The handshake is idempotent: it is
+     * re-presented, and the portal returns it unchanged while it is still the
+     * MAC's session token.
+     */
+    storedToken?: string;
+    /** Login/password for portals that answer `get_profile` with status 2. */
+    credentials?: StalkerPortalCredentials;
+    /**
+     * Skip the `get_profile` round trip when the stored token came back
+     * unchanged — an unchanged token is already an adopted session.
+     */
+    skipProfileWhenReused?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Abandons the flow between portal calls.
+     *
+     * This is what a timed-out discovery attempt needs: `get_profile` is the
+     * call that adopts a token for the MAC portal-side, so an abandoned
+     * attempt reaching it AFTER another candidate authenticated would
+     * invalidate that healthy candidate's token. Checking the signal before
+     * each call stops the request from being sent, which is the only thing
+     * that prevents it — a request already on the wire is processed by the
+     * server whether or not the client tears the socket down.
+     */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+}
+
+export interface StalkerAuthenticationResult {
+    token: string;
+    accountInfo?: StalkerProfileResponse['js']['account_info'];
+    /**
+     * Raw envelope so callers can apply their own failure checks — endpoint
+     * discovery rejects a candidate whose `get_profile` refuses even though
+     * the handshake succeeded. Absent when the stored token was reused and
+     * no profile was fetched.
+     */
+    profileResponse?: StalkerProfileResponse;
+    /** True when the stored token was accepted and `get_profile` was skipped. */
+    reusedStoredToken?: boolean;
+    watchdogTimeoutSeconds?: number;
+    timeslotSeconds?: number;
+}
+
+interface StalkerHandshakeOutcome {
+    token: string;
+    random: string;
+    /** The portal flagged the presented stored token as no longer valid. */
+    notValid: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SHA1 hash using native Web Crypto API
+ * Produces correct 40-character hex hash matching real Stalker clients
+ */
+async function sha1(str: string): Promise<string> {
+    const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+    const data = encoder.encode(str);
+    const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-1', data);
+    const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer));
+    return hashArray.map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generates SHA1 prehash from MAC address
+ * This must match what real Stalker clients send
+ */
+async function generatePrehash(macAddress: string): Promise<string> {
+    // Use MAC address with colons, uppercase - this is what most clients use
+    const str = macAddress.toUpperCase();
+    return (await sha1(str)).toUpperCase();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generates a random string for metrics
+ */
+function generateRandom(): string {
+    const chars = 'abcdef0123456789';
+    let result = '';
+    for (let i = 0; i < 40; i++) {
+        result += chars.charAt(Math.floor(Math.random() * chars.length));
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+
+function toFiniteNumber(value: unknown): number | undefined {
+    if (typeof value === 'number' && Number.isFinite(value)) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    if (typeof value === 'string' && value.trim() !== '') {
+        const parsed = Number(value);
+        return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? parsed : undefined;
+    }
+    return undefined;
+}
+
+/** Raised when a caller abandoned the flow between portal calls. */
+export class StalkerAuthAbortedError extends Error {
+    constructor() {
+        super('Stalker authentication was aborted');
+        this.name = 'StalkerAuthAbortedError';
+    }
+}
+
+function assertNotAborted(signal: AbortSignal | undefined): void {
+    if (signal?.aborted) {
+        throw new StalkerAuthAbortedError();
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Throws when a response is one of the portal's plain-text auth-failure
+ * bodies (already classified by the transport, or still raw on legacy paths).
+ */
+function assertNotAuthFailure(response: unknown): void {
+    const failureBody = extractStalkerAuthFailureBody(response);
+    if (failureBody) {
+        throw new StalkerPortalError('auth-failed', failureBody, failureBody);
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Raw Stalker authentication requests plus the documented login flow.
+ *
+ * Protocol (Stalker 4.9.35): `handshake` issues an idempotent token;
+ * `get_profile` turns it into a session and decodes as: full profile = OK,
+ * `status: 1` = blocked (see `msg`/`block_msg`), `status: 2` = login/password
+ * required → `do_auth`, then `get_profile` again with `auth_second_step=1`.
+ */
+export class StalkerAuthApi {
+    constructor(
+        private readonly dataService: DataService,
+        private readonly logger: ReturnType<typeof createLogger>
+    ) {}
+
+    async performHandshake(
+        portalUrl: string,
+        macAddress: string,
+        identity: StalkerPortalIdentity = {},
+        storedToken?: string,
+        signal?: AbortSignal
+    ): Promise<StalkerHandshakeOutcome> {
+        const normalizedIdentity = normalizeStalkerPortalIdentity(identity);
+        const prehash = await generatePrehash(macAddress);
+
+        const params: Record<string, string> = {
+            type: 'stb',
+            action: 'handshake',
+            // Re-presenting a persisted token is how a real client resumes a
+            // session: an idempotent portal returns it unchanged.
+            token: storedToken ?? '',
+            prehash,
+            JsHttpRequest: '1-xml',
+        };
+
+        try {
+            // Re-checked here rather than only at the call site: the prehash
+            // above is async, so an abort can land while it is being
+            // computed and the request would still go out.
+            assertNotAborted(signal);
+            const response =
+                await this.dataService.sendIpcEvent<StalkerHandshakeResponse>(
+                    STALKER_REQUEST,
+                    {
+                        url: portalUrl,
+                        macAddress,
+                        params,
+                        ...(normalizedIdentity.serialNumber
+                            ? { serialNumber: normalizedIdentity.serialNumber }
+                            : {}),
+                    }
+                );
+
+            assertNotAuthFailure(response);
+
+            if (response?.js?.token) {
+                return {
+                    token: response.js.token,
+                    random: response.js.random || generateRandom(),
+                    notValid: Number(response.js.not_valid ?? 0) === 1,
+                };
+            }
+
+            this.logger.error('No token in response');
+            throw new Error('Handshake failed: No token received');
+        } catch (error) {
+            this.logger.error('Handshake error:', error);
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Gets account profile information to validate the portal and check
+     * subscription. `authSecondStep` is set only on the retry after `do_auth`;
+     * `notValidToken` propagates the handshake's `not_valid` flag.
+     */
+    async getProfile(
+        portalUrl: string,
+        macAddress: string,
+        token: string,
+        identity: StalkerPortalIdentity,
+        handshakeRandom: string,
+        options: {
+            authSecondStep?: boolean;
+            notValidToken?: boolean;
+            signal?: AbortSignal;
+        } = {}
+    ): Promise<StalkerProfileResponse> {
+        const normalizedIdentity = normalizeStalkerPortalIdentity(identity);
+
+        // Build metrics JSON matching working app
+        const metrics: Record<string, string> = {
+            mac: macAddress,
+            model: 'MAG250',
+            type: 'STB',
+            random: handshakeRandom,
+            ...(normalizedIdentity.serialNumber
+                ? { sn: normalizedIdentity.serialNumber }
+                : {}),
+        };
+
+        // Generate prehash for get_profile (same as handshake)
+        const prehash = await generatePrehash(macAddress);
+
+        const params: Record<string, string> = {
+            type: 'stb',
+            action: 'get_profile',
+            hd: '1',
+            not_valid_token: options.notValidToken ? '1' : '0',
+            video_out: 'hdmi',
+            auth_second_step: options.authSecondStep ? '1' : '0',
+            num_banks: '2',
+            metrics: JSON.stringify(metrics),
+            ...(normalizedIdentity.serialNumber
+                ? { sn: normalizedIdentity.serialNumber }
+                : {}),
+            ...(normalizedIdentity.deviceId1
+                ? { device_id: normalizedIdentity.deviceId1 }
+                : {}),
+            ...(normalizedIdentity.deviceId2
+                ? { device_id2: normalizedIdentity.deviceId2 }
+                : {}),
+            ...(normalizedIdentity.signature1
+                ? { signature: normalizedIdentity.signature1 }
+                : {}),
+            ...(normalizedIdentity.signature2
+                ? { signature2: normalizedIdentity.signature2 }
+                : {}),
+            prehash: prehash,
+            stb_type: '',
+            JsHttpRequest: '1-xml',
+        };
+
+        try {
+            // The last possible moment before the call that adopts the MAC's
+            // token portal-side — the prehash above is async, so the caller's
+            // pre-check can be stale by now.
+            assertNotAborted(options.signal);
+            const response =
+                await this.dataService.sendIpcEvent<StalkerProfileResponse>(
+                    STALKER_REQUEST,
+                    {
+                        url: portalUrl,
+                        macAddress,
+                        params,
+                        token,
+                        ...(normalizedIdentity.serialNumber
+                            ? { serialNumber: normalizedIdentity.serialNumber }
+                            : {}),
+                    }
+                );
+
+            assertNotAuthFailure(response);
+            return response;
+        } catch (error) {
+            this.logger.error('Get profile error:', error);
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Performs `do_auth` — the login/password step behind `get_profile`
+     * status 2. Returns the portal's bare boolean verdict.
+     */
+    async doAuth(
+        portalUrl: string,
+        macAddress: string,
+        token: string,
+        credentials: StalkerPortalCredentials,
+        identity: StalkerPortalIdentity = {},
+        signal?: AbortSignal
+    ): Promise<boolean> {
+        const normalizedIdentity = normalizeStalkerPortalIdentity(identity);
+        const params: Record<string, string> = {
+            type: 'stb',
+            action: 'do_auth',
+            login: credentials.username ?? '',
+            password: credentials.password ?? '',
+            ...(normalizedIdentity.deviceId1
+                ? { device_id: normalizedIdentity.deviceId1 }
+                : {}),
+            ...(normalizedIdentity.deviceId2
+                ? { device_id2: normalizedIdentity.deviceId2 }
+                : {}),
+            JsHttpRequest: '1-xml',
+        };
+
+        try {
+            assertNotAborted(signal);
+            const response =
+                await this.dataService.sendIpcEvent<StalkerAuthConfirmationResponse>(
+                    STALKER_REQUEST,
+                    {
+                        url: portalUrl,
+                        macAddress,
+                        params,
+                        token,
+                        ...(normalizedIdentity.serialNumber
+                            ? { serialNumber: normalizedIdentity.serialNumber }
+                            : {}),
+                    }
+                );
+
+            assertNotAuthFailure(response);
+
+            // do_auth returns { js: true } on success
+            return response?.js === true;
+        } catch (error) {
+            this.logger.error('do_auth error:', error);
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Full authentication flow: handshake → (optional token reuse) →
+     * get_profile → (status 2 → do_auth → get_profile with
+     * auth_second_step=1) → decoded profile.
+     */
+    async authenticate(
+        portalUrl: string,
+        macAddress: string,
+        identity: StalkerPortalIdentity = {},
+        options: StalkerAuthenticateOptions = {}
+    ): Promise<StalkerAuthenticationResult> {
+        const normalizedIdentity = normalizeStalkerPortalIdentity(identity);
+
+        assertNotAborted(options.signal);
+        const handshake = await this.performHandshake(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            normalizedIdentity,
+            options.storedToken,
+            options.signal
+        );
+
+        // An unchanged stored token is already an adopted session — the
+        // profile round trip is what token persistence saves. `not_valid`
+        // vetoes that shortcut: it is the portal saying the presented token
+        // is not a live session, and adopting it anyway would be
+        // unrecoverable — nothing writes a new token back, so every later
+        // start would re-present the same dead one.
+        if (
+            options.skipProfileWhenReused &&
+            options.storedToken &&
+            !handshake.notValid &&
+            handshake.token === options.storedToken
+        ) {
+            return { token: handshake.token, reusedStoredToken: true };
+        }
+
+        // The abandoned-attempt guard that matters: this is the call that
+        // adopts the token for the MAC portal-side.
+        assertNotAborted(options.signal);
+        const profile = await this.getProfile(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            handshake.token,
+            normalizedIdentity,
+            handshake.random,
+            {
+                authSecondStep: false,
+                notValidToken: handshake.notValid,
+                signal: options.signal,
+            }
+        );
+
+        // The envelope the login flow actually settled on: after a status-2
+        // `do_auth` that is the RETRIED profile, not the first one.
+        const profileResponse = await this.resolveProfile(
+            profile,
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            handshake,
+            normalizedIdentity,
+            options
+        );
+        const resolved = profileResponse?.js;
+
+        return {
+            token: handshake.token,
+            accountInfo: resolved?.account_info,
+            profileResponse,
+            reusedStoredToken: false,
+            watchdogTimeoutSeconds: toFiniteNumber(resolved?.watchdog_timeout),
+            timeslotSeconds: toFiniteNumber(resolved?.timeslot),
+        };
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Decodes `js.status` and drives the status-2 login flow. Throws a
+     * `StalkerPortalError` carrying the portal's own `msg`/`block_msg` text
+     * when the portal refused the session.
+     */
+    private async resolveProfile(
+        profile: StalkerProfileResponse,
+        portalUrl: string,
+        macAddress: string,
+        handshake: StalkerHandshakeOutcome,
+        identity: StalkerPortalIdentity,
+        options: StalkerAuthenticateOptions
+    ): Promise<StalkerProfileResponse> {
+        let settled = profile;
+        let js = profile?.js;
+
+        // Portals routinely stringify numeric fields (the same reason
+        // `watchdog_timeout`/`timeslot` are typed `number | string`), so a
+        // strict `=== 2` would read `"2"` as a healthy profile and skip the
+        // whole login flow.
+        if (toFiniteNumber(js?.status) === 2) {
+            // The portal's own sentence travels WITH the refusal — "wrong
+            // password", "subscription expired", "contact your provider" —
+            // and reading it is the whole reason these errors carry
+            // `portalText`. It is read at each exit rather than once up
+            // front because `js` advances to the retry's response below: the
+            // second refusal explains itself, and quoting the first one back
+            // would describe a request that already succeeded.
+            const loginText = () =>
+                combineStalkerPortalMessages(js?.msg, js?.block_msg);
+            const username = options.credentials?.username?.trim() ?? '';
+            const password = options.credentials?.password ?? '';
+            if (!username || !password) {
+                throw new StalkerPortalError('login-required', loginText());
+            }
+
+            assertNotAborted(options.signal);
+            const accepted = await this.doAuth(
+                portalUrl,
+                macAddress,
+                handshake.token,
+                { username, password },
+                identity,
+                options.signal
+            );
+            if (!accepted) {
+                // `do_auth` answers a bare `{js: false}`, so the only text
+                // available here is the profile's — which is the one that
+                // asked for the login in the first place.
+                throw new StalkerPortalError('login-rejected', loginText());
+            }
+
+            assertNotAborted(options.signal);
+            const retried = await this.getProfile(
+                portalUrl,
+                macAddress,
+                handshake.token,
+                identity,
+                handshake.random,
+                {
+                    authSecondStep: true,
+                    notValidToken: handshake.notValid,
+                    signal: options.signal,
+                }
+            );
+            settled = retried;
+            js = retried?.js;
+            if (toFiniteNumber(js?.status) === 2) {
+                throw new StalkerPortalError('login-rejected', loginText());
+            }
+        }
+
+        const portalText = combineStalkerPortalMessages(
+            js?.msg,
+            js?.block_msg
+        );
+
+        if (toFiniteNumber(js?.status) === 1 || portalText) {
+            this.logger.error('Profile error:', portalText ?? 'status 1');
+            throw new StalkerPortalError('blocked', portalText);
+        }
+
+        return settled;
+    }
+}

