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iptvnator/docs/architecture/electron-security.md
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4gray fc449ca73e feat(electron): harden renderer security
Scope playback request header overrides to active stream origins and document the Electron runtime security contract.
2026-05-22 23:31:41 +03:00

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Electron Security Contract

This document records the Electron runtime security contract for the desktop app.

BrowserWindow Defaults

The main window is created in apps/electron-backend/src/app/app.ts with an explicit hardened webPreferences object:

  • contextIsolation: true
  • nodeIntegration: false
  • sandbox: true
  • webSecurity: true
  • preload: apps/electron-backend/src/app/api/main.preload.ts

Renderer code must use the preload bridge exposed as window.electron. Do not re-enable direct Node.js access from Angular code. New desktop-only APIs should be added to the preload bridge and backed by an ipcMain.handle(...) owner in the Electron backend.

Navigation And External URLs

The main window owns two navigation gates:

  • setWindowOpenHandler denies every new window. http: and https: targets are opened in the operating system browser through shell.openExternal.
  • will-navigate allows only the trusted renderer URL. Development mode allows http://localhost:4200, http://127.0.0.1:4200, and http://[::1]:4200. Packaged mode allows the app's file-backed renderer. External web navigations are denied in the app window and opened in the operating system browser.

Do not add broad protocol allow-lists for renderer navigation. If a new desktop-only flow needs to open a URL outside IPTVnator, route it through the default browser unless the app window is deliberately meant to host that URL.

Content Security Policy

The Angular shell defines a baseline CSP in apps/web/src/index.html.

The policy keeps the application self-hosted for scripts, blocks object and frame embedding, limits forms to the app origin, and allows IPTV playback sources through media-src and connect-src for http:, https:, blob:, and data:. The policy keeps script-src self-hosted and currently keeps unsafe-inline for existing inline styles.

Before tightening either value, validate both Electron development startup and the PWA/electron build configurations. Playback-heavy changes should also check that HLS, MPEG-TS, thumbnails, and local file playback are still allowed by the policy.

Scoped Request Header Overrides

Inline playback can request temporary User-Agent, Referer, and Origin header overrides through window.electron.setUserAgent(userAgent, referer, scopeUrl).

The Electron backend handles that IPC in apps/electron-backend/src/app/events/shared.events.ts and delegates to apps/electron-backend/src/app/services/request-header-overrides.service.ts. The service registers one session.defaultSession.webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders listener and updates the active override in memory instead of stacking a new listener for every channel change.

Rules:

  • empty userAgent and empty referer clear the active override
  • channel playback should pass the stream URL as scopeUrl
  • scoped overrides apply only to the active stream origin and referer origin
  • playlist-level user agents and referrers may call the bridge without a scopeUrl; that is intentionally broader because playlist settings apply to the whole M3U playlist
  • header names are replaced case-insensitively before canonical User-Agent, Referer, and Origin names are written

When changing this flow, keep stale header cleanup covered. Switching from a channel or playlist with custom headers to one without custom headers must clear the previous override.