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perf/devtools-dev-only
6
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 4grayandClaude Fable 5.1
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8ebb7e3424 |
perf(ci): run Tier A coverage concurrently with isolatedModules ts-jest (#1701)
Tier A coverage runs projects a few at a time (largest first, bounded Jest workers, buffered output, fail-fast kept) and ts-jest transpiles with isolatedModules instead of type-checking per process; five type re-exports become export type, two decorated inputs use import type. Unit Tests and Typechecks job: 26 min -> 9 min (Tier A step 23 min -> 6.5 min). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4grayandClaude Fable 5.1
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01c423ac43 |
fix(portals): stop treating a slow panel as a dead host; IPv4 fallback budget in Electron (#1621)
* fix(portals): apply the IPv6->IPv4 fallback budget in the Electron process The 2500 ms happy-eyeballs attempt timeout from #1404 only ever ran in the web backend. The Electron main process and its playlist-refresh and EPG workers kept Node's 250 ms default, so a dual-stack panel hostname behind a VPN or a slow link failed every connection attempt in a row and tripped the host connectivity guard. The module now lives in `@iptvnator/shared/host-health` and every Node isolate that opens connections applies it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): stop treating a slow panel as a dead one in the host guard axios raises the same ECONNABORTED whether the SYN went unanswered or the panel accepted the connection and then thought for longer than the request budget. Two such timeouts opened the breaker and every request to the panel was refused for 30 s with "portal is not responding" — the shape behind the "connection keeps dropping" reports on 0.23 and nightly. Both transports now report whether the TCP connection was established (`onConnect`: Electron through a per-request observed agent instead of the shared keep-alive globalAgent, the web backend through the transport that owns the ClientRequest), and `classifyHostRequestFailure(error, { connected })` downgrades a host-level code observed after the handshake to inconclusive. Redirect attribution keeps precedence. A host that never accepts the connection trips the guard exactly as before. The Xtream mock gains a `silent:silent` scenario whose detail actions accept and never answer, plus a real-socket regression spec for the guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): let an accepted connection clear the host-failure streak Review finding: an unanswered SYN, then an accepted-but-slow timeout, then another unanswered SYN still reached the two-failure threshold, because the middle request was merely not counted. An accepted TCP connection is the reachability the guard measures, so it now reads as `responded` and clears the streak like an HTTP response would. Regression coverage for the mixed sequence on one flapping loopback origin (Electron) and through the proxy route (web backend). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): credit an accepted connection when it happens, not when the request settles Review findings. A request that connected and then hung for 30 s cleared, on its eventual timeout, the failures later requests had recorded while it waited — reopening a host that had just died on evidence older than theirs. The connect hook now reports the connection the moment it fires through a new `HostConnectivityGuard.reportConnected`, which clears the failure streak but closes no open or half-open breaker (the trial keeps its slot until it settles), and the settled timeout is inconclusive. Electron also skips the socket observer while an environment proxy (`http_proxy` / `https_proxy` / `all_proxy`) applies to the request: through a proxy the socket connects to the proxy, whose handshake proves nothing about the portal, so those requests keep the pre-observer behaviour. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): decide the proxy exemption with axios' own resolution Review findings. The hand-rolled environment check ignored `no_proxy`, so a LAN portal exempted from the proxy lost its connect observer and slow requests to it still tripped the breaker; it also read the variables with `??`, letting an empty lowercase one mask a populated uppercase one that axios would honour. The decision now calls `proxy-from-env`'s `getProxyForUrl`, the same pinned package axios' http adapter uses, declared as a direct dependency so the packaged app carries it. The validated-axios spec clears and restores every proxy variable around each case, so a runner that exports a proxy cannot change what the cases prove. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4gray
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e9eca1c386 |
chore(deps): upgrade Angular to 22.1 and Nx to 23.2 (#1603)
* chore(deps): upgrade Angular to 22.1 and Nx to 23.2 * fix(deps): complete Angular migrations after rebasing on master * fix(ci): use the Node pin for Windows runtime refresh * docs(deps): synchronize the workspace-shell Node requirements |
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4gray
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e40f31db97 | fix(host-health): retain trial ownership until requests settle (#1547) | ||
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4gray
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1c56b3ea02 |
fix(portals): count concurrent connection failures once (#1537)
* fix(portals): count concurrent connection failures once * docs(portals): clarify failure counting after guard eviction |
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4grayandClaude Opus 5
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e94cc029eb |