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-portal-discovery.service.spec.ts

@@ -101,7 +101,12 @@ describe('StalkerPortalDiscoveryService', () => {
         expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
             'http://ministra.example/server/load.php',
             MAC,
-            { serialNumber: 'SN1' }
+            { serialNumber: 'SN1' },
+            // Import credentials ride along for portals that answer
+            // get_profile with status 2 (login/password required).
+            // A per-attempt abort signal: a timed-out authentication must
+            // not send its get_profile behind the next candidate's back.
+            { credentials: undefined, signal: expect.any(AbortSignal) }
         );
     });
 
@@ -190,7 +195,10 @@ describe('StalkerPortalDiscoveryService', () => {
         expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
             'http://gated.example/portal.php',
             MAC,
-            {}
+            {},
+            // A per-attempt abort signal: a timed-out authentication must
+            // not send its get_profile behind the next candidate's back.
+            { credentials: undefined, signal: expect.any(AbortSignal) }
         );
     });
 
@@ -343,4 +351,153 @@ describe('StalkerPortalDiscoveryService', () => {
             isFullStalkerPortal: false,
         });
     });
+
+    it('aborts a timed-out authentication before advancing to the next candidate', async () => {
+        jest.useFakeTimers();
+        try {
+            mockProbes({
+                'http://slow.example/portal.php': {
+                    resolve: 'Authorization failed.',
+                },
+            });
+
+            let captured: AbortSignal | undefined;
+            authenticate.mockImplementation(
+                (_url, _mac, _identity, options) => {
+                    captured = options?.signal;
+                    // Hangs past the auth budget, like the real symptom.
+                    return new Promise(() => undefined);
+                }
+            );
+
+            const discovery = service.discover(
+                'http://slow.example/c',
+                MAC
+            );
+            // Let the probe resolve so the auth attempt actually starts.
+            await Promise.resolve();
+            await Promise.resolve();
+            await Promise.resolve();
+
+            jest.advanceTimersByTime(65_000);
+            await Promise.resolve();
+
+            // The abandoned attempt is cancelled, so its get_profile never
+            // goes out to adopt the MAC's token behind a later candidate.
+            expect(captured?.aborted).toBe(true);
+
+            // …and discovery does not RACE it: a request already dispatched
+            // cannot be un-sent, so the run drains it (bounded) instead of
+            // probing the next candidate while it may still land.
+            jest.advanceTimersByTime(15_000);
+            // Outcome shape is unchanged: a timed-out confirmation is still
+            // reported as a refusal of that endpoint.
+            await expect(discovery).resolves.toMatchObject({
+                status: 'auth-rejected',
+                portalUrl: 'http://slow.example/portal.php',
+            });
+        } finally {
+            jest.useRealTimers();
+        }
+    });
+
+    it('drains an abandoned attempt instead of probing the next candidate', async () => {
+        jest.useFakeTimers();
+        try {
+            // Two candidates both answer "auth required", so a resolved first
+            // attempt would stop the run — only a timed-out one advances.
+            mockProbes({
+                'http://slow.example/portal.php': {
+                    resolve: 'Authorization failed.',
+                },
+                'http://slow.example/server/load.php': {
+                    resolve: 'Authorization failed.',
+                },
+            });
+
+            let settleFirst: (() => void) | undefined;
+            authenticate
+                .mockImplementationOnce(
+                    () =>
+                        new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
+                            settleFirst = () => reject(new Error('late'));
+                        })
+                )
+                .mockResolvedValue({ token: 'SECOND' });
+
+            const discovery = service.discover('http://slow.example/c', MAC);
+            for (let i = 0; i < 6; i += 1) {
+                await Promise.resolve();
+            }
+
+            jest.advanceTimersByTime(65_000);
+            for (let i = 0; i < 6; i += 1) {
+                await Promise.resolve();
+            }
+
+            // The first attempt is still on the wire: the second candidate
+            // must NOT have been authenticated yet, or its token could be
+            // invalidated by the first one's late get_profile.
+            expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+            // Once it settles, the run continues immediately.
+            settleFirst?.();
+            for (let i = 0; i < 10; i += 1) {
+                await Promise.resolve();
+            }
+            expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+            await expect(discovery).resolves.toMatchObject({
+                status: 'resolved',
+            });
+        } finally {
+            jest.useRealTimers();
+        }
+    });
+
+    it('stops discovery when the drain deadline expires with the attempt still live', async () => {
+        jest.useFakeTimers();
+        try {
+            // Cancellation is cooperative: neither transport can pull a
+            // request off the wire. An attempt still unsettled 80 s in may
+            // yet land its `get_profile`, which adopts the MAC's token
+            // portal-side — so probing on would stake the next candidate's
+            // freshly issued session on a request nobody can recall.
+            mockProbes({
+                'http://hung.example/portal.php': {
+                    resolve: 'Authorization failed.',
+                },
+                'http://hung.example/server/load.php': {
+                    resolve: 'Authorization failed.',
+                },
+            });
+
+            // Never settles — not even after the drain.
+            authenticate
+                .mockImplementationOnce(() => new Promise(() => undefined))
+                .mockResolvedValue({ token: 'SECOND' });
+
+            const discovery = service.discover('http://hung.example/c', MAC);
+            for (let i = 0; i < 6; i += 1) {
+                await Promise.resolve();
+            }
+
+            jest.advanceTimersByTime(65_000);
+            for (let i = 0; i < 6; i += 1) {
+                await Promise.resolve();
+            }
+            jest.advanceTimersByTime(15_000);
+            for (let i = 0; i < 10; i += 1) {
+                await Promise.resolve();
+            }
+
+            await expect(discovery).resolves.toMatchObject({
+                status: 'auth-rejected',
+                abandonedInFlight: true,
+            });
+            // The second candidate was never authenticated.
+            expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        } finally {
+            jest.useRealTimers();
+        }
+    });
 });

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-portal-discovery.service.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { DataService } from '@iptvnator/services';
 import { STALKER_REQUEST } from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
 import { createLogger } from '@iptvnator/portal/shared/util';
 import {
+    StalkerPortalCredentials,
     StalkerProfileResponse,
     StalkerSessionService,
 } from './stalker-session.service';
@@ -26,6 +27,13 @@ export interface StalkerPortalEndpointResolution {
     token?: string;
     /** Account block from the classification `get_profile` (full portals only). */
     accountInfo?: StalkerProfileResponse['js']['account_info'];
+    /**
+     * Watchdog cadence the confirming `get_profile` advertised. Persisted at
+     * import because a later start reuses the token and skips the only
+     * response that carries it.
+     */
+    watchdogTimeoutSeconds?: number;
+    timeslotSeconds?: number;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -37,6 +45,16 @@ export interface StalkerPortalDiscoveryRejection {
     status: 'auth-rejected';
     portalUrl: string;
     error?: unknown;
+    /**
+     * The abandoned attempt was STILL in flight when the drain deadline
+     * expired, so discovery must not advance. Cancellation is cooperative —
+     * neither transport can pull a request off the wire (the PWA `fetch()`
+     * takes no signal, and the Electron main process runs its HTTP request to
+     * completion) — so an attempt this far past its deadline may still land a
+     * `get_profile`, which adopts the MAC's token portal-side and would
+     * invalidate the session a later candidate had just established.
+     */
+    abandonedInFlight?: boolean;
 }
 
 /** No candidate answered like a Stalker portal (host down or not a portal). */
@@ -51,15 +69,42 @@ export type StalkerPortalDiscoveryOutcome =
 
 /** Per-request guard so a hanging host cannot stall discovery forever. */
 const PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;
-/** authenticate() is two sequential requests; give it a matching budget. */
-const AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS = 45_000;
+/**
+ * `authenticate()` is up to FOUR sequential requests once a portal answers
+ * `get_profile` with status 2 — handshake, profile, `do_auth`, profile retry —
+ * and the Electron transport allows each non-`create_link` call 15 s. A budget
+ * that only covered two would abort a valid but slow login-required portal
+ * before its final profile and report it as `auth-rejected`.
+ */
+const AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS = 4 * 15_000 + 5_000;
 
-function withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, timeoutMs: number): Promise<T> {
+/**
+ * How long to wait for an abandoned attempt to settle before probing the next
+ * candidate.
+ *
+ * Aborting cannot un-send a request: if its `get_profile` was already
+ * dispatched, the portal adopts that token regardless of what the client does
+ * to its socket. What we CAN do is refuse to race it — advancing while it is
+ * still in flight is what lets it invalidate the token the next candidate
+ * negotiates. Bounded by one request budget so a genuinely hung host cannot
+ * stall discovery forever; past that the risk is accepted rather than hanging.
+ */
+const ABANDONED_DRAIN_MS = 15_000;
+
+function withTimeout<T>(
+    promise: Promise<T>,
+    timeoutMs: number,
+    onTimeout?: () => void
+): Promise<T> {
     return new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {
-        const timer = setTimeout(
-            () => reject(new Error('Stalker portal probe timed out')),
-            timeoutMs
-        );
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+            // Abandon the underlying operation BEFORE advancing: the timer
+            // only rejects this wrapper, and a late `get_profile` would adopt
+            // the MAC's token portal-side, invalidating whatever the next
+            // candidate just negotiated.
+            onTimeout?.();
+            reject(new Error('Stalker portal probe timed out'));
+        }, timeoutMs);
         promise.then(
             (value) => {
                 clearTimeout(timer);
@@ -95,7 +140,8 @@ export class StalkerPortalDiscoveryService {
     async discover(
         rawUrl: string,
         macAddress: string,
-        identity: StalkerPortalIdentity = {}
+        identity: StalkerPortalIdentity = {},
+        options: { credentials?: StalkerPortalCredentials } = {}
     ): Promise<StalkerPortalDiscoveryOutcome> {
         const candidates = buildStalkerEndpointCandidates(rawUrl);
         let authRejection: StalkerPortalDiscoveryRejection | null = null;
@@ -114,11 +160,15 @@ export class StalkerPortalDiscoveryService {
                     const outcome = await this.confirmFullPortal(
                         candidate,
                         macAddress,
-                        identity
+                        identity,
+                        options.credentials
                     );
                     if (outcome.status === 'resolved') {
                         return outcome;
                     }
+                    if (outcome.abandonedInFlight) {
+                        return authRejection ?? outcome;
+                    }
                     authRejection = authRejection ?? outcome;
                     continue;
                 }
@@ -158,11 +208,17 @@ export class StalkerPortalDiscoveryService {
                     const outcome = await this.confirmFullPortal(
                         candidate,
                         macAddress,
-                        identity
+                        identity,
+                        options.credentials
                     );
                     if (outcome.status === 'resolved') {
                         return outcome;
                     }
+                    // An attempt still on the wire outranks further probing:
+                    // see `abandonedInFlight`.
+                    if (outcome.abandonedInFlight) {
+                        return authRejection ?? outcome;
+                    }
                     // The endpoint is real but refused our credentials;
                     // remember the first such endpoint in case no later
                     // candidate resolves.
@@ -184,18 +240,25 @@ export class StalkerPortalDiscoveryService {
     private async confirmFullPortal(
         candidate: string,
         macAddress: string,
-        identity: StalkerPortalIdentity
+        identity: StalkerPortalIdentity,
+        credentials?: StalkerPortalCredentials
     ): Promise<
         StalkerPortalEndpointResolution | StalkerPortalDiscoveryRejection
     > {
+        // Cooperative cancellation: `authenticate()` checks this before each
+        // portal call, so a timed-out attempt never sends the `get_profile`
+        // that would adopt the MAC's token behind the next candidate's back.
+        const abandon = new AbortController();
+        // Kept so a timed-out attempt can be drained rather than raced.
+        const pending = this.stalkerSession.authenticate(
+            candidate,
+            macAddress,
+            identity,
+            { credentials, signal: abandon.signal }
+        );
         try {
-            const auth = await withTimeout(
-                this.stalkerSession.authenticate(
-                    candidate,
-                    macAddress,
-                    identity
-                ),
-                AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS
+            const auth = await withTimeout(pending, AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS, () =>
+                abandon.abort()
             );
             // A handshake can hand out a token whose `get_profile` still
             // answers a structured denial (`{js:{error:'Invalid token'}}`);
@@ -215,12 +278,41 @@ export class StalkerPortalDiscoveryService {
                 isFullStalkerPortal: true,
                 token: auth.token,
                 accountInfo: auth.accountInfo,
+                watchdogTimeoutSeconds: auth.watchdogTimeoutSeconds,
+                timeslotSeconds: auth.timeslotSeconds,
             };
         } catch (error) {
+            // Do not advance while the abandoned attempt may still be on the
+            // wire: its `get_profile` adopts the MAC's token portal-side, so
+            // racing it is exactly what invalidates the next candidate's
+            // freshly issued session.
+            //
+            // Draining is the normal case and usually returns at once — an
+            // aborted attempt settles as soon as its in-flight request errors
+            // out. The deadline exists for the attempt that does not settle,
+            // and reaching it is reported rather than swallowed: continuing
+            // would stake a working candidate's session on a request nobody
+            // can recall.
+            const DRAINED = Symbol('drained');
+            const outcome = await Promise.race([
+                pending.then(
+                    () => DRAINED,
+                    () => DRAINED
+                ),
+                new Promise<undefined>((resolve) =>
+                    setTimeout(resolve, ABANDONED_DRAIN_MS)
+                ),
+            ]);
+            if (outcome !== DRAINED) {
+                this.logger.warn(
+                    'Abandoned Stalker authentication is still in flight after the drain deadline; stopping discovery rather than racing it'
+                );
+            }
             return {
                 status: 'auth-rejected',
                 portalUrl: candidate,
                 error,
+                ...(outcome === DRAINED ? {} : { abandonedInFlight: true }),
             };
         }
     }

