mirror of
https://github.com/4gray/iptvnator.git
synced 2026-10-11 11:06:16 -08:00
Nine PRs landed between 2026-08-01 and 2026-08-04 in parallel worktrees, each
editing its own section of docs/architecture/stalker-portal.md and CLAUDE.md.
Sections that were correct when written disagreed with each other, or with
master, afterwards. Every claim here was verified against the code.
Corrected in stalker-portal.md: routes listed without the /workspace prefix;
"simple portals carry only the mac= cookie" (every request goes through the
shared identity builder — but the direct branch forwards no serial, so no
SN/__cfduid either, while playback headers are NOT mode-gated); a facade
introduced as "three modules" above a list of five; the pre-#1370 "blank
fields are not generated" opening; an ambiguous stalker-identity.utils.ts
citation (two files share the name); two of the three surfaces that apply the
scoped header override; a bare {status: 1} now being a refusal; and the
session-state fields #1354 added to the backup exclusion list (mirrored in
playlist-backup-restore.md).
CLAUDE.md had no entry at all for portal mode / endpoint discovery / lazy
repair — the largest change of the series; added one. Its session-facade list
was missing two modules and status 1 still read as plain "blocked".
Mock server: documented the /stalker, /stream/gated and marketing-poster
routes and the HOST variable; replaced the global POST /reset guidance with
the real per-MAC isolation contract (OWNED_MACS, the sibling 00:1A:79:5F:*
range, mode: 'serial'); added get_main_info; refreshed the project tree; fixed
a broken anchor; and corrected MOCK_PORT, which moves the client side only —
nothing maps it to the server's PORT.
The repo skill's "keep Stalker request rules in Stalker data access" no longer
holds: the wire-format, identity, portal-mode and auth-failure contracts live
in shared/interfaces because the Electron main process cannot import renderer
libs.
Also fixes four stale code comments carrying the same claims, including
"Single choke point for Stalker API calls" — four callers deliberately go
direct, and only fetchViaProfile() wires repair itself.
Docs and comments only; no executable change. No release note (no user-visible
behavior); no-release-note label applied for the libs/** paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
388 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
388 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
import http from 'http';
|
|
import { join } from 'node:path';
|
|
import express, { Request, Response } from 'express';
|
|
import cors from 'cors';
|
|
import { buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext } from '@iptvnator/shared/interfaces';
|
|
import portalRouter, { createPortalRouter } from './app/routes/portal.route.js';
|
|
import dispatchPortalAction from './app/routes/dispatch.js';
|
|
import {
|
|
checkRequestAuthorization,
|
|
invalidateSession,
|
|
resetAuthState,
|
|
} from './app/auth-store.js';
|
|
import { resetWatchdogPings } from './app/handlers/get-events.handler.js';
|
|
import { resetAll, resetMac } from './app/data-store.js';
|
|
import { SCENARIOS } from './app/scenarios.js';
|
|
import {
|
|
buildRequestOrigin,
|
|
resolveMarketingPosterUrls,
|
|
} from './app/marketing-poster-url.js';
|
|
|
|
const PORT = parseInt(process.env['PORT'] ?? '3210', 10);
|
|
// Loopback by default: the fixture serves fabricated but unauthenticated
|
|
// content, so it should not be reachable from other hosts unless a dev
|
|
// explicitly opts in with HOST=0.0.0.0 (e.g. to point a phone or STB at it).
|
|
const HOST = process.env['HOST'] ?? '127.0.0.1';
|
|
const app = express();
|
|
const MARKETING_POSTER_DIRECTORY = join(
|
|
process.cwd(),
|
|
'apps/xtream-mock-server/public/marketing/poster'
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Middleware
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
app.use(cors());
|
|
app.use(express.json());
|
|
app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true }));
|
|
|
|
// Log every request
|
|
app.use((req, _res, next) => {
|
|
const action = req.query['action'] ?? '-';
|
|
const mac =
|
|
(req.headers['cookie'] ?? '')
|
|
.split(';')
|
|
.find((c) => c.trim().startsWith('mac='))
|
|
?.split('=')[1]
|
|
?.trim() ?? (req.query['macAddress'] as string) ?? 'no-mac';
|
|
console.log(
|
|
`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${req.method} ${req.path} action=${action} mac=${mac}`
|
|
);
|
|
next();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// Marketing fixtures store deployment-neutral asset paths. Resolve them
|
|
// against the public origin of each request, including reverse-proxy headers.
