Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into agent/download-season-queue

# Conflicts:
#	apps/electron-backend/src/app/events/database/download-requests.ts
#	libs/portal/xtream/feature/src/lib/serial-details/serial-details.component.spec.ts
#	libs/portal/xtream/feature/src/lib/serial-details/serial-details.component.ts
#	libs/ui/components/src/lib/season-container/episode-download.util.ts
#	libs/ui/components/src/lib/season-container/episode-utils.spec.ts
#	libs/ui/components/src/lib/season-container/season-container.component.spec.ts
#	libs/ui/components/src/lib/season-container/season-container.component.ts
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4gray committed 2026-08-02 18:06:37 +02:00
commit 31ac306bb0
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ export * from './lib/playback-position.interface';
export * from './lib/playlist-auto-update.interface';
export * from './lib/playlist-backup.interface';
export * from './lib/playlist-meta.type';
export * from './lib/portal-account-playlist.utils';
export * from './lib/preload-performance-marker.interface';
export * from './lib/playlist-recently-viewed.interface';
export * from './lib/playlist-recently-viewed.utils';
@@ -37,12 +38,14 @@ export * from './lib/portal-playback.interface';
export * from './lib/random-id.util';
export * from './lib/security-policy-error.utils';
export * from './lib/settings.interface';
export * from './lib/stalker-cmd-encoding.util';
export * from './lib/stalker-portal-actions.enum';
export * from './lib/store-keys.enum';
export * from './lib/stream-format.enum';
export * from './lib/catalog-title-match.interface';
export * from './lib/theme.enum';
export * from './lib/season-marker.util';
export * from './lib/stalker-account-info-dialog-data.interface';
export * from './lib/title-normalization.util';
export * from './lib/tmdb.interface';
export * from './lib/vod-source.interface';
@@ -65,7 +68,10 @@ export * from './lib/xtream-vod-stream.interface';
// Stalker interfaces
export * from './lib/stalker-item.normalizer';
export * from './lib/stalker-identity.utils';
export * from './lib/stalker-request-identity.util';
export * from './lib/stalker-request-url.util';
export * from './lib/stalker-portal-item.interface';
export * from './lib/stalker-stream-profile.util';
export * from './lib/stalker-serial-details.interface';
export * from './lib/stalker-vod-details.interface';
@@ -193,6 +193,17 @@ export interface ElectronBridgeWindowState {
isFullScreen: boolean;
}
/**
* Portal credentials for an auth-gated stream, passed alongside the scoped
* header override. The main process attaches them only to requests going to
* the exact origin of the override's `scopeUrl`, keeps them in memory only,
* and drops them when the scoped override is cleared or replaced.
*/
export interface ElectronBridgeStreamCredentials {
authorization?: string | null;
cookie?: string | null;
}
/**
* A playlist file the operating system asked the app to open — a command line
* argument, a file association double-click, or macOS' `open-file` event. The
@@ -632,7 +643,8 @@ export interface ElectronBridgeApi {
setUserAgent: (
userAgent?: string | null,
referer?: string | null,
scopeUrl?: string | null
scopeUrl?: string | null,
credentials?: ElectronBridgeStreamCredentials | null
) => Promise<boolean>;
openInMpv: (
url: string,
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
import { PlaylistMeta } from './playlist-meta.type';
/**
* A playlist backed by an Xtream Codes account — the only kind the Xtream
* account-info dialog can query (`player_api.php` needs all three fields).
*/
export function isXtreamAccountPlaylist(
playlist: PlaylistMeta
): playlist is PlaylistMeta & {
serverUrl: string;
username: string;
password: string;
} {
return Boolean(
playlist.serverUrl && playlist.username && playlist.password
);
}
/**
* A playlist backed by a Stalker/Ministra portal. Portal URL + MAC address
* are what every Stalker request is keyed on, so together they identify an
* account the Stalker account-info dialog can describe.
*/
export function isStalkerAccountPlaylist(
playlist: PlaylistMeta
): playlist is PlaylistMeta & {
portalUrl: string;
macAddress: string;
} {
return Boolean(playlist.portalUrl && playlist.macAddress);
}
/**
* Any playlist for which an account-info dialog exists.