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-portal-error.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+import {
+    asStalkerPortalError,
+    combineStalkerPortalMessages,
+    StalkerPortalError,
+    stripStalkerPortalMarkup,
+} from './stalker-portal-error';
+
+describe('stripStalkerPortalMarkup', () => {
+    it('strips the markup a real block_msg carries', () => {
+        expect(
+            stripStalkerPortalMarkup(
+                'Your STB is damaged.<br/> Call the provider.'
+            )
+        ).toBe('Your STB is damaged. Call the provider.');
+    });
+
+    it('collapses whitespace and trims', () => {
+        expect(stripStalkerPortalMarkup('  a \n b  ')).toBe('a b');
+    });
+});
+
+describe('combineStalkerPortalMessages', () => {
+    it('joins msg and block_msg', () => {
+        expect(
+            combineStalkerPortalMessages('device conflict', 'STB damaged')
+        ).toBe('device conflict — STB damaged');
+    });
+
+    it('drops empty and duplicated parts', () => {
+        expect(combineStalkerPortalMessages('', undefined)).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(combineStalkerPortalMessages('same', 'same')).toBe('same');
+    });
+});
+
+describe('asStalkerPortalError', () => {
+    it('recognizes real instances', () => {
+        const error = new StalkerPortalError('blocked', 'text');
+        expect(asStalkerPortalError(error)).toBe(error);
+    });
+
+    it('recognizes a structurally equivalent object across chunk boundaries', () => {
+        const shaped = {
+            name: 'StalkerPortalError',
+            kind: 'login-required',
+            message: 'refused',
+        };
+        expect(asStalkerPortalError(shaped)?.kind).toBe('login-required');
+    });
+
+    it('rejects ordinary errors and non-errors', () => {
+        expect(asStalkerPortalError(new Error('nope'))).toBeNull();
+        expect(asStalkerPortalError('Access denied.')).toBeNull();
+        expect(asStalkerPortalError(null)).toBeNull();
+    });
+});

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-portal-error.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+import type { StalkerAuthFailureBody } from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
+
+/**
+ * Why a Stalker portal refused the session.
+ *
+ * - `login-required` — `get_profile` answered `status: 2`: the portal wants
+ *   `do_auth` with a login/password, and none are stored for the playlist.
+ * - `login-rejected` — `do_auth` answered `{js: false}` (the operator billing
+ *   script refused the credentials), or the profile still demanded a login
+ *   after a successful `do_auth`.
+ * - `blocked` — `get_profile` answered `status: 1`: the account is blocked or
+ *   the device identity conflicts. `msg`/`block_msg` explain why.
+ * - `auth-failed` — a request came back as one of the plain-text bodies
+ *   (`Authorization failed.`, `Access denied.`, `Unauthorized request.`) and
+ *   re-authentication did not recover it.
+ */
+export type StalkerPortalErrorKind =
+    | 'login-required'
+    | 'login-rejected'
+    | 'blocked'
+    | 'auth-failed';
+
+/**
+ * `block_msg` routinely carries markup ("Your STB is damaged.<br/> Call the
+ * provider."); strip it before the text reaches a snackbar or error view.
+ */
+export function stripStalkerPortalMarkup(text: string): string {
+    return text
+        .replace(/<[^>]*>/g, ' ')
+        .replace(/\s+/g, ' ')
+        .trim();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Combines the portal's own `msg`/`block_msg` explanation into one plain-text
+ * line, or returns undefined when the portal sent none.
+ */
+export function combineStalkerPortalMessages(
+    msg: string | undefined,
+    blockMsg: string | undefined
+): string | undefined {
+    const parts = [msg, blockMsg]
+        .map((part) => stripStalkerPortalMarkup(part ?? ''))
+        .filter((part) => part.length > 0);
+    // A duplicated msg/block_msg pair should not be echoed twice.
+    const unique = parts.filter(
+        (part, index) => parts.indexOf(part) === index
+    );
+    return unique.length > 0 ? unique.join(' — ') : undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A portal-explained authentication failure. `portalText` carries the server's
+ * own words (already markup-stripped) when it sent any — the UI shows them
+ * verbatim instead of a generic "unable to load" message.
+ */
+export class StalkerPortalError extends Error {
+    constructor(
+        readonly kind: StalkerPortalErrorKind,
+        readonly portalText?: string,
+        readonly failureBody?: StalkerAuthFailureBody
+    ) {
+        super(
+            `Stalker portal refused the session (${kind})` +
+                (portalText ? `: ${portalText}` : '')
+        );
+        this.name = 'StalkerPortalError';
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Recognizes a StalkerPortalError across chunk boundaries: `instanceof` is
+ * checked first, but a structurally equivalent object (same name + kind) is
+ * accepted too so lazy-loaded consumers never mis-classify one.
+ */
+export function asStalkerPortalError(
+    error: unknown
+): StalkerPortalError | null {
+    if (error instanceof StalkerPortalError) {
+        return error;
+    }
+
+    if (
+        typeof error === 'object' &&
+        error !== null &&
+        (error as { name?: unknown }).name === 'StalkerPortalError' &&
+        typeof (error as { kind?: unknown }).kind === 'string'
+    ) {
+        return error as StalkerPortalError;
+    }
+
+    return null;
+}

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-portal-repair.service.spec.ts

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ describe('StalkerPortalRepairService', () => {
     /** When set, the atomic write fails AFTER the transform verified. */
     let persistError: Error | null;
     let setCachedToken: jest.Mock;
+    let adoptDiscoveredSession: jest.Mock;
     let clearCachedToken: jest.Mock;
     let refreshActiveWatchdogPlaylist: jest.Mock;
 
@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ describe('StalkerPortalRepairService', () => {
             return of(next);
         });
         setCachedToken = jest.fn();
+        adoptDiscoveredSession = jest.fn();
         clearCachedToken = jest.fn();
         refreshActiveWatchdogPlaylist = jest.fn();
 
@@ -81,6 +83,7 @@ describe('StalkerPortalRepairService', () => {
                     provide: StalkerSessionService,
                     useValue: {
                         setCachedToken,
+                        adoptDiscoveredSession,
                         clearCachedToken,
                         refreshActiveWatchdogPlaylist,
                     },
@@ -210,12 +213,13 @@ describe('StalkerPortalRepairService', () => {
                 portalUrl: 'http://ministra.example/server/load.php',
                 isFullStalkerPortal: true,
             });
-            // The classification handshake already produced a token,
-            // tagged with the playlist as its identity source.
-            expect(setCachedToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            // The classification handshake already produced a session; it is
+            // adopted whole (token + cadence), tagged with the REPAIRED
+            // configuration as its identity source.
+            expect(adoptDiscoveredSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
                 'portal-1',
-                'TOKEN1',
-                expect.objectContaining({ _id: 'portal-1' })
+                expect.objectContaining({ _id: 'portal-1' }),
+                expect.objectContaining({ token: 'TOKEN1' })
             );
             // A repaired ACTIVE playlist must re-sync the watchdog now: a
             // simple→full flip has to start the keepalive mid-session.
@@ -282,6 +286,82 @@ describe('StalkerPortalRepairService', () => {
             expect(writtenRow).toBeNull();
         });
 
+        it('discards a repair whose credentials changed while probing', async () => {
+            // Discovery can run for tens of seconds; a login saved meanwhile
+            // means the outcome was negotiated for an account the row no
+            // longer belongs to, so committing it would adopt the wrong
+            // session.
+            discover.mockResolvedValue({
+                status: 'resolved',
+                portalUrl: 'http://panel.example/server/load.php',
+                isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+                token: 'WRONG-ACCOUNT',
+            });
+            // The row the transform sees carries the NEW login.
+            persistedRow = {
+                ...MISCLASSIFIED,
+                username: 'edited-mid-probe',
+            } as Playlist;
+
+            expect(
+                await service.repairPortal({
+                    ...MISCLASSIFIED,
+                    username: 'original',
+                })
+            ).toBeNull();
+            expect(writtenRow).toBeNull();
+            expect(adoptDiscoveredSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        });
+
+        it('adopts the cadence the repair confirmation discovered', async () => {
+            // Caching the token alone satisfies the retry, so NO
+            // authentication path would ever apply the profile outcome — the
+            // repaired playlist would keep the default cadence until the
+            // token failed or the app restarted.
+            discover.mockResolvedValue({
+                status: 'resolved',
+                portalUrl: 'http://panel.example/server/load.php',
+                isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+                token: 'REPAIRED',
+                watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 60,
+                timeslotSeconds: 9,
+            });
+
+            await service.repairPortal(MISCLASSIFIED);
+
+            expect(adoptDiscoveredSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+                MISCLASSIFIED._id,
+                expect.objectContaining({
+                    portalUrl: 'http://panel.example/server/load.php',
+                }),
+                {
+                    token: 'REPAIRED',
+                    watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 60,
+                    timeslotSeconds: 9,
+                }
+            );
+        });
+
+        it("forwards the playlist's stored credentials to discovery", async () => {
+            // A login/password portal answers status 2 during confirmation;
+            // without the credentials the probe reports `login-required` and
+            // the source could never be repaired.
+            discover.mockResolvedValue({ status: 'unreachable' });
+
+            await service.repairPortal({
+                ...MISCLASSIFIED,
+                username: 'user',
+                password: 'secret',
+            });
+
+            expect(discover).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+                expect.any(String),
+                expect.any(String),
+                expect.any(Object),
+                { credentials: { username: 'user', password: 'secret' } }
+            );
+        });
+
         it('probes at most once per playlist per session', async () => {
             discover.mockResolvedValue({ status: 'unreachable' });
 
@@ -438,7 +518,7 @@ describe('StalkerPortalRepairService', () => {
 
             expect(await service.repairPortal(MISCLASSIFIED)).toBeNull();
             expect(writtenRow).toBeNull();
-            expect(setCachedToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+            expect(adoptDiscoveredSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
             expect(refreshActiveWatchdogPlaylist).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
         });
 

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-portal-repair.service.ts

@@ -322,6 +322,11 @@ export class StalkerPortalRepairService implements StalkerPortalRepairApi {
             playlist.portalUrl ?? '',
             isFullStalkerPortalPlaylist(playlist),
             stalkerIdentityFingerprint(playlist),
+            // Credentials are part of the discovery outcome now: a probe that
+            // failed on a wrong login must be retried once the login is
+            // corrected, instead of staying declined until the app restarts.
+            playlist.username ?? '',
+            playlist.password ?? '',
         ]);
     }
 