|
|
app.use((req, res, next) => {
|
|
if (
|
|
!['get_ordered_list', 'favorites'].includes(
|
|
String(req.query['action'])
|
|
)
|
|
) {
|
|
next();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const sendJson = res.json.bind(res);
|
|
const requestOrigin = buildRequestOrigin(req);
|
|
|
|
res.json = ((body: unknown) =>
|
|
sendJson(
|
|
resolveMarketingPosterUrls(body, requestOrigin)
|
|
)) as Response['json'];
|
|
next();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Routes
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
// Serve the shared screenshot-safe poster catalog directly from this process.
|
|
app.use(
|
|
'/assets/marketing/poster',
|
|
express.static(MARKETING_POSTER_DIRECTORY, {
|
|
fallthrough: false,
|
|
immutable: true,
|
|
maxAge: '1y',
|
|
})
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Stalker portal.php endpoint (reseller-panel alias — tolerant, no token check)
|
|
app.use('/portal.php', portalRouter);
|
|
|
|
// Canonical Ministra endpoints — enforce the Bearer token and the MAC format
|
|
// exactly like the real middleware, so the full-portal auth flow is testable.
|
|
// Both URL shapes the app classifies as "full" must land on the strict branch.
|
|
app.use('/stalker_portal/server/load.php', createPortalRouter(true));
|
|
app.use('/server/load.php', createPortalRouter(true));
|
|
|
|
// Genuine-Ministra host simulation: everything under /ministra serves ONLY
|
|
// the canonical `server/load.php` endpoint — `/ministra/portal.php` 404s like
|
|
// a real Stalker/Ministra installation (portal.php is a reseller-panel alias
|
|
// the official middleware never ships). This is what lets e2e prove the
|
|
// endpoint-discovery fallthrough: `http://host/ministra/c` must probe
|
|
// portal.php, hit the 404, and land on server/load.php in full-portal mode.
|
|
app.use('/ministra/server/load.php', createPortalRouter(true));
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Which proxied portal URLs this mock enforces the token on. It mirrors
|
|
* `isFullStalkerPortalUrl()` in `@iptvnator/shared/interfaces` — the union of
|
|
* the three predicates that used to diverge in the app before endpoint
|
|
* discovery unified them.
|
|
*
|
|
* The app itself no longer classifies by URL shape (mode is an observed,
|
|
* persisted fact), but a fixture has to decide strictness from the path
|
|
* alone: it IS the behavior being observed. Every URL shape the client would
|
|
* authenticate against must be enforced here, or tests silently exercise the
|
|
* tolerant branch.
|
|
*/
|
|
function isFullPortalUrlShape(url: string): boolean {
|
|
return url.includes('/stalker_portal') || url.includes('/server/load.php');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* CORS proxy compatibility endpoint — mirrors the IPTVnator backend API shape:
|
|
* GET /stalker?url=<portal_url>&macAddress=<mac>&action=<action>&...
|
|
* → { payload: <stalker_response> }
|
|
*
|
|
* The IPTVnator PWA sends Stalker requests to AppConfig.BACKEND_URL/stalker.
|
|
* Playwright tests redirect those calls to this endpoint using page.route(),
|
|
* so no app code changes are required.
|
|
*/
|
|
app.get('/stalker', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
|
|
const {
|
|
macAddress,
|
|
token,
|
|
serialNumber,
|
|
url: portalUrl,
|
|
...rest
|
|
} = req.query as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
|
|
// A repeated query key arrives as an array, so every value used below must
|
|
// be narrowed to a string before it reaches a string API.
|
|
const asString = (value: unknown): string | undefined =>
|
|
typeof value === 'string' ? value : undefined;
|
|
|
|
const mac = asString(macAddress) ?? '00:1a:79:00:00:01';
|
|
const bearer = asString(token);
|
|
|
|
// Mirror of the real backend proxy: `macAddress`, `token` and
|
|
// `serialNumber` are control params turned into the portal-facing
|
|
// Cookie / Authorization / SN headers and STRIPPED from the query the
|
|
// portal sees — with one protocol exception, `handshake`, which presents
|
|
// its candidate token as a query param (that keeps the
|
|
// idempotent-handshake path testable). The shared identity builder is the
|
|
// same code the real proxy and the Electron transport run, so this mirror
|
|
// cannot drift from them.