*/
export function isPortalAccountPlaylist(playlist: PlaylistMeta): boolean {
return (
isXtreamAccountPlaylist(playlist) || isStalkerAccountPlaylist(playlist)
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
import { PlaylistMeta } from './playlist-meta.type';
/**
* Dialog input for the Stalker account-info dialog. The meta row carries the
* portal URL, MAC address, and device identity needed for a fresh portal
* query; the cached `stalkerAccountInfo` snapshot lives only in the full
* playlist payload, so the dialog loads it by id.
*/
export interface StalkerAccountInfoDialogData {
playlist: PlaylistMeta;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
import { encodeStalkerCmdValue } from './stalker-cmd-encoding.util';
/**
* One application-x-www-form-urlencoded decode, the way PHP's `$_GET` (and
* Express' query parser) sees the value: `+` is a space, `%XX` decodes once.
*/
function portalVisibleValue(encoded: string): string {
return decodeURIComponent(encoded.replace(/\+/g, '%20'));
}
describe('encodeStalkerCmdValue', () => {
it('keeps a plain solution-prefixed cmd readable (space only)', () => {
expect(encodeStalkerCmdValue('ffrt3 http://host/ch/123')).toBe(
'ffrt3%20http://host/ch/123'
);
});
it('keeps ?, = and : raw in a tokened cmd', () => {
expect(
encodeStalkerCmdValue('auto http://host/ch/123?token=abc')
).toBe('auto%20http://host/ch/123?token=abc');
});
it('leaves a bare media path untouched', () => {
expect(encodeStalkerCmdValue('/media/12345.mpg')).toBe(
'/media/12345.mpg'
);
});
it('never double-encodes pre-encoded sequences', () => {
expect(
encodeStalkerCmdValue('auto http://host/s/a%3Ab%20c.m3u8')
).toBe('auto%20http://host/s/a%3Ab%20c.m3u8');
});
it('passes a bare, malformed % through untouched', () => {
expect(encodeStalkerCmdValue('/media/100%.mpg')).toBe(
'/media/100%.mpg'
);
});
it('encodes the query-structure characters &, # and ;', () => {
expect(encodeStalkerCmdValue('a&b#c;d')).toBe('a%26b%23c%3Bd');
});
it('keeps + raw so the portal sees a space, like it does for a real STB', () => {
const encoded = encodeStalkerCmdValue('auto http://host/s/a+b.ts');
expect(encoded).toBe('auto%20http://host/s/a+b.ts');
expect(portalVisibleValue(encoded)).toBe('auto http://host/s/a b.ts');
});
it('keeps IPv6 literals byte-identical', () => {
expect(encodeStalkerCmdValue('ffmpeg http://[::1]:8080/ch/1')).toBe(
'ffmpeg%20http://[::1]:8080/ch/1'
);
});
it('encodes quotes, backslash and control characters', () => {
expect(encodeStalkerCmdValue(`a"b'c\\d\ne`)).toBe(
'a%22b%27c%5Cd%0Ae'
);
});
it('percent-encodes non-ASCII as UTF-8', () => {
expect(encodeStalkerCmdValue('auto http://host/канал/1')).toBe(
'auto%20http://host/%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB/1'
);
});
it('survives WHATWG URL re-parsing byte-identically', () => {
const corpus = [
'ffrt3 http://host/ch/123',
'auto http://host/ch/123?token=abc',
'/media/12345.mpg',
'auto http://host/s/a%3Ab%20c.m3u8',
"a&b#c;d'e\"f",
'ffmpeg http://[::1]:8080/ch/1',
'auto http://host/канал/1',
];
for (const cmd of corpus) {
const query = `cmd=${encodeStalkerCmdValue(cmd)}`;
expect(new URL(`http://portal/load.php?${query}`).search).toBe(
`?${query}`
);
}
});
it('is value-preserving after one server-side decode for every escaped character', () => {
const original = `ffrt http://h/s?a=1&b=2#f;g "q" 'x' я`;
expect(portalVisibleValue(encodeStalkerCmdValue(original))).toBe(
original
);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
/**
* Wire encoding for the Stalker `cmd` query parameter.