@@ -336,7 +341,18 @@ export class StalkerPortalRepairService implements StalkerPortalRepairApi {
         const outcome = await this.discovery.discover(
             playlist.portalUrl ?? '',
             playlist.macAddress ?? '',
-            getStalkerPortalIdentityFromPlaylist(playlist)
+            getStalkerPortalIdentityFromPlaylist(playlist),
+            {
+                // A login/password portal answers `get_profile` with status 2
+                // during confirmation. Without the stored credentials the
+                // probe reports `login-required` and such a source could
+                // never be repaired, even though the playlist holds a
+                // working login.
+                credentials: {
+                    username: playlist.username,
+                    password: playlist.password,
+                },
+            }
         );
 
         if (outcome.status !== 'resolved') {
@@ -416,14 +432,22 @@ export class StalkerPortalRepairService implements StalkerPortalRepairApi {
             ?.set(this.repairSourceFingerprint(playlist), override);
 
         if (outcome.isFullStalkerPortal && outcome.token) {
-            // The classification handshake already authenticated; reuse its
-            // token so the retry does not immediately handshake again. The
-            // playlist itself is the identity source — a repair never
-            // changes WHO the session belongs to, only WHERE it talks.
-            this.stalkerSession.setCachedToken(
+            // The classification handshake already authenticated; adopt the
+            // whole session so the retry does not handshake again AND the
+            // cadence that profile advertised is applied — caching the token
+            // alone would satisfy the retry and leave the repaired playlist
+            // pinging on the default until restart. The identity source is
+            // the REPAIRED configuration: a repair never changes WHO the
+            // session belongs to, only WHERE it talks, and the session is
+            // bound to that endpoint.
+            this.stalkerSession.adoptDiscoveredSession(
                 playlist._id,
-                outcome.token,
-                playlist
+                toStalkerSessionPlaylist(this.applyOverride(playlist)),
+                {
+                    token: outcome.token,
+                    watchdogTimeoutSeconds: outcome.watchdogTimeoutSeconds,
+                    timeslotSeconds: outcome.timeslotSeconds,
+                }
             );
         } else if (!outcome.isFullStalkerPortal) {
             this.stalkerSession.clearCachedToken(playlist._id);
@@ -483,7 +507,13 @@ export class StalkerPortalRepairService implements StalkerPortalRepairApi {
             row.portalUrl === playlist.portalUrl &&
             isFullStalkerPortalPlaylist(row) === sourceMode &&
             stalkerIdentityFingerprint(row) ===
-                stalkerIdentityFingerprint(playlist)
+                stalkerIdentityFingerprint(playlist) &&
+            // Credentials too, matching repairSourceFingerprint(): discovery
+            // can run for tens of seconds, and a login saved meanwhile means
+            // the outcome was negotiated for an account the row no longer
+            // belongs to — committing it would adopt the wrong session.
+            (row.username ?? '') === (playlist.username ?? '') &&
+            (row.password ?? '') === (playlist.password ?? '')
         );
     }
 

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-response-classification.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+import {
+    isStalkerAuthFailureMessage,
+    isStalkerAuthFailureResponse,
+} from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
+
+/**
+ * Checks whether a response or thrown error indicates a Stalker authorization
+ * failure.
+ *
+ * Every signal here is structural. `isStalkerAuthFailureResponse` covers the
+ * complete set of portal auth failures — the plain-text bodies, the transport
+ * marker Electron mints from them, and the JSON-envelope forms — and is
+ * shared with endpoint discovery and the lazy repair, so a phrase one layer
+ * classifies as an auth failure cannot be ignored by another: the session
+ * would otherwise keep an expired token and every later request fails.
+ *
+ * What is deliberately gone: the old `JSON.stringify(response)` regex sweep.
+ * It matched the phrase anywhere in an arbitrary payload — including inside
+ * legitimate catalog data — and existed only because the raw body reached the
+ * renderer unclassified. The transports classify now, so the shapes are known.
+ */
+export function isStalkerAuthorizationFailure(
+    responseOrError: unknown
+): boolean {
+    if (!responseOrError) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    const response = responseOrError as Record<string, unknown>;
+    const message = response?.['message'];
+
+    if (
+        isStalkerAuthFailureResponse(responseOrError) ||
+        isStalkerAuthFailureMessage(message)
+    ) {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // HTTP auth codes survive the IPC boundary only as message text
+    // (`HTTP Error 401: …`): the custom `status` property is stripped by
+    // ipcRenderer, so the numeric code must be read from the message.
+    if (typeof message === 'string' && /HTTP Error 40[13]\b/.test(message)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // Same code on a response object that never crossed IPC.
+    return response?.['status'] === 401 || response?.['status'] === 403;
+}

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-session-store.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+import { firstValueFrom } from 'rxjs';
+import type { Playlist } from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
+import type { PlaylistsService } from '@iptvnator/services';
+import type { createLogger } from '@iptvnator/portal/shared/util';
+import { STALKER_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT_PERIOD_SECONDS } from './stalker-watchdog.controller';
+import { stalkerIdentityFingerprint } from './stalker-identity.utils';
+import type { StalkerAuthenticationResult } from './stalker-auth.api';
+
+/**
+ * Everything a Stalker session is bound to: the endpoint it was negotiated
+ * against, the device identity, and the account credentials.
+ *
+ * All three halves matter, and each was a real defect when missing:
+ *
+ * - **Endpoint** — `ensureToken()` re-presents tokens in a handshake, so a
+ *   playlist repointed at another portal would disclose the previous one's
+ *   bearer token to it. Origin alone is not enough: discovery deliberately
+ *   preserves tenant base paths (`/tenant-a/…` vs `/tenant-b/…`), which are
+ *   different portals on one host.
+ * - **Identity** — an edited MAC/serial must not inherit the old session.
+ * - **Credentials** — for a status-2 portal the login decides which account
+ *   the token represents, so changing it must not keep serving the previous
+ *   account's session.
+ *
+ * Used for BOTH the in-run cache and the persisted session: an edit applies
+ * without waiting for a restart.
+ */
+export function stalkerSessionFingerprint(
+    playlist: Pick<
+        Playlist,
+        | 'portalUrl'
+        | 'macAddress'
+        | 'username'
+        | 'password'
+        | 'stalkerSerialNumber'
+        | 'stalkerDeviceId1'
+        | 'stalkerDeviceId2'
+        | 'stalkerSignature1'
+        | 'stalkerSignature2'
+    >
+): string {
+    return JSON.stringify([
+        portalEndpoint(playlist.portalUrl),
+        stalkerIdentityFingerprint(playlist as Playlist),
+        playlist.username ?? '',
+        playlist.password ?? '',
+    ]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Origin AND path, minus query/fragment — the endpoint a session belongs to.
+ *
+ * No attempt is made to treat different handler paths for the same portal
+ * (`…/portal.php` vs `…/server/load.php`) as equivalent. Both sides of the
+ * comparison read the SAME persisted `portalUrl`, so the same portal always
+ * yields the same key; the value changes only on a real edit or repair, and
+ * both of those re-authenticate anyway. An equivalence rule would add
+ * machinery whose only failure mode is aliasing two genuinely different
+ * endpoints — the exact thing this key exists to prevent.
+ */
+function portalEndpoint(portalUrl: string | undefined): string {
+    if (!portalUrl) {
+        return '';
+    }
+    try {
+        const parsed = new URL(portalUrl);
+        return `${parsed.origin}${parsed.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, '')}`;
+    } catch {
+        // Unparseable: fall back to the raw string so a change is still a
+        // change — never to a constant, which would alias every endpoint.
+        return portalUrl;
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Session facts persisted with the playlist between app starts.
+ *
+ * `identityFingerprint` is what makes the token safe to re-present: it records
+ * the identity the session was negotiated for, so an edited MAC or serial
+ * cannot inherit the previous session.
+ */
+export interface PersistedStalkerSession {
+    token?: string;
+    identityFingerprint?: string;
+    watchdogTimeoutSeconds?: number;
+    timeslotSeconds?: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads and writes the Stalker session persisted on the playlist row.
+ *
+ * Kept out of the session service because it is the only part that needs the
+ * persistence stack, which is resolved lazily: the service is constructed
+ * during bootstrap, and pulling `PlaylistsService` in eagerly would both
+ * widen its dependency graph and risk a DI cycle.
+ */
+export class StalkerSessionStore {
+    constructor(
+        private readonly resolvePlaylistsService: () => PlaylistsService,
+        private readonly logger: ReturnType<typeof createLogger>
+    ) {}
+
+    /** Reads a playlist row through the lazily-resolved persistence stack. */
+    async readRow(playlistId: string): Promise<Playlist | undefined> {
+        const row = await firstValueFrom(
+            this.resolvePlaylistsService().getPlaylistById(playlistId)
+        );
+        return (row as Playlist) ?? undefined;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Reads the session persisted with the playlist: the token, the identity
+     * it was negotiated for, and the watchdog cadence the portal advertised.
+     *
+     * The token is only offered for reuse when its identity still matches —
+     * re-presenting one minted for an edited MAC would pair a new identity
+     * with an old session, exactly what the in-memory cache guards against.
+     */
+    async read(
+        playlist: Playlist,
+        fingerprint: string
+    ): Promise<PersistedStalkerSession> {
+        const fromPlaylist: PersistedStalkerSession = {
+            token: playlist.stalkerToken || undefined,
+            identityFingerprint: playlist.stalkerSessionIdentity,
+            watchdogTimeoutSeconds: playlist.stalkerWatchdogTimeout,
+            timeslotSeconds: playlist.stalkerTimeslot,
+        };
+
+        // Shortcut only when the object carries the cadence too. Taking it on
+        // the token alone would silently drop a persisted cadence for any
+        // playlist shape that copies the token without the timing fields.
+        const stored =
+            fromPlaylist.token &&
+            fromPlaylist.watchdogTimeoutSeconds !== undefined
+                ? fromPlaylist
+                : await this.readFromRow(playlist, fromPlaylist);
+
+        // A token with NO recorded fingerprint is unverified, not trusted:
+        // playlists written before the fingerprint existed carry one, and
+        // re-presenting it after an endpoint or identity edit is exactly the
+        // disclosure the fingerprint prevents. Such a row has no cadence
+        // either, so it already owes a full profile — refusing the token
+        // costs it nothing, and the write-back then records the fingerprint.
+        if (stored.token && stored.identityFingerprint !== fingerprint) {
+            return { ...stored, token: undefined };
+        }
+
+        return stored;
+    }
+
+    private async readFromRow(
+        playlist: Playlist,
+        fallback: PersistedStalkerSession
+    ): Promise<PersistedStalkerSession> {
+        try {
+            const stored = await this.readRow(playlist._id);
+            return {
+                // The row is authoritative, but a meta that carried a token
+                // the row has not seen yet must not lose it.
+                token: stored?.stalkerToken || fallback.token,
+                identityFingerprint:
+                    stored?.stalkerSessionIdentity ??
+                    fallback.identityFingerprint,
+                watchdogTimeoutSeconds: stored?.stalkerWatchdogTimeout,
+                timeslotSeconds: stored?.stalkerTimeslot,
+            };
+        } catch (error) {
+            this.logger.debug('Persisted session lookup failed:', error);
+            return fallback;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Propagates a successful authentication into session-side state: the
+     * watchdog cadence, and the write-back.
+     *
+     * Reusing a stored token skips the `get_profile` that carries the
+     * cadence, so the persisted cadence is applied instead — otherwise a
+     * portal advertising a non-default `watchdog_timeout` would sit on the
+     * 120 s fallback for the whole session.
+     */
+    applyAuthenticationOutcome(
+        playlistId: string,
+        result: StalkerAuthenticationResult,
+        stored: PersistedStalkerSession,
+        fingerprint: string,
+        watchdog: {
+            applyProfileTiming: (
+                playlistId: string,
+                timing: {
+                    watchdogTimeoutSeconds?: number;
+                    timeslotSeconds?: number;
+                }
+            ) => void;
+        }
+    ): void {
+        if (result.reusedStoredToken) {
+            watchdog.applyProfileTiming(playlistId, {
+                watchdogTimeoutSeconds: stored.watchdogTimeoutSeconds,
+                timeslotSeconds: stored.timeslotSeconds,
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+
+        watchdog.applyProfileTiming(playlistId, {
+            watchdogTimeoutSeconds: result.watchdogTimeoutSeconds,
+            timeslotSeconds: result.timeslotSeconds,
+        });
+        this.write(playlistId, result, stored, fingerprint);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Writes a renegotiated session back, best effort.
+     *
+     * The EFFECTIVE cadence is stored, not the raw one: a portal that
+     * advertises nothing must still leave a value behind, or "no cadence
+     * stored" would keep meaning "never profiled" and every start would
+     * re-profile it. Stored absence therefore means exactly one thing — this
+     * playlist has never completed a profile.
+     *
+     * Returns the cadence that was applied, so the caller can drive the
+     * watchdog with the same numbers.
+     */
+    write(
+        playlistId: string,
+        result: StalkerAuthenticationResult,
+        stored: PersistedStalkerSession,
+        fingerprint: string
+    ): void {
+        const watchdogTimeout =
+            result.watchdogTimeoutSeconds ??
+            STALKER_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT_PERIOD_SECONDS;
+        const timeslot = result.timeslotSeconds ?? 0;
+        const changed =
+            result.token !== stored.token ||
+            fingerprint !== stored.identityFingerprint ||
+            watchdogTimeout !== stored.watchdogTimeoutSeconds ||
+            timeslot !== stored.timeslotSeconds;
+
+        if (!changed) {
+            return;
+        }
+
+        try {
+            void firstValueFrom(
+                this.resolvePlaylistsService().updateStalkerSession(
+                    playlistId,
+                    {
+                        stalkerToken: result.token,
+                        stalkerSessionIdentity: fingerprint,
+                        stalkerWatchdogTimeout: watchdogTimeout,
+                        stalkerTimeslot: timeslot,
+                    }
+                )
+            ).catch((error) => {
+                this.logger.debug('Session write-back failed:', error);
+            });
+        } catch (error) {
+            // Persistence stack unavailable (e.g. isolated tests, or a DI
+            // cycle at this point in bootstrap). The session still works for
+            // this run; only the cross-restart reuse is lost.
+            this.logger.debug('Session write-back unavailable:', error);
+        }
+    }
+}