|
|
const query: Record<string, unknown> = { ...rest };
|
|
if (query['action'] === 'handshake' && bearer) {
|
|
query['token'] = bearer;
|
|
}
|
|
const identity = buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext({
|
|
macAddress: mac,
|
|
params: query as Record<string, string | number>,
|
|
...(bearer ? { token: bearer } : {}),
|
|
...(asString(serialNumber)
|
|
? { serialNumber: asString(serialNumber) }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
});
|
|
// The real proxy appends this while building the portal URL; mirror it so
|
|
// `query_keys_received` diagnostics match what a real portal would log.
|
|
if (!identity.requestParams['JsHttpRequest']) {
|
|
identity.requestParams['JsHttpRequest'] = '1-xml';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Forward the COMPLETE identity header set (Cookie, MAG UA pair, SN,
|
|
// Authorization, Accept/Language/Connection), lowercased the way Express
|
|
// normalizes incoming headers, so portal handlers can validate any header
|
|
// the real proxy sends — not just the cookie and token.
|
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = Object.fromEntries(
|
|
Object.entries(identity.headers).map(([key, value]) => [
|
|
key.toLowerCase(),
|
|
value,
|
|
])
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Build a lightweight synthetic request. We need a fresh object with mutable
|
|
// `query` and a Cookie header containing the MAC for the handler helpers.
|
|
const syntheticReq = {
|
|
query: identity.requestParams,
|
|
headers,
|
|
params: {},
|
|
} as unknown as Request;
|
|
|
|
// Capture the JSON response and wrap it in the proxy envelope { payload: ... }
|
|
let captured: unknown;
|
|
let plainTextBody: string | undefined;
|
|
const syntheticRes = {
|
|
json: (data: unknown) => {
|
|
captured = data;
|
|
},
|
|
status: () => syntheticRes,
|
|
type: () => syntheticRes,
|
|
send: (body: string) => {
|
|
plainTextBody = body;
|
|
},
|
|
} as unknown as Response & { send: (body: string) => void };
|
|
|
|
dispatchPortalAction(syntheticReq, syntheticRes, {
|
|
// The proxied portal URL decides strictness, matching the direct
|
|
// endpoints: every canonical Ministra path shape enforces the token.
|
|
enforceAuth: isFullPortalUrlShape(asString(portalUrl) ?? ''),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// The portal answers auth failures with a plain-text body; the real backend
|
|
// proxy still wraps whatever it got in the { payload } envelope, so the
|
|
// renderer sees the raw string there rather than a transport error.
|
|
res.json({ payload: plainTextBody ?? captured });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Auth-gated media endpoints for the `gated-stream` scenario. A real portal's
|
|
* streamer sits behind the same session gate as the API, so these routes
|
|
* require the mac cookie AND the MAC's Bearer token and answer 403
|
|
* otherwise. They are the only automated proof that a player's actual media
|
|
* requests carry the portal credentials — a unit test cannot show that a
|
|
* header reached the video (or audio) element.
|
|
*
|
|
* The bodies are the shared clear (non-DRM) fragmented-MP4 fixtures from the
|
|
* DASH e2e suite (video for ITV, audio-only for radio); `sendFile` supplies
|
|
* Range support for progressive playback.
|
|
*/
|
|
const GATED_STREAM_FIXTURES: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
'audio.mp4': join(
|
|
process.cwd(),
|
|
'apps/web-e2e/src/fixtures/dash/clear-audio.mp4'
|
|
),
|
|
'video.mp4': join(
|
|
process.cwd(),
|
|
'apps/web-e2e/src/fixtures/dash/clear-video.mp4'
|
|
),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
app.get('/stream/gated/:file', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
|
|
const fixture = GATED_STREAM_FIXTURES[req.params['file'] ?? ''];
|
|
if (!fixture) {
|
|
res.status(404).type('text/plain').send('Not found');
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const failure = checkRequestAuthorization(req, true);
|
|
if (failure) {
|
|
// Log only header PRESENCE: the cookie carries the mac session
|
|
// credential and must never reach terminal/CI logs verbatim.
|
|
console.log(
|
|
`[gated-stream] 403 (${failure}) cookie=${
|
|
req.headers['cookie'] ? 'present' : '<none>'
|
|
} auth=${req.headers['authorization'] ? 'present' : '<none>'}`
|
|
);
|
|
res.status(403).type('text/plain').send(failure);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// `dotfiles: 'allow'`: express refuses any path with a dot-segment by
|
|
// default, and git worktrees live under `.claude/worktrees/…` — without
|
|
// this the fixture 404s in every worktree checkout.