*
* A real MAG/STB sends `cmd` unencoded: the portal's own client JS
* concatenates raw `key=value` pairs, WebKit's URL layer escapes only the
* characters a URL cannot carry (space, quotes, non-ASCII), and PHP's `$_GET`
* then applies exactly one form-urldecode. The portal therefore sees the
* stored cmd decoded **once** — pre-encoded sequences such as `%3A` arrive as
* `:`, and a literal `+` arrives as a space.
*
* `encodeURIComponent` (the previous behavior) broke that contract for any
* cmd already containing `%`: `%3A` went out as `%253A` and reached the
* portal still encoded, so strict panels and the stock
* `preg_match`-based `create_link` handlers saw a different string than a
* real STB would send.
*
* This encoder reproduces the reference wire bytes instead:
*
* - `%` passes through untouched (never double-encoded);
* - characters the WHATWG URL serializer keeps raw in a query stay raw
* (`/ : ? = + , @ $ [ ] ! * ( ) ~ - _ .`), so the bytes we emit survive
* `new URL(...)` unchanged;
* - everything else is percent-encoded. That covers the characters that
* would restructure our request (`&`, `#`, and `;` for PHP setups with a
* `;` argument separator) — a malicious portal cannot smuggle extra query
* parameters through cmd — plus characters a URL cannot carry raw (space,
* quotes, control characters, non-ASCII). All of them decode back to the
* original byte on the server, so the portal-visible value is unaffected.
*/
const SAFE_CMD_CHAR = /^[A-Za-z0-9\-_.~!*()/:?@$,+=[\]%]$/;
const utf8Encoder = new TextEncoder();
/**
* Percent-encode every UTF-8 byte of a character. Deliberately not
* `encodeURIComponent`, whose unreserved set (e.g. `'`) overlaps characters
* this encoder must escape because `new URL(...)` would re-encode them and
* change the wire bytes behind our back.
*/
function percentEncodeChar(char: string): string {
let encoded = '';
for (const byte of utf8Encoder.encode(char)) {
encoded += `%${byte.toString(16).toUpperCase().padStart(2, '0')}`;
}
return encoded;
}
export function encodeStalkerCmdValue(value: string): string {
let encoded = '';
for (const char of value) {
encoded += SAFE_CMD_CHAR.test(char) ? char : percentEncodeChar(char);
}
return encoded;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
import { LEGACY_DEFAULT_STALKER_SERIAL } from './stalker-identity.utils';
import { buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext } from './stalker-request-identity.util';
describe('buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext', () => {
const macAddress = '00:1A:79:AA:BB:CC';
it('does not add SN header or force get_profile SN fields when serial is absent', () => {
const context = buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext({
macAddress,
params: {
type: 'stb',
action: 'get_profile',
sn: 'STALE-SN',
metrics: JSON.stringify({
mac: macAddress,
sn: 'STALE-SN',
}),
},
});
expect(context.effectiveSerialNumber).toBeUndefined();
expect(context.headers).not.toHaveProperty('SN');
expect(context.cookieString).not.toContain('__cfduid=');
expect(context.requestParams).not.toHaveProperty('sn');
expect(
JSON.parse(String(context.requestParams['metrics']))
).not.toHaveProperty('sn');
});
it('preserves a provided serial exactly in headers, params, and metrics', () => {
const context = buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext({
macAddress,
serialNumber: 'CustomSn123',
params: {
type: 'stb',
action: 'get_profile',
metrics: JSON.stringify({
mac: macAddress,
}),
},
});
expect(context.effectiveSerialNumber).toBe('CustomSn123');
expect(context.headers['SN']).toBe('CustomSn123');
expect(context.cookieString).toContain('__cfduid=');
expect(
context.cookieString.match(/__cfduid=([^;]+)/)?.[1]
).toHaveLength(32);
expect(context.requestParams['sn']).toBe('CustomSn123');
expect(JSON.parse(String(context.requestParams['metrics']))).toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({
sn: 'CustomSn123',
})
);
});
it('treats the legacy default serial as absent', () => {
const context = buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext({