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-session.service.spec.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ import { TestBed } from '@angular/core/testing';
 import { of } from 'rxjs';
 import { DataService, PlaylistsService } from '@iptvnator/services';
 import { Playlist } from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
+import { StalkerPortalError } from './stalker-portal-error';
+import { STALKER_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT_PERIOD_SECONDS } from './stalker-watchdog.controller';
+import { stalkerSessionFingerprint } from './stalker-session-store';
 import {
     STALKER_SERIAL_NUMBER,
     StalkerProfileResponse,
@@ -186,8 +189,10 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity-tagged token cache', () => {
         );
 
         const oldAuth = service.ensureToken(playlistA);
-        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i += 1) {
-            await Promise.resolve();
+        // ensureToken reads the persisted session before the handshake, so
+        // wait for the transport call rather than a fixed microtask count.
+        while (pendingResolvers.length === 0) {
+            await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve));
         }
 
         const editedIdentity = {
@@ -198,10 +203,10 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity-tagged token cache', () => {
 
         // Settle the OLD identity's handshake + profile.
         pendingResolvers[0]({ js: { token: 'TOKEN-OLD', random: 'r' } });
-        for (let i = 0; i < 10; i += 1) {
-            await Promise.resolve();
+        while (pendingResolvers.length < 2) {
+            await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve));
         }
-        pendingResolvers[1]?.({ js: {} });
+        pendingResolvers[1]({ js: {} });
         await expect(oldAuth).resolves.toMatchObject({ token: 'TOKEN-OLD' });
 
         // The edited identity re-enters and negotiates its OWN session.
@@ -285,13 +290,19 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity-tagged token cache', () => {
         service.setCachedToken('portal-1', 'DEAD', playlistA);
         sendIpcEvent.mockResolvedValue('Authorization failed.');
 
+        // The typed refusal replaced the generic "Authorization failed after
+        // retry": callers need the portal's own reason to show the user.
         await expect(
             service.makeAuthenticatedRequest(
                 playlistA,
                 { action: 'get_events' },
                 false
             )
-        ).rejects.toThrow('Authorization failed after retry');
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            name: 'StalkerPortalError',
+            kind: 'auth-failed',
+            failureBody: 'Authorization failed.',
+        });
 
         // Leaving the dead token cached would hand it to the next caller.
         expect(service.getCachedToken('portal-1')).toBeNull();
@@ -374,6 +385,10 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity payloads', () => {
 
     let service: StalkerSessionService;
     let dataService: { sendIpcEvent: jest.Mock };
+    let playlistsService: {
+        getPlaylistById: jest.Mock;
+        updateStalkerSession: jest.Mock;
+    };
 
     beforeEach(() => {
         Object.defineProperty(globalThis, 'crypto', {
@@ -390,11 +405,16 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity payloads', () => {
         dataService = {
             sendIpcEvent: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ js: {} }),
         };
+        playlistsService = {
+            getPlaylistById: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(of(undefined)),
+            updateStalkerSession: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(of(null)),
+        };
 
         TestBed.configureTestingModule({
             providers: [
                 StalkerSessionService,
                 { provide: DataService, useValue: dataService },
+                { provide: PlaylistsService, useValue: playlistsService },
             ],
         });
 
@@ -484,13 +504,19 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity payloads', () => {
             stalkerSignature2: 'SIGNATURE-2',
         } as Playlist);
 
-        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(portalUrl, macAddress, {
-            serialNumber: 'CUSTOMSN123',
-            deviceId1: 'DEVICE-ID-1',
-            deviceId2: 'DEVICE-ID-2',
-            signature1: 'SIGNATURE-1',
-            signature2: 'SIGNATURE-2',
-        });
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            {
+                serialNumber: 'CUSTOMSN123',
+                deviceId1: 'DEVICE-ID-1',
+                deviceId2: 'DEVICE-ID-2',
+                signature1: 'SIGNATURE-1',
+                signature2: 'SIGNATURE-2',
+            },
+            // No cadence stored for this playlist, so the profile must run.
+            expect.objectContaining({ skipProfileWhenReused: false })
+        );
     });
 
     it('treats the legacy default serial number as absent during ensureToken', async () => {
@@ -507,7 +533,12 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity payloads', () => {
         } as Playlist);
 
         expect(result.serialNumber).toBeUndefined();
-        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(portalUrl, macAddress, {});
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            {},
+            expect.objectContaining({ skipProfileWhenReused: false })
+        );
     });
 
     it('serializes refreshAccountProfile behind an in-flight ensureToken', async () => {
@@ -536,8 +567,9 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity payloads', () => {
         const refresh = service.refreshAccountProfile(playlist);
 
         // Two handshakes must never overlap: on strict portals the second
-        // would invalidate the first one's token.
-        await Promise.resolve();
+        // would invalidate the first one's token. (Macrotask flush: the
+        // persisted-token lookup adds awaits before authenticate fires.)
+        await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve));
         expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
 
         releaseFirst({ token: 'session-token' });
@@ -574,7 +606,7 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity payloads', () => {
         const first = service.refreshAccountProfile(playlist);
         const second = service.refreshAccountProfile(playlist);
 
-        await Promise.resolve();
+        await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve));
         expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
 
         releases[0]({ token: 'session-token' });
@@ -708,6 +740,581 @@ describe('StalkerSessionService identity payloads', () => {
         expect(accountInfo).toEqual({ login: 'user-2' });
     });
 
+    it('re-presents the token persisted on the playlist during ensureToken', async () => {
+        const authenticate = jest
+            .spyOn(service, 'authenticate')
+            .mockResolvedValue({ token: 'STORED-TOKEN' });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-7',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+            stalkerToken: 'STORED-TOKEN',
+            stalkerSessionIdentity: stalkerSessionFingerprint({
+                portalUrl,
+                macAddress,
+            } as Playlist),
+            // With the cadence present the playlist is self-sufficient, so no
+            // row read is needed.
+            stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 120,
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(playlistsService.getPlaylistById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            {},
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                storedToken: 'STORED-TOKEN',
+                skipProfileWhenReused: true,
+            })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('falls back to the stored playlist row for the persisted token', async () => {
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                _id: 'playlist-8',
+                stalkerToken: 'ROW-TOKEN',
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: stalkerSessionFingerprint({
+                    portalUrl,
+                    macAddress,
+                } as Playlist),
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 120,
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+        const authenticate = jest
+            .spyOn(service, 'authenticate')
+            .mockResolvedValue({ token: 'ROW-TOKEN', reusedStoredToken: true });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-8',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(playlistsService.getPlaylistById).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'playlist-8'
+        );
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            {},
+            expect.objectContaining({ storedToken: 'ROW-TOKEN' })
+        );
+        // A reused token was not renegotiated — nothing to write back.
+        expect(playlistsService.updateStalkerSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('writes a newly negotiated token back to the playlist', async () => {
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({ _id: 'playlist-9', stalkerToken: 'OLD-TOKEN' } as Playlist)
+        );
+        jest.spyOn(service, 'authenticate').mockResolvedValue({
+            token: 'NEW-TOKEN',
+            reusedStoredToken: false,
+        });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-9',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(playlistsService.updateStalkerSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'playlist-9',
+            expect.objectContaining({ stalkerToken: 'NEW-TOKEN' })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('applies the persisted watchdog cadence when the token is reused', async () => {
+        // Reuse skips the get_profile that carries the cadence, so without
+        // the persisted values the watchdog would sit on its 120 s default
+        // for the whole session — for a portal that advertised 60 s that is
+        // slower than before this feature existed.
+        const watchdog = (
+            service as unknown as {
+                watchdog: { applyProfileTiming: jest.Mock };
+            }
+        ).watchdog;
+        jest.spyOn(watchdog, 'applyProfileTiming');
+
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                _id: 'playlist-12',
+                stalkerToken: 'REUSED',
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 60,
+                stalkerTimeslot: 7,
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+        jest.spyOn(service, 'authenticate').mockResolvedValue({
+            token: 'REUSED',
+            reusedStoredToken: true,
+        });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-12',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(watchdog.applyProfileTiming).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'playlist-12',
+            { watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 60, timeslotSeconds: 7 }
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('profiles a legacy token-only playlist and refuses its unverified token', async () => {
+        // A playlist written before this change has a token but no recorded
+        // fingerprint, so nothing proves which endpoint/identity it belongs
+        // to — re-presenting it after an edit is the disclosure the
+        // fingerprint exists to prevent. It owes a full profile anyway (no
+        // cadence), so refusing the token costs nothing and the write-back
+        // then records the fingerprint.
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({ _id: 'playlist-16', stalkerToken: 'LEGACY' } as Playlist)
+        );
+        const authenticate = jest
+            .spyOn(service, 'authenticate')
+            .mockResolvedValue({
+                token: 'LEGACY',
+                reusedStoredToken: false,
+                watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 60,
+                timeslotSeconds: 5,
+            });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-16',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            {},
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                storedToken: undefined,
+                skipProfileWhenReused: false,
+            })
+        );
+        // ...and the learned cadence is persisted, so the next start skips.
+        expect(playlistsService.updateStalkerSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'playlist-16',
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 60,
+                stalkerTimeslot: 5,
+            })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('records the effective cadence when the portal advertises none', async () => {
+        // Otherwise "no cadence stored" would keep meaning "never profiled"
+        // and such a portal would be re-profiled on every single start.
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({ _id: 'playlist-17', stalkerToken: 'LEGACY' } as Playlist)
+        );
+        jest.spyOn(service, 'authenticate').mockResolvedValue({
+            token: 'LEGACY',
+            reusedStoredToken: false,
+        });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-17',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(playlistsService.updateStalkerSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'playlist-17',
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout:
+                    STALKER_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT_PERIOD_SECONDS,
+                stalkerTimeslot: 0,
+            })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('refuses a cached and persisted session after the login changed', async () => {
+        // For a status-2 portal the login decides WHICH account the token
+        // represents, so serving the old session would keep the user on the
+        // previous account indefinitely.
+        const before = {
+            _id: 'playlist-login-change',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+            username: 'old-user',
+            password: 'old-pass',
+        } as Playlist;
+        service.setCachedToken(before._id, 'OLD-ACCOUNT-TOKEN', before);
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                ...before,
+                stalkerToken: 'OLD-ACCOUNT-TOKEN',
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: stalkerSessionFingerprint(before),
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 60,
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+        const authenticate = jest
+            .spyOn(service, 'authenticate')
+            .mockResolvedValue({ token: 'NEW', reusedStoredToken: false });
+
+        const result = await service.ensureToken({
+            ...before,
+            username: 'new-user',
+            password: 'new-pass',
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        // Neither the in-run cache nor the persisted token is reused.
+        expect(result.token).toBe('NEW');
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            {},
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                storedToken: undefined,
+                credentials: { username: 'new-user', password: 'new-pass' },
+            })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('refuses a persisted token across tenants on the SAME host', async () => {
+        // Discovery deliberately preserves tenant base paths, so two portals
+        // can share an origin. An origin-only key would send tenant A's
+        // bearer to tenant B.
+        const tenantA = {
+            _id: 'playlist-tenant',
+            portalUrl: 'https://panel.example.com/tenant-a/server/load.php',
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist;
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                ...tenantA,
+                stalkerToken: 'TENANT-A-TOKEN',
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: stalkerSessionFingerprint(tenantA),
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 60,
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+        const authenticate = jest
+            .spyOn(service, 'authenticate')
+            .mockResolvedValue({ token: 'FRESH', reusedStoredToken: false });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            ...tenantA,
+            portalUrl: 'https://panel.example.com/tenant-b/server/load.php',
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'https://panel.example.com/tenant-b/server/load.php',
+            macAddress,
+            {},
+            expect.objectContaining({ storedToken: undefined })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('keeps the session for the same endpoint spelled with a trailing slash', async () => {
+        // Normalisation must not turn a cosmetic difference into a forced
+        // re-authentication.
+        const portal = {
+            _id: 'playlist-slash',
+            portalUrl: 'https://panel.example.com/tenant-a/server/load.php',
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist;
+        expect(
+            stalkerSessionFingerprint({
+                ...portal,
+                portalUrl: 'https://panel.example.com/tenant-a/server/load.php/',
+            } as Playlist)
+        ).toBe(stalkerSessionFingerprint(portal));
+    });
+
+    it('refuses a persisted token when the playlist was repointed at another host', async () => {
+        // ensureToken re-presents persisted tokens in a handshake, so an
+        // identity-only check would disclose the previous portal's bearer
+        // token to an unrelated server.
+        const original = {
+            _id: 'playlist-moved',
+            portalUrl: 'https://old.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist;
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                ...original,
+                stalkerToken: 'OLD-HOST-TOKEN',
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: stalkerSessionFingerprint(original),
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 60,
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+        const authenticate = jest
+            .spyOn(service, 'authenticate')
+            .mockResolvedValue({ token: 'FRESH', reusedStoredToken: false });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            ...original,
+            portalUrl: 'https://new.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'https://new.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+            macAddress,
+            {},
+            expect.objectContaining({ storedToken: undefined })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('refuses a persisted token minted for a different identity', async () => {
+        // The playlist was edited after the token was issued. Re-presenting
+        // it would pair the new identity with the old session — the same bug
+        // class the in-memory cache guards against, just across a restart.
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                _id: 'playlist-identity',
+                stalkerToken: 'OLD-IDENTITY-TOKEN',
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: 'not-the-current-fingerprint',
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 60,
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+        const authenticate = jest
+            .spyOn(service, 'authenticate')
+            .mockResolvedValue({ token: 'FRESH', reusedStoredToken: false });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-identity',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            {},
+            expect.objectContaining({ storedToken: undefined })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('reuses a persisted token whose identity still matches', async () => {
+        const playlist = {
+            _id: 'playlist-identity-ok',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist;
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                ...playlist,
+                stalkerToken: 'SAME-IDENTITY-TOKEN',
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: stalkerSessionFingerprint(playlist),
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 60,
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+        const authenticate = jest
+            .spyOn(service, 'authenticate')
+            .mockResolvedValue({
+                token: 'SAME-IDENTITY-TOKEN',
+                reusedStoredToken: true,
+            });
+
+        await service.ensureToken(playlist);
+
+        expect(authenticate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            {},
+            expect.objectContaining({ storedToken: 'SAME-IDENTITY-TOKEN' })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('reads the stored row when a token arrives without its cadence', async () => {
+        // A playlist shape that copies the token but not the timing fields
+        // must not silently downgrade the portal to the 120 s default.
+        const watchdog = (
+            service as unknown as {
+                watchdog: { applyProfileTiming: jest.Mock };
+            }
+        ).watchdog;
+        jest.spyOn(watchdog, 'applyProfileTiming');
+
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                _id: 'playlist-15',
+                stalkerToken: 'REUSED',
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 45,
+                stalkerTimeslot: 3,
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+        jest.spyOn(service, 'authenticate').mockResolvedValue({
+            token: 'REUSED',
+            reusedStoredToken: true,
+        });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-15',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+            // Token present, cadence absent — the shortcut must not fire.
+            stalkerToken: 'REUSED',
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(playlistsService.getPlaylistById).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'playlist-15'
+        );
+        expect(watchdog.applyProfileTiming).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'playlist-15',
+            { watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 45, timeslotSeconds: 3 }
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('persists a freshly decoded watchdog cadence with the token', async () => {
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({ _id: 'playlist-13' } as Playlist)
+        );
+        jest.spyOn(service, 'authenticate').mockResolvedValue({
+            token: 'NEW-TOKEN',
+            reusedStoredToken: false,
+            watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 90,
+            timeslotSeconds: 12,
+        });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-13',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(playlistsService.updateStalkerSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'playlist-13',
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                stalkerToken: 'NEW-TOKEN',
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 90,
+                stalkerTimeslot: 12,
+                // The identity the session was negotiated for, so a later
+                // start can refuse to reuse it after an identity edit.
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: expect.any(String),
+            })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('rewrites the session when only the cadence changed', async () => {
+        playlistsService.getPlaylistById.mockReturnValue(
+            of({
+                _id: 'playlist-14',
+                stalkerToken: 'SAME',
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 120,
+            } as Playlist)
+        );
+        jest.spyOn(service, 'authenticate').mockResolvedValue({
+            token: 'SAME',
+            reusedStoredToken: false,
+            watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 45,
+        });
+
+        await service.ensureToken({
+            _id: 'playlist-14',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist);
+
+        expect(playlistsService.updateStalkerSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            'playlist-14',
+            expect.objectContaining({ stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 45 })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('surfaces the portal failure body when the retry also fails', async () => {
+        const playlist = {
+            _id: 'playlist-10',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist;
+
+        jest.spyOn(service, 'ensureToken').mockResolvedValue({
+            token: 'token-1',
+        });
+        // The transport marker for a blocked account, on both attempts.
+        dataService.sendIpcEvent.mockResolvedValue({
+            stalkerAuthFailure: 'Access denied.',
+        });
+
+        await expect(
+            service.makeAuthenticatedRequest(playlist, {
+                type: 'vod',
+                action: 'get_categories',
+            })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            name: 'StalkerPortalError',
+            kind: 'auth-failed',
+            failureBody: 'Access denied.',
+        });
+        // One retry happened before giving up.
+        expect(dataService.sendIpcEvent).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    });
+
+    it('recognizes the raw PWA plain-text failure body and retries', async () => {
+        const playlist = {
+            _id: 'playlist-11',
+            portalUrl,
+            macAddress,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+        } as Playlist;
+
+        jest.spyOn(service, 'ensureToken')
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ token: 'stale' })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ token: 'fresh' });
+        dataService.sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce('Unauthorized request.')
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({ js: { data: [] } });
+
+        await expect(
+            service.makeAuthenticatedRequest(playlist, {
+                type: 'itv',
+                action: 'get_ordered_list',
+            })
+        ).resolves.toEqual({ js: { data: [] } });
+    });
+
+    it('throws StalkerPortalError with the portal text when auth is refused', async () => {
+        // Blocked account: get_profile answers status 1 with msg/block_msg.
+        dataService.sendIpcEvent
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: { token: 'token-1', random: 'random-1' },
+            })
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+                js: {
+                    status: 1,
+                    msg: 'device conflict - device_id mismatch',
+                    block_msg: 'Your STB is damaged.<br/> Call the provider.',
+                },
+            });
+
+        await expect(
+            service.authenticate(portalUrl, macAddress)
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            name: 'StalkerPortalError',
+            kind: 'blocked',
+            portalText:
+                'device conflict - device_id mismatch — Your STB is damaged. Call the provider.',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('keeps StalkerPortalError recognizable via instanceof', () => {
+        expect(new StalkerPortalError('blocked')).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+    });
+
     it('passes an explicit serial into the initial handshake request', async () => {
         dataService.sendIpcEvent
             .mockResolvedValueOnce({

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-token-cache.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+export interface StalkerPendingAuth {
+    promise: Promise<{ token: string; serialNumber?: string }>;
+    identityFingerprint: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * In-memory session state for the current app run, keyed by playlist ID and
+ * tagged with the identity fingerprint the session was negotiated for.
+ *
+ * The tagging is the point: a playlist whose endpoint, identity or login was
+ * edited must never inherit the previous session — neither the cached token
+ * nor an authentication still in flight for the old one. The key comes from
+ * `stalkerSessionFingerprint`, so an edit applies without a restart.
+ */
+export class StalkerTokenCache {
+    private readonly tokens = new Map<
+        string,
+        { token: string; identityFingerprint: string }
+    >();
+    private readonly pending = new Map<string, StalkerPendingAuth>();
+
+    /**
+     * The cached token regardless of identity. Playback fast paths that
+     * cannot supply an identity use this; `takeFor` is the checked accessor.
+     */
+    get(playlistId: string): string | null {
+        return this.tokens.get(playlistId)?.token || null;
+    }
+
+    set(playlistId: string, token: string, sessionFingerprint: string): void {
+        this.tokens.set(playlistId, {
+            token,
+            identityFingerprint: sessionFingerprint,
+        });
+    }
+
+    clear(playlistId: string): void {
+        this.tokens.delete(playlistId);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * The cached token when it was negotiated for this exact identity. A
+     * mismatch retires the entry and returns null, so the caller
+     * authenticates as the current identity instead of pairing a new one
+     * with an old session.
+     */
+    takeFor(playlistId: string, fingerprint: string): string | null {
+        const cached = this.tokens.get(playlistId);
+        if (!cached) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        if (cached.identityFingerprint === fingerprint) {
+            return cached.token;
+        }
+
+        this.clear(playlistId);
+        return null;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Clears the cached token only while it is still the one that just
+     * failed. A request dispatched with the previous token can see its
+     * authorization failure arrive after a profile refresh has already
+     * cached a fresh token — deleting blindly would kill that fresh token
+     * and trigger a cascade of competing handshakes on strict portals.
+     */
+    retireFailed(playlistId: string, failedToken: string | null): void {
+        if (failedToken && this.get(playlistId) === failedToken) {
+            this.clear(playlistId);
+        }
+    }
+
+    getPending(playlistId: string): StalkerPendingAuth | undefined {
+        return this.pending.get(playlistId);
+    }
+
+    setPending(playlistId: string, entry: StalkerPendingAuth): void {
+        this.pending.set(playlistId, entry);
+    }
+
+    clearPending(playlistId: string): void {
+        this.pending.delete(playlistId);
+    }
+
+    /** Retires the pending slot only when it is still the caller's own. */
+    clearPendingIf(playlistId: string, entry: StalkerPendingAuth): void {
+        if (this.pending.get(playlistId) === entry) {
+            this.pending.delete(playlistId);
+        }
+    }
+}

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-watchdog.controller.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+import type { Playlist } from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
+import type { createLogger } from '@iptvnator/portal/shared/util';
+import { StalkerWatchdogController } from './stalker-watchdog.controller';
+
+describe('StalkerWatchdogController', () => {
+    const playlist = {
+        _id: 'playlist-1',
+        portalUrl: 'https://portal.example.com/stalker_portal/server/load.php',
+        macAddress: '00:1A:79:AA:BB:CC',
+        isFullStalkerPortal: true,
+    } as Playlist;
+
+    let sendRequest: jest.Mock;
+    let readPersistedPlaylist: jest.Mock;
+    let controller: StalkerWatchdogController;
+
+    const logger = {
+        error: jest.fn(),
+        warn: jest.fn(),
+        debug: jest.fn(),
+    } as unknown as ReturnType<typeof createLogger>;
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        jest.useFakeTimers();
+        sendRequest = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ js: {} });
+        // The row is the source of truth for each ping; specs that care
+        // about mid-session edits override this per test.
+        readPersistedPlaylist = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(playlist);
+        controller = new StalkerWatchdogController({
+            sendRequest,
+            readPersistedPlaylist,
+            logger,
+        });
+    });
+
+    afterEach(() => {
+        controller.setActivePlaylist(null);
+        jest.useRealTimers();
+    });
+
+    /** Lets the async sendPing settle between timer advances. */
+    async function flush(): Promise<void> {
+        await Promise.resolve();
+        await Promise.resolve();
+    }
+
+    it('pings immediately with init=1, then every 120 s by default', async () => {
+        controller.setActivePlaylist(playlist);
+        await flush();
+
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            playlist,
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                action: 'get_events',
+                type: 'watchdog',
+                init: '1',
+            })
+        );
+
+        // The legacy cadence was 25 s — nothing may fire that early.
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(25_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(95_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+        expect(sendRequest.mock.calls[1][1]).toEqual(
+            expect.objectContaining({ init: '0' })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('reschedules to the profile cadence with the timeslot offset', async () => {
+        controller.setActivePlaylist(playlist);
+        await flush();
+        sendRequest.mockClear();
+
+        controller.applyProfileTiming(playlist._id, {
+            watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 90,
+            timeslotSeconds: 10,
+        });
+
+        // Timeslot offset: nothing during the first 10 s...
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(9_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+        // ...then the 90 s cadence starts.
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(91_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(90_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    });
+
+    it('keeps the stored cadence when the watchdog restarts', async () => {
+        controller.applyProfileTiming(playlist._id, {
+            watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 60,
+            timeslotSeconds: 0,
+        });
+        controller.setActivePlaylist(playlist);
+        await flush();
+        sendRequest.mockClear();
+
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(60_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    it('clamps a garbage watchdog_timeout instead of adopting it', async () => {
+        controller.applyProfileTiming(playlist._id, {
+            watchdogTimeoutSeconds: 1,
+            timeslotSeconds: 0,
+        });
+        controller.setActivePlaylist(playlist);
+        await flush();
+        sendRequest.mockClear();
+
+        // Clamped to the 30 s floor — a 1 s cadence would hammer the portal.
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(29_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(1_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    it('logs and continues when a ping fails — never retries or escalates', async () => {
+        sendRequest.mockRejectedValue(new Error('portal down'));
+        controller.setActivePlaylist(playlist);
+        await flush();
+
+        expect(logger.warn).toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+        // No immediate retry: the next attempt is the next scheduled tick.
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(119_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(1_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    });
+
+    it('stops pinging when the active playlist is cleared', async () => {
+        controller.setActivePlaylist(playlist);
+        await flush();
+        sendRequest.mockClear();
+
+        controller.setActivePlaylist(null);
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(600_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('never pings for a simple (non-full) portal', async () => {
+        controller.setActivePlaylist({
+            ...playlist,
+            isFullStalkerPortal: false,
+        } as Playlist);
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(600_000);
+        await flush();
+        expect(sendRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+});

libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-watchdog.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+import {
+    isFullStalkerPortalPlaylist,
+    type Playlist,
+} from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
+import type { createLogger } from '@iptvnator/portal/shared/util';
+
+/**
+ * The portal expects `get_events` every `watchdog_timeout` seconds — 120 by
+ * default — not every 25 s as the client historically pinged.
+ */
+export const STALKER_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT_PERIOD_SECONDS = 120;
+
+/** Guard rails for a garbage `watchdog_timeout` echoed by a broken panel. */
+const MIN_PERIOD_SECONDS = 30;
+const MAX_PERIOD_SECONDS = 3600;
+
+export interface StalkerWatchdogTiming {
+    periodSeconds: number;
+    /** Per-user jitter: delays the first periodic ping so clients spread out. */
+    timeslotSeconds: number;
+}
+
+export interface StalkerWatchdogDeps {
+    /** Sends one authenticated `get_events` ping. */
+    sendRequest: (
+        playlist: Playlist,
+        params: Record<string, string | number>
+    ) => Promise<unknown>;
+    /**
+     * Reads the persisted row for a playlist. The row is the source of truth
+     * for the configuration a ping authenticates as; see `resolvePlaylist`.
+     */
+    readPersistedPlaylist: (playlistId: string) => Promise<Playlist | undefined>;
+    logger: ReturnType<typeof createLogger>;
+}
+
+interface WatchdogTimers {
+    timeslotTimeout?: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>;
+    interval?: ReturnType<typeof setInterval>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Keeps the active full portal's session "online" by pinging `get_events`.
+ *
+ * The cadence comes from the profile (`watchdog_timeout` + `timeslot`); until
+ * a profile has been decoded the documented default of 120 s applies. A missed
+ * ping never invalidates authentication — it only affects the portal's
+ * "online" reporting — so failures are logged and never retried or escalated.
+ */
+export class StalkerWatchdogController {
+    private readonly timers = new Map<string, WatchdogTimers>();
+    /** Activation-time snapshot; only a fallback when the row cannot be read. */
+    private readonly playlists = new Map<string, Playlist>();
+    private readonly inFlight = new Set<string>();
+    /** Survives stop/start: the cadence is a per-portal fact, not session state. */
+    private readonly timings = new Map<string, StalkerWatchdogTiming>();
+    private activePlaylistId: string | null = null;
+    private playlistDecorator: ((playlist: Playlist) => Playlist) | null = null;
+
+    constructor(private readonly deps: StalkerWatchdogDeps) {}
+
+    /**
+     * Sets which playlist should receive periodic watchdog pings.
+     * This keeps some Ministra/Stalker sessions alive for live playback.
+     */
+    setActivePlaylist(playlist?: Playlist | null): void {
+        const nextPlaylistId = playlist?._id ?? null;
+
+        if (this.activePlaylistId && this.activePlaylistId !== nextPlaylistId) {
+            this.stop(this.activePlaylistId);
+        }
+
+        this.activePlaylistId = nextPlaylistId;
+
+        if (
+            !playlist ||
+            !isFullStalkerPortalPlaylist(playlist) ||
+            !playlist.portalUrl ||
+            !playlist.macAddress
+        ) {
+            if (nextPlaylistId) {
+                this.stop(nextPlaylistId);
+            }
+            return;
+        }
+
+        this.start(playlist);
+    }
+
+    /** Whether this playlist currently owns the watchdog. */
+    isActivePlaylist(playlistId: string): boolean {
+        return this.activePlaylistId === playlistId;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Lets the repair layer overlay its in-session override on the row a ping
+     * resolves: the persisted row can still carry a pre-repair configuration
+     * while persistence is pending (or failed), and pinging that would stop
+     * or misdirect the keepalive.
+     */
+    registerPlaylistDecorator(decorator: (playlist: Playlist) => Playlist): void {
+        this.playlistDecorator = decorator;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Applies the cadence decoded from a `get_profile` response. When the
+     * playlist's watchdog is already running on a different cadence, its
+     * periodic schedule restarts (without re-sending the init ping).
+     */
+    applyProfileTiming(
+        playlistId: string,
+        timing: { watchdogTimeoutSeconds?: number; timeslotSeconds?: number }
+    ): void {
+        const next = normalizeTiming(timing);
+        const current = this.timings.get(playlistId);
+        if (
+            current &&
+            current.periodSeconds === next.periodSeconds &&
+            current.timeslotSeconds === next.timeslotSeconds
+        ) {
+            return;
+        }
+
+        this.timings.set(playlistId, next);
+
+        if (this.timers.has(playlistId)) {
+            this.clearTimers(playlistId);
+            this.timers.set(playlistId, {});
+            this.schedule(playlistId);
+        }
+    }
+
+    private start(playlist: Playlist): void {
+        const playlistId = playlist._id;
+        this.playlists.set(playlistId, playlist);
+
+        if (this.timers.has(playlistId)) {
+            return;
+        }
+
+        this.timers.set(playlistId, {});
+        void this.sendPing(playlistId, '1');
+        this.schedule(playlistId);
+    }
+
+    private stop(playlistId: string): void {
+        this.clearTimers(playlistId);
+        this.timers.delete(playlistId);
+        this.playlists.delete(playlistId);
+        this.inFlight.delete(playlistId);
+    }
+
+    private clearTimers(playlistId: string): void {
+        const timers = this.timers.get(playlistId);
+        if (!timers) {
+            return;
+        }
+        if (timers.timeslotTimeout) {
+            clearTimeout(timers.timeslotTimeout);
+        }
+        if (timers.interval) {
+            clearInterval(timers.interval);
+        }
+    }
+
+    private timingFor(playlistId: string): StalkerWatchdogTiming {
+        return (
+            this.timings.get(playlistId) ?? {
+                periodSeconds: STALKER_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT_PERIOD_SECONDS,
+                timeslotSeconds: 0,
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    private schedule(playlistId: string): void {
+        const timers = this.timers.get(playlistId);
+        if (!timers) {
+            return;
+        }
+
+        const { periodSeconds, timeslotSeconds } = this.timingFor(playlistId);
+        const startInterval = () => {
+            const current = this.timers.get(playlistId);
+            if (!current) {
+                return;
+            }
+            current.timeslotTimeout = undefined;
+            current.interval = setInterval(() => {
+                void this.sendPing(playlistId, '0');
+            }, periodSeconds * 1000);
+        };
+
+        if (timeslotSeconds > 0) {
+            timers.timeslotTimeout = setTimeout(
+                startInterval,
+                timeslotSeconds * 1000
+            );
+        } else {
+            startInterval();
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * The playlist a ping authenticates as. The persisted row is the source of
+     * truth: portal metadata (endpoint, mode, MAC, identity) edited or
+     * repaired mid-session must reach the keepalive within one cycle — the
+     * activation-time snapshot is only the fallback when the row cannot be
+     * read.
+     */
+    private async resolvePlaylist(
+        playlistId: string
+    ): Promise<Playlist | undefined> {
+        try {
+            const row = await this.deps.readPersistedPlaylist(playlistId);
+            if (row) {
+                // Keep the fallback snapshot fresh for the next cycle.
+                this.playlists.set(playlistId, row);
+                return this.decorate(row);
+            }
+        } catch {
+            // Store unavailable (e.g. isolated tests): keep the snapshot.
+        }
+
+        const snapshot = this.playlists.get(playlistId);
+        return snapshot ? this.decorate(snapshot) : snapshot;
+    }
+
+    private decorate(playlist: Playlist): Playlist {
+        return this.playlistDecorator
+            ? this.playlistDecorator(playlist)
+            : playlist;
+    }
+
+    private async sendPing(playlistId: string, init: '0' | '1'): Promise<void> {
+        if (this.inFlight.has(playlistId)) {
+            return;
+        }
+
+        // Claimed BEFORE the row read: it awaits, and two overlapping pings
+        // passing the check together would double-fire the keepalive.
+        this.inFlight.add(playlistId);
+        try {
+            const playlist = await this.resolvePlaylist(playlistId);
+            if (
+                !playlist ||
+                !playlist.portalUrl ||
+                !playlist.macAddress ||
+                !isFullStalkerPortalPlaylist(playlist)
+            ) {
+                this.stop(playlistId);
+                return;
+            }
+
+            await this.deps.sendRequest(playlist, {
+                type: 'watchdog',
+                action: 'get_events',
+                event_active_id: '0',
+                cur_play_type: '0',
+                init,
+                JsHttpRequest: '1-xml',
+            });
+        } catch (error) {
+            // Keep failures non-fatal; the next tick can recover after a
+            // token refresh. Never retry or escalate: a missed ping does not
+            // invalidate authentication.
+            this.deps.logger.warn('Watchdog ping failed:', error);
+        } finally {
+            this.inFlight.delete(playlistId);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+function normalizeTiming(timing: {
+    watchdogTimeoutSeconds?: number;
+    timeslotSeconds?: number;
+}): StalkerWatchdogTiming {
+    const period = clamp(
+        Math.floor(
+            timing.watchdogTimeoutSeconds ??
+                STALKER_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT_PERIOD_SECONDS
+        ),
+        MIN_PERIOD_SECONDS,
+        MAX_PERIOD_SECONDS
+    );
+    const timeslot = clamp(Math.floor(timing.timeslotSeconds ?? 0), 0, period - 1);
+    return { periodSeconds: period, timeslotSeconds: timeslot };
+}
+
+function clamp(value: number, min: number, max: number): number {
+    if (!Number.isFinite(value)) {
+        return min;
+    }
+    return Math.min(Math.max(value, min), max);
+}

libs/services/src/lib/playlists.service.spec.ts

@@ -441,6 +441,115 @@ describe('PlaylistsService', () => {
         ).toBe('1');
     });
 
+    it('carries the Stalker session fields through the SQLite fallback read', async () => {
+        // Without these, every cold Electron session loses the persisted
+        // cadence AND the identity the token was negotiated for — so the
+        // mismatch check cannot run and the watchdog falls back to default.
+        const electron = {
+            dbGetAppPlaylist: jest.fn(async () => ({
+                id: 'stalker-1',
+                stalkerToken: 'TOKEN',
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: 'fingerprint-1',
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 90,
+                stalkerTimeslot: 7,
+            })),
+            dbGetAppPlaylists: jest.fn(async () => []),
+            dbGetAppState: jest.fn(async () => '1'),
+            dbSetAppState: jest.fn(),
+            dbUpsertAppPlaylist: jest.fn(),
+            dbUpsertAppPlaylists: jest.fn(),
+        };
+        testWindow.electron = electron;
+
+        const service = createService();
+        const playlist = await firstValueFrom(
+            service.getPlaylistById('stalker-1')
+        );
+
+        expect(playlist).toEqual(
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                stalkerToken: 'TOKEN',
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: 'fingerprint-1',
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 90,
+                stalkerTimeslot: 7,
+            })
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('clears a stale watchdog cadence when the portal stops advertising one', async () => {
+        // Reusing the token skips the profile that would correct the cadence,
+        // so leaving the old value on the row means the next restart applies
+        // a cadence the portal no longer asks for.
+        const existingPlaylist: Playlist = {
+            _id: 'stalker-1',
+            title: 'Stalker',
+            count: 0,
+            importDate: new Date('2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z').toISOString(),
+            lastUsage: new Date('2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z').toISOString(),
+            autoRefresh: false,
+            stalkerToken: 'OLD',
+            stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 45,
+            stalkerTimeslot: 7,
+        } as Playlist;
+        const dbService = {
+            getAll: jest.fn(() => of([])),
+            getByID: jest.fn(() => of(existingPlaylist)),
+            update: jest.fn((_storeName: string, playlist: Playlist) =>
+                of(playlist)
+            ),
+        };
+        testWindow.electron = undefined;
+
+        const service = createService(dbService);
+
+        await firstValueFrom(
+            service.updateStalkerSession('stalker-1', { stalkerToken: 'NEW' })
+        );
+
+        const written = dbService.update.mock.calls[0][1] as Playlist;
+        expect(written.stalkerToken).toBe('NEW');
+        expect(written.stalkerWatchdogTimeout).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(written.stalkerTimeslot).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('persists the watchdog cadence alongside the stalker token', async () => {
+        const existingPlaylist: Playlist = {
+            _id: 'stalker-1',
+            title: 'Stalker',
+            count: 0,
+            importDate: new Date('2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z').toISOString(),
+            lastUsage: new Date('2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z').toISOString(),
+            autoRefresh: false,
+        } as Playlist;
+        const dbService = {
+            getAll: jest.fn(() => of([])),
+            getByID: jest.fn(() => of(existingPlaylist)),
+            update: jest.fn((_storeName: string, playlist: Playlist) =>
+                of(playlist)
+            ),
+        };
+        testWindow.electron = undefined;
+
+        const service = createService(dbService);
+
+        await firstValueFrom(
+            service.updateStalkerSession('stalker-1', {
+                stalkerToken: 'TOKEN',
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 90,
+                stalkerTimeslot: 12,
+            })
+        );
+
+        expect(dbService.update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            DbStores.Playlists,
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                stalkerToken: 'TOKEN',
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: 90,
+                stalkerTimeslot: 12,
+            })
+        );
+    });
+
     it('persists hiddenGroupTitles in playlist meta updates', async () => {
         const existingPlaylist: Playlist = {
             _id: 'playlist-1',