|
|
res.sendFile(fixture, {
|
|
dotfiles: 'allow',
|
|
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'video/mp4' },
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// Health check
|
|
app.get('/health', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
|
|
res.json({ status: 'ok', timestamp: new Date().toISOString() });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Reset in-memory state between test runs.
|
|
*
|
|
* `?macAddress=<mac>` scopes the reset to that MAC and is what specs should
|
|
* use: mock state is per-MAC, so a scoped reset cannot wipe the session of a
|
|
* spec file running concurrently in another Playwright worker. Without the
|
|
* parameter everything is cleared, which is only safe when nothing else is
|
|
* talking to this server.
|
|
*/
|
|
app.post('/reset', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
|
|
const macParam = req.query['macAddress'];
|
|
// Repeated `macAddress` params let a suite clear all of its MACs in one
|
|
// request instead of one round trip each.
|
|
const macs = (Array.isArray(macParam) ? macParam : [macParam]).filter(
|
|
(value): value is string => typeof value === 'string' && value !== ''
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if (macs.length > 0) {
|
|
for (const mac of macs) {
|
|
resetMac(mac);
|
|
resetAuthState(mac);
|
|
resetWatchdogPings(mac);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
resetAll();
|
|
resetAuthState();
|
|
resetWatchdogPings();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res.json({
|
|
status: 'reset',
|
|
...(macs.length > 0 ? { macs } : {}),
|
|
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Drop a MAC's session so the next portal request fails with
|
|
* `Authorization failed.` — lets e2e assert the client re-handshakes and
|
|
* retries instead of surfacing an error.
|
|
*/
|
|
app.post('/invalidate-session', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
|
|
const macParam = req.query['macAddress'];
|
|
const mac = typeof macParam === 'string' ? macParam : '';
|
|
if (!mac) {
|
|
res.status(400).json({ error: 'macAddress query param is required' });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
invalidateSession(mac);
|
|
res.json({ status: 'invalidated', mac });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Start
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
const server = http.createServer(app);
|
|
|
|
server.on('error', (err: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => {
|
|
if (err.code === 'EADDRINUSE') {
|
|
console.error(`[stalker-mock] Port ${PORT} is already in use.`);
|
|
} else {
|
|
console.error('[stalker-mock] Server error:', err.message);
|
|
}
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const shutdown = () => {
|
|
console.log('\n[stalker-mock] Shutting down...');
|
|
server.close(() => process.exit(0));
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
process.on('SIGINT', shutdown);
|
|
process.on('SIGTERM', shutdown);
|
|
process.on('uncaughtException', (err) => {
|
|
console.error('[stalker-mock] Uncaught exception:', err);
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
});
|
|
process.on('unhandledRejection', (reason) => {
|
|
console.error('[stalker-mock] Unhandled rejection:', reason);
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// When Nx (or any process manager) closes stdin, prevent auto-exit.
|
|
// The HTTP server handle is what keeps the process alive.
|
|
process.stdin.resume();
|
|
process.stdin.on('end', () => { /* ignore stdin close */ });
|
|
|
|
server.listen(PORT, HOST, () => {
|
|
const divider = '─'.repeat(62);
|
|
console.log(`\n${divider}`);
|
|
console.log(` 🎬 Stalker Mock Server → http://localhost:${PORT}`);
|
|
console.log(divider);
|
|
console.log(' Portal URL (Electron/direct):');
|
|
console.log(` http://localhost:${PORT}/portal.php`);
|
|
console.log('');
|
|
console.log(' CORS proxy URL (PWA/Playwright e2e):');
|
|
console.log(` http://localhost:${PORT}/stalker?url=...&macAddress=...`);
|
|
console.log('');
|
|
console.log(' Predefined scenario MACs:');
|
|
for (const [mac, scenario] of Object.entries(SCENARIOS)) {
|
|
console.log(
|
|
` ${mac} → ${scenario.name.padEnd(16)} ${scenario.description}`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
console.log('');
|
|
console.log(' Any other MAC generates deterministic unique data from MAC bytes.');
|
|
console.log(` Utilities:`);
|
|
console.log(` GET http://localhost:${PORT}/health`);
|
|
console.log(` POST http://localhost:${PORT}/reset (clears favorites + cache)`);
|
|
console.log(`${divider}\n`);
|
|
});
|