macAddress,
serialNumber: LEGACY_DEFAULT_STALKER_SERIAL,
params: {
type: 'stb',
action: 'get_profile',
sn: LEGACY_DEFAULT_STALKER_SERIAL,
metrics: JSON.stringify({
mac: macAddress,
sn: LEGACY_DEFAULT_STALKER_SERIAL,
}),
},
});
expect(context.effectiveSerialNumber).toBeUndefined();
expect(context.headers).not.toHaveProperty('SN');
expect(context.cookieString).not.toContain('__cfduid=');
expect(context.requestParams).not.toHaveProperty('sn');
expect(
JSON.parse(String(context.requestParams['metrics']))
).not.toHaveProperty('sn');
});
it('removes stale SN params from non-profile requests', () => {
const context = buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext({
macAddress,
params: {
type: 'itv',
action: 'get_ordered_list',
sn: 'STALE-SN',
},
});
expect(context.requestParams).not.toHaveProperty('sn');
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
import {
buildStalkerSerialCfduid,
normalizeStalkerSerialNumber,
} from './stalker-identity.utils';
/**
* User-Agent of a MAG250 set-top box (matches the stalker-to-m3u reference
* implementation). Sent as both `User-Agent` and `X-User-Agent` on every
* portal API request — some panels reject requests without it.
*/
export const STALKER_MAG_USER_AGENT =
'Mozilla/5.0 (QtEmbedded; U; Linux; C) AppleWebKit/533.3 (KHTML, like Gecko) MAG250';
export interface StalkerIdentityRequestInput {
macAddress: string;
params: Record<string, string | number>;
token?: string;
serialNumber?: string;
}
export interface StalkerIdentityRequestContext {
requestParams: Record<string, string | number>;
headers: Record<string, string>;
cookieString: string;
effectiveSerialNumber?: string;
}
/**
* Builds the portal-facing identity of a Stalker request: the cookie a real
* STB sends (`mac` + `stb_lang` + `timezone`, plus a serial-derived
* `__cfduid`), the MAG User-Agent pair, the `SN`/`Authorization` headers, and
* the serial-number parameter rules (`sn` travels only on `get_profile`).
*
* This is the single source of truth for BOTH transports — the Electron main
* process and the self-hosted PWA's web-backend `/stalker` proxy — so the two
* cannot drift apart again. The stock server reads the timezone cookie with
* `new DateTimeZone()`, so it must always be a valid PHP timezone.
*/
export function buildStalkerIdentityRequestContext({
macAddress,
params,
token,
serialNumber,
}: StalkerIdentityRequestInput): StalkerIdentityRequestContext {
const effectiveSerialNumber = normalizeStalkerSerialNumber(serialNumber);
const requestParams = buildRequestParams(params, effectiveSerialNumber);
const cookieString = buildCookieString(macAddress, effectiveSerialNumber);
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
Cookie: cookieString,
'User-Agent': STALKER_MAG_USER_AGENT,
'X-User-Agent': STALKER_MAG_USER_AGENT,
Accept: '*/*',
Connection: 'keep-alive',
'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.9',
};
if (effectiveSerialNumber) {
headers['SN'] = effectiveSerialNumber;
}
if (token) {
headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${token}`;
}
return {
requestParams,
headers,
cookieString,
...(effectiveSerialNumber ? { effectiveSerialNumber } : {}),
};
}
function buildRequestParams(
params: Record<string, string | number>,
effectiveSerialNumber: string | undefined
): Record<string, string | number> {
const requestParams = { ...params };
const isProfileRequest =
requestParams['type'] === 'stb' &&
requestParams['action'] === 'get_profile';
if (!isProfileRequest) {
delete requestParams['sn'];
return requestParams;
}
if (effectiveSerialNumber) {
requestParams['sn'] = effectiveSerialNumber;
} else {
delete requestParams['sn'];
}
if (typeof requestParams['metrics'] === 'string') {
try {
const parsedMetrics = JSON.parse(requestParams['metrics']);
const nextMetrics = { ...(parsedMetrics ?? {}) };
if (effectiveSerialNumber) {
nextMetrics.sn = effectiveSerialNumber;
} else {
delete nextMetrics.sn;
}
requestParams['metrics'] = JSON.stringify(nextMetrics);
} catch {
// Keep original metrics payload when malformed.
}
}
return requestParams;
}
function buildCookieString(
macAddress: string,
effectiveSerialNumber: string | undefined
): string {
const cookieParts = [
`mac=${macAddress}`,
'stb_lang=en_US@rg=dezzzz',
'timezone=Europe/Berlin',
];
if (effectiveSerialNumber) {
cookieParts.push(
`__cfduid=${buildStalkerSerialCfduid(effectiveSerialNumber)}`
);
}
return cookieParts.join('; ');
}
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
import { buildStalkerRequestUrl } from './stalker-request-url.util';
const PORTAL = 'http://portal.example/stalker_portal/server/load.php';
/** Decode a query value the way PHP's `$_GET` would (one form-urldecode). */
function portalVisibleValue(encoded: string): string {
return decodeURIComponent(encoded.replace(/\+/g, '%20'));
}
function cmdWireValue(fullUrl: string): string {
const match = /[?&]cmd=([^&]*)/.exec(fullUrl);
if (!match) {
throw new Error(`no cmd param in ${fullUrl}`);
}
return match[1];
}
describe('buildStalkerRequestUrl', () => {
it('builds the reference wire format for a typical create_link request', () => {
const fullUrl = buildStalkerRequestUrl(PORTAL, {
type: 'itv',
action: 'create_link',
cmd: 'ffrt3 http://host/ch/123',
});
expect(fullUrl).toBe(
'http://portal.example/stalker_portal/server/load.php' +
'?type=itv&action=create_link' +
'&cmd=ffrt3%20http://host/ch/123&JsHttpRequest=1-xml'
);
});
it.each([
['ffrt3 http://host/ch/123', 'ffrt3%20http://host/ch/123'],
[
'auto http://host/ch/123?token=abc',
'auto%20http://host/ch/123?token=abc',
],
['/media/12345.mpg', '/media/12345.mpg'],
[
'auto http://host/s/a%3Ab%20c.m3u8',
'auto%20http://host/s/a%3Ab%20c.m3u8',
],
])('sends cmd %s as %s', (cmd, expectedWireValue) => {
const fullUrl = buildStalkerRequestUrl(PORTAL, {
action: 'create_link',
cmd,
});
expect(cmdWireValue(fullUrl)).toBe(expectedWireValue);
});
it('does not double-encode a cmd that already contains percent sequences', () => {
const fullUrl = buildStalkerRequestUrl(PORTAL, {
action: 'create_link',
cmd: 'auto http://host/s/a%3Ab.m3u8?sig=x%2Fy',
});
expect(fullUrl).not.toContain('%25');
// After the portal's single decode, pre-encoded sequences resolve —
// exactly what it would receive from a real STB.
expect(portalVisibleValue(cmdWireValue(fullUrl))).toBe(
'auto http://host/s/a:b.m3u8?sig=x/y'
);
});
it('blocks query-parameter injection through cmd without losing data', () => {
const maliciousCmd =
'http://host/ch/1?x=1&action=do_evil&mac=00:00:00:00:00:00#frag';
const fullUrl = buildStalkerRequestUrl(PORTAL, {
action: 'create_link',
type: 'itv',
cmd: maliciousCmd,
});
const params = new URL(fullUrl).searchParams;
expect(params.getAll('action')).toEqual(['create_link']);
expect(params.get('mac')).toBeNull();
expect(params.get('x')).toBeNull();
expect(fullUrl).not.toContain('#');
// The dangerous characters are escaped, not stripped: the portal
// still receives the full original cmd string after one decode.