fix(portals): time out and fast-fail PWA proxy requests to dead hosts (#1424)
* refactor(portals): hoist the connectivity guard into libs/shared/host-health The breaker was written dependency-free so both processes that talk to portals could share it. Move the part that has no Electron in it — the state machine, the failure classification, the redirect-attribution helpers and the fast-fail error — into `@iptvnator/shared/host-health` (`scope:shared` / `domain:shared-runtime` / `type:util`). What stays in `apps/electron-backend` is the genuinely main-process part: one guard for the whole process, so both portal IPC handlers see each other's evidence, and the console warning that announces it. Every call site is unchanged; the wrapper re-exports the two types they import. The spec splits the same way — the state machine moves with the class, the singleton and its redirect attribution stay with the wrapper. Register the new project in the coverage policy, which every project with a test target must declare a tier for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): time out and fast-fail PWA proxy requests to dead hosts The web backend's proxy routes were bare `axios.get()` calls with no `timeout`, so a provider that accepted a connection and then went silent held the request until the OS gave up on the TCP connection — minutes, rather than the 15/30 s budget the Electron handlers use. Add the same per-route timeouts (Xtream 30 s, Stalker 15 s / 30 s for `create_link`, playlist and XMLTV 30 s). Those numbers are safe for large downloads: on axios' default transport `timeout` bounds the time to response headers and then continues as the socket's inactivity timeout, so a multi-megabyte XMLTV file that keeps delivering bytes is never cut off — only a stalled one is. With requests bounded, run `/xtream` and `/stalker` through the shared breaker, injected via `WebBackendAppOptions.hostGuard` so specs drive it with a clock they own. Playlist and XMLTV downloads keep the timeout but no breaker, matching Electron: a download is one request rather than a catalog fan-out, it is usually the direct result of the user asking for it, and it can outlive the half-open trial window. The breaker is checked before the Xtream URL revalidation, which resolves the hostname — a dead host is where DNS is slow too, and a request admitted and then abandoned by the URL policy hands its token back rather than holding the trial slot. `resetHostConnectivityGuard()` no longer no-ops in the PWA: the breaker lives in the backend process, so it travels to a new `POST /connectivity-guard/reset`, which reads only the origin and never logs the credential-bearing URL. `skipConnectionGuard` now survives the PWA transport too, so Stalker endpoint discovery keeps the exemption it has on the desktop instead of tripping the breaker with its own probes. A fast-fail keeps each route's HTTP 200 `{message, status}` envelope. The Stalker path needs one extra step: `forwardStalkerRequest` turns that envelope into `HTTP Error <code>: …` with a numeric `status`, and the renderer reads both as "the endpoint answered" — which would make discovery walk every candidate and fire lazy repair at a host just declared dead. A prior branch keyed on the shared `isHostConnectivityFastFailMessage` rethrows it bare instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): report exempt Stalker probe responses to the PWA breaker Flagged by the author of #1421 as one of the twelve fixes that landed there after this branch cherry-picked the pre-review commit: an exempt discovery probe must still REPORT, it just must not COUNT. The web backend was skipping the report entirely for a probe, which loses the case that matters. A failure carrying an HTTP response proves the endpoint answered, and this route sets no `validateStatus`, so axios rejects every non-2xx with `error.response` attached — a probe answered with 404 or 500 was therefore dropped instead of clearing the record. Two counted failures either side of it then read as consecutive and opened the breaker in the middle of discovery, which is exactly what the exemption exists to prevent. `reportProviderRequestFailure` now takes `countFailures`, matching the Electron reporter, and both routes always report. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): read the redirect hop from the transport that followed it `failedAfterRedirect` decided whether a failure belonged to a redirect destination by reading `error.config.url`. That is right for the Electron transport, which sets `maxRedirects: 0` and reissues every hop as its own request, so the hop IS the config URL. It is blind on the web backend, which uses axios' default transport: follow-redirects walks the chain inside one request and `config` is built once, so `config.url` stays the URL we asked for. Verified against the installed axios 1.19.0 with a live server that 302s to a dead port: asked for : http://127.0.0.1:63953/player_api.php config.url : http://127.0.0.1:63953/player_api.php request._currentUrl: http://127.0.0.1:1/dead So the comparison was original-vs-original, found no redirect, and charged two dead destinations to the provider that had answered both times with a 302 — then fast-failed it. Read `request._currentUrl` first and fall back to `config.url`, which covers both transports; Electron's native per-hop requests expose no `_currentUrl` and are unaffected. Also check redirect attribution BEFORE suppressing failure counting for an exempt probe. A 3xx from the guarded endpoint is an answer, so a probe that observed one must clear the record; otherwise a timeout, a probe redirected to a dead destination, and another timeout still read as two consecutive failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): stop axios query params reading as a redirect Codex found that the Xtream breaker never opened at all, and it was right. The web