libs/services/src/lib/playlists.service.ts

@@ -242,6 +242,13 @@ export class PlaylistsService {
             stalkerSignature2: playlist.stalkerSignature2,
             isFullStalkerPortal: playlist.isFullStalkerPortal,
             stalkerToken: playlist.stalkerToken,
+            // Without these the Electron cold read loses the persisted
+            // cadence AND the identity the token was negotiated for, so the
+            // mismatch check cannot run and the watchdog falls back to the
+            // default.
+            stalkerSessionIdentity: playlist.stalkerSessionIdentity,
+            stalkerWatchdogTimeout: playlist.stalkerWatchdogTimeout,
+            stalkerTimeslot: playlist.stalkerTimeslot,
             stalkerAccountInfo: playlist.stalkerAccountInfo,
         } as Playlist;
     }
@@ -729,6 +736,45 @@ export class PlaylistsService {
         });
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Persists a freshly negotiated Stalker session on the playlist so the
+     * next app start can re-present the token (the portal handshake is
+     * idempotent) and keep the portal's own watchdog cadence — reusing a
+     * token skips the `get_profile` that carries the cadence, so it has to
+     * survive with the token. No-ops when the playlist row does not exist
+     * yet: the import flow saves both with the playlist itself.
+     */
+    updateStalkerSession(
+        playlistId: string,
+        session: {
+            stalkerToken: string;
+            stalkerSessionIdentity?: string;
+            stalkerWatchdogTimeout?: number;
+            stalkerTimeslot?: number;
+        }
+    ) {
+        return this.serializePlaylistWrite(playlistId, async () => {
+            const playlist = await firstValueFrom(
+                this.getPlaylistById(playlistId)
+            );
+            if (!playlist) {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            // The cadence is written unconditionally, including as
+            // `undefined`: a portal that stops advertising one must not leave
+            // a stale value behind for the next restart to re-apply, since
+            // reusing the token skips the profile that would correct it.
+            return this.persistPlaylistMutation({
+                ...playlist,
+                stalkerToken: session.stalkerToken,
+                stalkerSessionIdentity: session.stalkerSessionIdentity,
+                stalkerWatchdogTimeout: session.stalkerWatchdogTimeout,
+                stalkerTimeslot: session.stalkerTimeslot,
+            });
+        });
+    }
+
     updateFavorites(id: string, favorites: string[]) {
         return this.serializePlaylistWrite(id, async () => {
             const playlist = await firstValueFrom(this.getPlaylistById(id));

libs/shared/interfaces/src/lib/playlist.interface.ts

@@ -58,6 +58,23 @@ export interface Playlist {
     serverTimezone?: string;
     /** Session token for full stalker portal authentication - persisted for session */
     stalkerToken?: string;
+    /**
+     * Identity fingerprint the persisted `stalkerToken` was negotiated for.
+     * Re-presenting a token minted for a DIFFERENT identity (the user edited
+     * the MAC, serial or device ids) would pair a new identity with an old
+     * session — the same class of bug the in-memory cache guards against, so
+     * reuse is refused unless this still matches the playlist.
+     */
+    stalkerSessionIdentity?: string;
+    /**
+     * Watchdog cadence the portal advertised in `get_profile`, persisted
+     * alongside the token: reusing a stored token skips the profile request
+     * that carries these, so without persistence the keep-alive would fall
+     * back to the 120 s default forever.
+     */
+    stalkerWatchdogTimeout?: number;
+    /** Per-user watchdog jitter (seconds) from `get_profile`. */
+    stalkerTimeslot?: number;
     /** Serial number for stalker portal - generated once and stored for consistency */
     stalkerSerialNumber?: string;
     /** Optional device ID 1 for stalker portal - if not provided, auto-generated from MAC */

libs/shared/interfaces/src/lib/stalker-auth-failure.util.spec.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 import {
     classifyStalkerAuthFailureBody,
+    createStalkerAuthFailureMarker,
+    extractStalkerAuthFailureBody,
     isStalkerAuthFailureBody,
     isStalkerAuthFailureMessage,
     isStalkerAuthFailureResponse,
@@ -98,6 +100,58 @@ describe('isStalkerAuthFailureResponse', () => {
     });
 });
 
+describe('transport marker', () => {
+    it('round-trips through create / detect / extract', () => {
+        const marker = createStalkerAuthFailureMarker('Access denied.');
+        expect(isStalkerAuthFailureResponse(marker)).toBe(true);
+        expect(extractStalkerAuthFailureBody(marker)).toBe('Access denied.');
+    });
+
+    it('is what keeps the repair trigger working once Electron classifies', () => {
+        // The main process replaces the plain-text body with this marker, so
+        // a detector that only knew the raw string would silently stop
+        // triggering portal repair on the desktop app.
+        expect(
+            isStalkerAuthFailureResponse({
+                stalkerAuthFailure: 'Authorization failed.',
+            })
+        ).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('does not accept arbitrary objects as markers', () => {
+        expect(isStalkerAuthFailureResponse({ stalkerAuthFailure: 'nope' })).toBe(
+            false
+        );
+        expect(extractStalkerAuthFailureBody({})).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
+describe('extractStalkerAuthFailureBody', () => {
+    it('extracts from the raw PWA payload string', () => {
+        expect(extractStalkerAuthFailureBody('Authorization failed. 12')).toBe(
+            'Authorization failed.'
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('extracts from a {js: body} envelope', () => {
+        expect(
+            extractStalkerAuthFailureBody({ js: 'Authorization failed. 75' })
+        ).toBe('Authorization failed.');
+    });
+
+    it('reports no canonical body for the structured panel wording', () => {
+        // Still an auth failure — just not one of the middleware's bodies.
+        const response = { js: { error: 'Invalid token' } };
+        expect(extractStalkerAuthFailureBody(response)).toBeNull();
+        expect(isStalkerAuthFailureResponse(response)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('returns null for ordinary responses', () => {
+        expect(extractStalkerAuthFailureBody({ js: { data: [] } })).toBeNull();
+        expect(extractStalkerAuthFailureBody(undefined)).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
 describe('isStalkerAuthFailureMessage', () => {
     it('accepts messages our own auth layer produces', () => {
         expect(

libs/shared/interfaces/src/lib/stalker-auth-failure.util.ts

@@ -128,17 +128,77 @@ export function isStalkerAuthFailureMessage(message: unknown): boolean {
 }
 
 /**
- * Whether a portal response is an authorization failure in EITHER wire
- * shape: the middleware's plain-text body, or the JSON envelope some panels
- * answer instead. Classification and the lazy-repair trigger must use this,
- * not the string-only primitive: a JSON-failing panel would otherwise be
- * persisted as token-free and never repaired.
+ * Structured shape a transport returns in place of the raw plain-text body.
+ *
+ * Returned, never thrown: `ipcRenderer.invoke` strips custom properties from
+ * rejected values, so a classified body would not survive the trip to the
+ * renderer as an error. The Electron main process mints this because it is
+ * where the body arrives; the PWA proxy still delivers the raw string, and
+ * every consumer goes through the predicates below rather than caring which.
+ */
+export interface StalkerAuthFailureMarker {
+    stalkerAuthFailure: StalkerAuthFailureBody;
+}
+
+export function createStalkerAuthFailureMarker(
+    body: StalkerAuthFailureBody
+): StalkerAuthFailureMarker {
+    return { stalkerAuthFailure: body };
+}
+
+function readAuthFailureMarker(
+    value: unknown
+): StalkerAuthFailureBody | null {
+    if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
+        return null;
+    }
+
+    return classifyStalkerAuthFailureBody(
+        (value as StalkerAuthFailureMarker).stalkerAuthFailure
+    );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extracts the canonical failure body from any shape an auth failure reaches
+ * a consumer in: the transport marker (Electron), the raw plain-text payload
+ * (PWA proxy), or a `{js: '<body>'}` envelope. Returns null for everything
+ * else, including the structured `{js: {error|msg}}` form — that one is a
+ * panel's own wording, not one of the middleware's three bodies, so it has
+ * no canonical body to report. Use `isStalkerAuthFailureResponse` when the
+ * question is merely "did authorization fail?".
+ */
+export function extractStalkerAuthFailureBody(
+    value: unknown
+): StalkerAuthFailureBody | null {
+    return (
+        readAuthFailureMarker(value) ??
+        classifyStalkerAuthFailureBody(value) ??
+        classifyStalkerAuthFailureBody(
+            typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && 'js' in value
+                ? (value as { js?: unknown }).js
+                : undefined
+        )
+    );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether a portal response is an authorization failure in ANY wire shape:
+ * the middleware's plain-text body, the transport marker minted from it, or
+ * the JSON envelope some panels answer instead. Classification and the
+ * lazy-repair trigger must use this, not the string-only primitive: a
+ * JSON-failing panel would otherwise be persisted as token-free and never
+ * repaired, and an Electron-classified body would stop triggering repair at
+ * all.
  */
 export function isStalkerAuthFailureResponse(response: unknown): boolean {
     if (isStalkerAuthFailureBody(response)) {
         return true;
     }
 
+    if (readAuthFailureMarker(response) !== null) {
+        return true;
+    }
+
     if (
         response === null ||
         typeof response !== 'object' ||

libs/workspace/shell/feature/src/lib/workspace-context-panel/workspace-context-panel.component.html

@@ -157,9 +157,7 @@
         } @else if (isStalkerCategoryFailed()) {
             <app-workspace-context-error-view
                 [title]="'WORKSPACE.CONTEXT.LOAD_CATEGORIES_ERROR' | translate"
-                [description]="
-                    'WORKSPACE.CONTEXT.LOAD_CATEGORIES_ERROR_HINT' | translate
-                "
+                [description]="stalkerCategoryErrorDescription()"
                 [showActionButtons]="false"
             />
         } @else {

libs/workspace/shell/feature/src/lib/workspace-context-panel/workspace-context-panel.component.ts

@@ -17,7 +17,10 @@ import { MatMenuModule } from '@angular/material/menu';
 import { MatTooltip } from '@angular/material/tooltip';
 import { Router } from '@angular/router';
 import { TranslatePipe, TranslateService } from '@ngx-translate/core';
-import { StalkerStore } from '@iptvnator/portal/stalker/data-access';
+import {
+    StalkerStore,
+    asStalkerPortalError,
+} from '@iptvnator/portal/stalker/data-access';
 import {
     PortalCategorySortMode,
     persistPortalCategorySortMode,
@@ -152,6 +155,28 @@ export class WorkspaceContextPanelComponent {
         this.stalkerStore.isCategoryResourceLoading;
     readonly isStalkerCategoryFailed =
         this.stalkerStore.isCategoryResourceFailed;
+    /**
+     * When category loading failed because the portal refused the session,
+     * the portal's own explanation (msg/block_msg or the documented
+     * plain-text failure body) replaces the generic hint; a login-required
+     * refusal gets its own actionable text.
+     */
+    readonly stalkerCategoryErrorDescription = computed(() => {
+        const portalError = asStalkerPortalError(
+            this.isStalkerCategoryFailed()
+        );
+        if (portalError?.portalText) {
+            return portalError.portalText;
+        }
+        if (portalError?.kind === 'login-required') {
+            return this.translate.instant(
+                'PORTALS.ERROR_VIEW.STALKER_LOGIN_REQUIRED'
+            );
+        }
+        return this.translate.instant(
+            'WORKSPACE.CONTEXT.LOAD_CATEGORIES_ERROR_HINT'
+        );
+    });
     // Category count badges are only available for Stalker Live TV, where the
     // full channel list is cached — VOD/series/radio still page lazily, so
     // their per-category totals are unknown.

tools/eslint/max-lines-baseline.mjs

@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ export const maxLinesBaseline = [
     'libs/portal/shared/ui/src/lib/components/unified-collection/unified-collection-page.component.ts',
     'libs/portal/shared/ui/src/lib/components/unified-collection/unified-live-tab.component.ts',
     'libs/portal/shared/util/src/lib/navigation/workspace-portal-navigation.ts',
-    'libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stalker-session.service.ts',
     'libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stores/features/with-stalker-content.feature.ts',
     'libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stores/features/with-stalker-epg.feature.ts',
     'libs/portal/stalker/data-access/src/lib/stores/features/with-stalker-player.feature.ts',