expect(portalVisibleValue(cmdWireValue(fullUrl))).toBe(maliciousCmd);
});
it('keeps full encoding for non-cmd params', () => {
const fullUrl = buildStalkerRequestUrl(PORTAL, {
action: 'get_profile',
metrics: '{"mac":"00:1A:79:AA:BB:CC"}',
});
expect(fullUrl).toContain(
'metrics=%7B%22mac%22%3A%2200%3A1A%3A79%3AAA%3ABB%3ACC%22%7D'
);
});
it('appends JsHttpRequest only when missing', () => {
const withoutIt = buildStalkerRequestUrl(PORTAL, { action: 'x' });
expect(withoutIt.match(/JsHttpRequest/g)).toHaveLength(1);
const withIt = buildStalkerRequestUrl(PORTAL, {
action: 'x',
JsHttpRequest: '1-xml',
});
expect(withIt.match(/JsHttpRequest/g)).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('drops any query string carried by the portal URL itself', () => {
const fullUrl = buildStalkerRequestUrl(
'http://portal.example/portal.php?stale=1',
{ action: 'handshake' }
);
expect(fullUrl).toBe(
'http://portal.example/portal.php?action=handshake&JsHttpRequest=1-xml'
);
});
it('emits URLs whose bytes survive WHATWG re-parsing (the axios transport)', () => {
const cmds = [
'ffrt3 http://host/ch/123',
'auto http://host/ch/123?token=a%3Ab c',
'/media/12345.mpg',
'x&y=z#w;v',
'auto http://host/канал/1',
];
for (const cmd of cmds) {
const fullUrl = buildStalkerRequestUrl(PORTAL, {
action: 'create_link',
cmd,
});
expect(new URL(fullUrl).toString()).toBe(fullUrl);
}
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
import { encodeStalkerCmdValue } from './stalker-cmd-encoding.util';
/**
* Builds the full Stalker portal request URL from an already-validated portal
* URL and the prepared request params. Shared by the Electron main process
* and the web-backend `/stalker` proxy so both transports emit the exact same
* wire format.
*
* The query string is assembled manually because the two parameter classes
* need different encodings:
*
* - `cmd` uses the minimal reference encoding (`encodeStalkerCmdValue`): a
* real MAG sends cmd unencoded and the portal decodes the query exactly
* once, so pre-encoded sequences (`%3A`) must pass through untouched while
* `&`/`#`/`;` are still escaped so a malicious portal cannot append query
* parameters through cmd.
* - every other param is fully `encodeURIComponent`-encoded.
*
* Any query string on the portal URL itself is intentionally dropped (the
* request params are the complete query), matching long-standing behavior.
*/
export function buildStalkerRequestUrl(
url: string,
requestParams: Record<string, string | number>
): string {
const urlObject = new URL(url);
const queryParts: string[] = [];
Object.entries(requestParams).forEach(([key, value]) => {
if (key === 'cmd') {
queryParts.push(`${key}=${encodeStalkerCmdValue(String(value))}`);
} else {
queryParts.push(`${key}=${encodeURIComponent(String(value))}`);
}
});
// Always add JsHttpRequest parameter if not present (required by Stalker API)
if (!requestParams['JsHttpRequest']) {
queryParts.push('JsHttpRequest=1-xml');
}
return `${urlObject.origin}${urlObject.pathname}?${queryParts.join('&')}`;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
import { isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe } from './stalker-stream-profile.util';
describe('isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe', () => {
const PORTAL = 'http://portal.example/stalker_portal/c/';
it('accepts a stream on the exact portal origin', () => {
expect(
isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(
PORTAL,
'http://portal.example/live/ch1.ts'
)
).toBe(true);
});
it('accepts a same-host stream on a different port', () => {
// The #1158 class: panels routinely serve streams from :8080 next to
// the portal on :80, and those streams are gated on the portal cookie.
expect(
isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(
PORTAL,
'http://portal.example:8080/live/ch1.ts'
)
).toBe(true);
});
it('accepts a same-host scheme upgrade (http portal → https stream)', () => {
expect(
isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(
PORTAL,
'https://portal.example/live/ch1.ts'
)
).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects an https→http downgrade on the same host', () => {
expect(
isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(
'https://portal.example/stalker_portal/c/',
'http://portal.example/live/ch1.ts'
)
).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects a different host', () => {
expect(
isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(
PORTAL,
'http://cdn.other.example/live/ch1.ts'
)
).toBe(false);
});
it('compares hostnames case-insensitively', () => {
expect(
isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(
PORTAL,
'http://PORTAL.example:8080/live/ch1.ts'
)
).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects non-HTTP(S) stream schemes', () => {
expect(
isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(PORTAL, 'rtsp://portal.example/ch1')
).toBe(false);
});
it('fails closed on missing or unparseable URLs', () => {
expect(isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(PORTAL, undefined)).toBe(false);
expect(isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(PORTAL, '')).toBe(false);
expect(isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(undefined, PORTAL)).toBe(false);
expect(isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(PORTAL, 'not a url')).toBe(false);
expect(isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe('not a url', PORTAL)).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
/**
* Decides whether a resolved Stalker stream URL may carry the portal's
* credentials (mac cookie, Bearer token, serial-number headers).
*
* Both the renderer playback-header builder and the Electron main-process
* playback-context fallback classify streams with this single predicate; if
* the two ever disagreed, `isStalkerDirectStreamProfile` in the external
* player path would silently discard the caller's credentialed headers.
*
* The rule mirrors the transport-security carve-out of the validated
* redirect layer (docs/architecture/electron-security.md): IPTV portals
* routinely hand out stream URLs on the same host but a different port or an
* upgraded scheme, and losing the session cookie/token there breaks playback
* outright (#1158, #849, #910). A different host would hand provider
* credentials to a third party, and an https→http downgrade would replay a
* TLS-obtained session in cleartext — both stay credential-free.
*/
export function isStalkerStreamCredentialSafe(
portalUrl: string | undefined | null,
streamUrl: string | undefined | null
): boolean {
if (!portalUrl || !streamUrl) {
return false;
}
let portal: URL;
let stream: URL;
try {
portal = new URL(portalUrl);
stream = new URL(streamUrl);
} catch {
return false;
}
if (stream.protocol !== 'http:' && stream.protocol !== 'https:') {
return false;
}
if (portal.hostname.toLowerCase() !== stream.hostname.toLowerCase()) {
return false;
}
return !(portal.protocol === 'https:' && stream.protocol === 'http:');
}
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import {
extractXtreamCredentialsFromUrl,
normalizeXtreamServerUrl,
resolveXtreamPortalExpiration,
resolveXtreamPortalStatus,
} from './xtream-portal.utils';
@@ -104,4 +105,39 @@ describe('xtream portal utilities', () => {
).toBe('expired');
});
});
describe('resolveXtreamPortalExpiration', () => {
it('parses numeric-string exp_date into unix seconds', () => {
expect(
resolveXtreamPortalExpiration({
user_info: { exp_date: '1790000000' },
})
).toBe(1_790_000_000);
});
it('treats unlimited and absent expirations as null', () => {
expect(
resolveXtreamPortalExpiration({
user_info: { exp_date: '0' },
})
).toBeNull();
expect(
resolveXtreamPortalExpiration({
user_info: { exp_date: '' },
})
).toBeNull();
expect(
resolveXtreamPortalExpiration({ user_info: {} })
).toBeNull();
expect(resolveXtreamPortalExpiration(null)).toBeNull();
});
it('rejects non-numeric exp_date values', () => {
expect(
resolveXtreamPortalExpiration({
user_info: { exp_date: 'never' },
})
).toBeNull();
});
});
});
@@ -102,6 +102,17 @@ export function resolveXtreamPortalStatus(
return 'active';
}
/**
* Reads the account expiration from an Xtream `get_account_info`-style
* response as unix seconds. Returns null when the portal doesn't report one
* (unlimited accounts answer with empty/zero/absent `exp_date`).
*/
export function resolveXtreamPortalExpiration(
response: XtreamPortalStatusResponseLike | null | undefined
): number | null {
return parseXtreamExpiration(response?.user_info?.exp_date);
}
function normalizeAuthValue(
value: boolean | number | string | null | undefined
): boolean | null {