backend passes credentials and the action through axios' `params`, so axios sends `…/player_api.php?username=…&action=…` while the baseline handed to `failedAfterRedirect` is the query-less URL the route built. Verified against axios 1.19.0 with a plain ECONNREFUSED and no redirect anywhere in sight: baseline : http://127.0.0.1:1/player_api.php request._currentUrl: http://127.0.0.1:1/player_api.php?username=demo&… The two normalized URLs differ, so every ordinary failure looked like a post-redirect failure, credited the endpoint, and the breaker could never trip. Compare origin and path, not the whole URL. That keeps what the check is for — an endpoint that answered and sent us elsewhere, including the same-origin `/player_api.php` → `/slow/player_api.php` case — and gives up only a redirect that changes nothing but the query, which is then counted as an ordinary failure. Erring towards counting is the safe direction here. The reason 57 tests passed over a dead feature is the real lesson: `StubHttpClient` threw bare `Error`s, so the guard's redirect check saw neither `config.url` nor `request._currentUrl` and quietly did nothing. The stub now shapes its rejections like axios does, including the query axios appends. With that alone, four existing tests fail against the old comparison. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): count a hostname that stops resolving, and fix a stale docblock Two from review, one behavioural and one documentation. A name that will not resolve is the host failing to answer — the same evidence as the ENOTFOUND the transport would have raised a moment later. But the SSRF validation turns a lookup failure into a 400 "host could not be resolved", and the release path added earlier handed the token back as inconclusive, so the breaker could never open for a host whose DNS died and every request kept paying for the same dead lookup. `ProviderUrlError` now carries the underlying lookup error internally. A refusal that has one is counted; a genuine policy refusal — private address, bad scheme, credentials in the URL — still only releases the half-open slot, because that says nothing about reachability. The field is internal: `providerUrlErrorBody()` strips it at both call sites, so the client sees exactly the body it saw before, which the test asserts. The docblock on `resetHostConnectivityGuard` still said the PWA channel is unknown and the call no-ops. That stopped being true when this branch implemented `CONNECTIVITY_GUARD_RESET` over HTTP, and a stale contract there is how the next caller silently skips the PWA path. (The edit was in an earlier commit and was lost when the branch was rebuilt on master.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(portals): record the transport-specific redirect contract The redirect section still described one transport: hop-by-hop requests, `error.config.url`, whole-URL comparison. Two of those three are now wrong for the web backend, and this document is the canonical contract — leaving it stale is how the attribution bugs fixed in the last two commits get reintroduced. Says what is actually true: which field holds the failed hop on each transport and why the helper reads both, and that the comparison is origin + path because the web backend's credentials ride in axios' `params` and a whole-URL comparison therefore reported a redirect for every ordinary failure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(portals): scope the guard summary to both processes The opening line still defined the breaker as an Electron main-process concern, which contradicted the ownership section below it and is the part a reader skims to decide whether the document applies to them. Names both processes, and records that the web backend had the worse version of the problem first — no request timeout at all — since that is why the timeouts and the breaker had to land there together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): declare the shared-interfaces dependency of host-health The new library's manifest listed only `tslib`, but its emitted JavaScript does `require('@iptvnator/shared/interfaces')` — the guard builds its fast-fail message with `buildHostConnectivityFastFailMessage`. Anything resolving the built artifact from its own manifest would have failed with MODULE_NOT_FOUND. The manifest was copied from `shared/logging`, which imports nothing across libraries and therefore needs nothing beyond `tslib`. `shared/m3u-utils` is the right precedent: it imports the same library and declares `"@iptvnator/shared/interfaces": "0.0.1"`. Verified against the build output rather than by inspection — the emitted `host-connectivity-guard.js` requires the module, and the generated `dist/libs/shared/host-health/package.json` now declares it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(portals): bound the PWA connectivity-guard reset The reset was a bare `fetch` with no timeout, which is the exact failure this change exists to remove, reintroduced one layer up. Every caller awaits the reset BEFORE issuing the request it is clearing the way for — `retryContentInitialization` awaits it first by design — so a backend or reverse proxy that accepts the POST and then goes quiet would leave Retry doing nothing at all, for as long as the socket stayed open. Bound it with an AbortController and a 5 s timer. The abort rejects, `resetHostConnectivityGuard` swallows it as it already does for any other failure, and the caller proceeds to its real request — which is what "best effort" was supposed to mean. The timer is cleared in a `finally`, and it covers the body read as well as the headers. Five seconds because this talks to the user's own backend rather than a provider: it should answer immediately, and a slow one must not hold up the retry that asked for it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |