# EasyTier Domain Context ## Module layers `easytier-core` layers dependencies from `foundation` upward through the portable networking domains. `foundation` contains infrastructure Modules that have no dependency on a networking domain and may be used by any higher layer. ## Operation broker An operation broker owns the lifecycle of asynchronous work submitted by an external caller to core. It allocates opaque operation IDs, arbitrates completion, cancellation, and disposal, retains terminal outcomes, and publishes a batch-drainable completion queue. The broker does not interpret operation kinds, outcomes, resources, wire formats, or domain errors. Each domain Module owns those semantics and composes the broker under the same lock as any state that must change atomically with an operation transition. Host capability operations use a separate seam. They turn Host readiness into Rust task wakeups and do not share the caller-to-core broker state machine. ## Credential grant A credential grant contains the authorization constraints shared by generated, imported, managed, and attached-peer credentials: ACL groups, relay permission, allowed proxy CIDRs, and whether concurrent reuse is allowed. It does not own credential identity, key material, lifetime, persistence, or runtime ownership. Each credential intake path normalizes the grant before installing it. ## Peer Relay advertisement A platform peer may prefer an eligible directly connected credential relay by omitting covered credential-leaf edges from only its own advertised OSPF connection row. Its local route calculation still uses the complete physical adjacency so direct-destination fallback remains available. Other peers' source-owned rows and versions are never rewritten, cached for promotion, or otherwise changed by this projection. Before a graceful Instance stop, the owner publishes a new-version empty connection row while keeping its physical adjacencies available for route synchronization. It waits for the current direct route Sessions to acknowledge that withdrawal up to a bounded deadline, then continues shutdown. Abrupt process loss cannot publish this withdrawal and retains the normal route expiry behavior. Relay eligibility comes from the transport-authenticated credential identity and grant, not self-reported route metadata. The advertisement Module does not support changing a credential's relay permission in place; such a permission change is a credential revocation and new authenticated Session. ## Attached peer An attached peer is an ordinary `PeerManagerCore` connected to another `PeerManagerCore` through an authenticated in-process transport. Each authenticated portal client owns one complete peer manager. The managers are protocol peers; `attached` describes only the local transport and its trusted ingress provenance, not a parent/child peer role. An attached peer owns one complete IPv4 CIDR (for example `10.144.0.5/16`). Its address and advertised network are independent of the network manager's own static or DHCP address. A VPN portal derives the attached peer route and the external client's allowed network from that single CIDR; it does not infer either value from the portal-hosting instance. An external portal client uses that same IPv4 address on its native tunnel interface. The portal validates the source address and forwards IPv4 packets unchanged between the native tunnel and the attached peer; it does not assign a second tunnel-only address or perform address translation. Each manager owns its ACL execution state, route service, RPC endpoint, secure sessions, packet processing, and lifecycle. Portal code supplies raw packets and peer configuration but does not build, reload, or coordinate ACL filters. When the network manager uses Secure Mode, an attached peer authenticates as a credential peer. Its portal-owned, in-memory credential grant carries ACL groups and is revoked with the attached runtime; the peer never receives the network secret or ACL group secrets. A non-Secure-Mode network retains the legacy admin-attached identity for compatibility. A credential peer cannot host a portal because it cannot issue credential grants. Each live portal Session owns a fresh attached-peer identity, while the external client key remains stable across Sessions; a replacement Session must never reuse the previous non-reusable credential identity. ## Compact compatibility Host A compact compatibility Host retains accepted values in the authoritative TOML model for management readback, while the shared host-aware normalization path omits capabilities that the compact runtime cannot execute. Omitted settings are silent no-ops and must not be advertised as live network capabilities. ## Web compatibility Host The Web compatibility Host runs the portable EasyTier guest in JavaScript runtimes that provide WebAssembly JSPI. Its shared runtime Module owns guest lifecycle, Host capability operations, data-plane resources, and WebSocket message handling. Browser and Cloudflare Adapters own only the platform-specific way that WebSockets are dialed or accepted and the matching guest artifact. The Browser Adapter is an outbound-only EasyTier instance with a smoltcp TCP data plane. The Cloudflare Adapter is an inbound-only relay hosted by one named Durable Object. Their public configuration exposes only capabilities each Host can execute; guest ABI details and serialized TOML remain internal. ## Web configuration consumers Central network management and an external Console are alternative consumers of `ClientManager`. An external webhook selects Console mode; otherwise the central service registers devices through an in-process webhook handler and publishes each device's complete compiled configuration through the existing Full reconcile API. `ClientManager` owns persistence, offline replay, and runtime reconciliation without knowing central network business state. The central service owns network intent, device registration and bans, and Gateway runtimes. Central HTTP mutations and direct public configuration writes share its mutation lock so ownership checks cannot race with enrollment. Internal Console APIs retain their upstream behavior and central routes and publication workers are disabled in Console mode. Device deletion uses the upstream disconnect semantics: an already in-flight validation may register the device again. A persisted ban rejects subsequent validations. Deletion does not introduce device generations or session fences.